Notes on a new mealybug (Hemiptera: Coccoidea: Pseudococcidae) pest in Florida and the Caribbean : the papaya mealybug, Paracoccus marginatus Williams and Granara de Willink

Paracoccus marginatus Williams and Granara de Willink, here called the papaya mealybug, was first detected in the United States in Hollywood, Florida in 1998. By the end of 1998 it was found in four localities in the state and has since spread to nine localities in five counties. This mealybug appears to have moved through the Caribbean area since its 1994 detection in the Dominican Republic. The pest is reported to cause serious damage to tropical fruit, especially papaya, and has been detected most frequently, in Florida, on hibiscus. It is now known from Antigua, Belize, the British Virgin Islands, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Mexico, Nevis, Puerto Rico, St. Barthelemy, St. Kitts, St. Martin, and the US Virgin Islands. Hosts include: Acacia sp.(Luguminosae), Acalypha sp.(Euphorbiaceae), Ambrosia cumanensis (Compositae), Annona squamosa (Annonaceae), Carica papaya (Caricaceae), Guazuma ulmifolia (Sterculiaccea), Hibiscus rosa-sinensis (Euphorbiaceae), Hibiscus sp. (Euphorbiaceae), Ipomoea sp. (Convolvulaceae), Manihot chloristica (Euphorbiaceae), Manihot esculenta (Euphorbiaceae), Mimosa pigra (Lugiminosae), Parthenium hysterophorus (Compositae), Persea americana (Lauraceae), Plumeria sp. (Apocynaceae), Sida sp. (Malvaceae), Solanum melongena (Solanaceae). The species is believed to be native to Mexico andlor Central America

When Voluntary, Incentive-Based Controls Fail: Structuring a Regulatory Response to Agricultural Nonpoint Source Water Pollution

This Essay considers the extent to which more direct federal regulation of agricultural nonpoint source pollution is warranted. My first conclusion is that an increased federal presence is necessary. My second conclusion is that the costs of implementing such plans and practices should be distributed in a pragmatic way that recognizes the extraordinary organizational presence and political clout of the agricultural industry. Third, measures that promise water quality improvements beyond baseline regulatory requirements should be encouraged. Innovative programs such as point-nonpoint source pollution trading programs may yield sizeable environmental benefits at reduced costs, and states should be free to experiment with this sort of alternative

Toward Regional Governance in Environmental Law

This article will proceed in three parts. Part I provides a brief introduction to the structured institutional arrangements under the CAA and the CWA. I discuss how these programs have evolved in ways that depart from what may have been originally anticipated and how their structure poses impediments to effective environmental management. Part II provides a short summary of current thinking about the institutional architecture of our environmental programs, focusing primarily on the “environmental federalism” scholarship of recent years. I offer reasons for abandoning federalism as an appropriate institutional framework. Part III presents a conceptual, rather than tightly engineered, argument for regional governance institutions, which I call Regional Environmental Management Agencies (“REMAs”). I speculate about the benefits of such institutions and provide a rough architectural rendering of how such institutions might be structured and the powers they may exercise. The argument is provisional. I make no claim to have comprehensively identified the issues that may arise in restructuring institutions along regional lines, nor do I claim to have fully grasped the range of costs, benefits, and difficulties that might result

When Voluntary, Incentive-Based Controls Fail: Structuring a Regulatory Response to Agricultural Nonpoint Source Water Pollution

This article is part of the Symposium, Sustainable Agriculture: Food for the Future. Recognizing that, to date, farms had largely escaped regulation under the Clean Water Act, and that agricultural nonpoint source pollution is a leading contributor to impaired water quality, this article advocates for a regulatory response to such pollution. It considers existing programs to control nonpoint source pollution and demonstrates that they are inadequate. The article makes three recommendations: (1) an increased federal regulatory presence is needed; (2) the costs of implementing nonpoint source controls should be distributed in a pragmatic way that recognizes the extraordinary organizational presence and political clout of the agriculture industry; and (3) measures that promise water quality improvements beyond baseline regulatory requirements should be encouraged through such innovative programs as pollution trading