Vertrauen: Substitut oder Komplement zu formellen Institutionen?

In diesem Beitrag diskutieren wir den in der Literatur heftig umstrittenen Aspekt, ob Vertrauen (Institutionen) nur ein Komplement zu formellen Institutionen (Vertrauen) sein oder diese(s) möglicherweise sogar substituieren kann (können). Wir fassen Vertrauen als spezifische, kooperative Investition auf. Dem Vertrauensgeber geht es dabei um die Verlässlichkeit des Vertrauensnehmers ("reliability"). Der Wert einer Vertrauensbeziehung besteht in nicht weniger als in dem sozialen Überschuss, den sie entstehen lassen kann. Ohne weiteres (Reputationseffekte, Trigger Strategien etc.) kommt diese Beziehung aber nicht zustande. Auch anreizkompatible Verträge können das Dilemma nicht lösen. Dafür aber kann die Zahlung des individuell geregelten Schadensersatzes (perfekte Jurisdiktion) dafür Sorge tragen, die Parteien zur Realisierung der sozial optimalen Lösung zu bewegen. Ein ähnlich hoher sozialer Überschuss kann auch dann erreicht werden, wenn bei imperfekter Jurisdiktion der Vertrauensgeber den größeren Teil dieses Überschusses verantwortet.In this paper, we discuss the heavily debated issue whether trust (formal institutions) can only serve as complement(s) or rather as substitute(s) of formal institutions (trust). We take trust as a specific, cooperative investment. The trustor is mainly interested in the reliability of the trustee. The value of a trust relationship amounts and equals to not less than the social surplus which it can generate. Without additional provisions such as trigger strategies, reputation effects etc., however, a trust relationship will not evolve in a one shot game. Not even incentive compatible contracts can solve the dilemma. In a perfect jurisdiction world, a social optimal solution is feasible in the case where both parties agree on "liquidated damages". A comparable social surplus can also be achieved in a non-perfect jurisdiction world. A necessary condition is that the trustor is responsible for the larger part of the social surplus

Vertrauen : Substitut oder Komplement zu formellen Institutionen?

In diesem Beitrag diskutieren wir den in der Literatur heftig umstrittenen Aspekt, ob Vertrauen (Institutionen) nur ein Komplement zu formellen Institutionen (Vertrauen) sein oder diese(s) möglicherweise sogar substituieren kann (können). Wir fassen Vertrauen als spezifische, kooperative Investition auf. Dem Vertrauensgeber geht es dabei um die Verlässlichkeit des Vertrauensnehmers ("reliability"). Der Wert einer Vertrauensbeziehung besteht in nicht weniger als in dem sozialen Überschuss, den sie entstehen lassen kann. Ohne weiteres (Reputationseffekte, Trigger Strategien etc.) kommt diese Beziehung aber nicht zustande. Auch anreizkompatible Verträge können das Dilemma nicht lösen. Dafür aber kann die Zahlung des individuell geregelten Schadensersatzes (perfekte Jurisdiktion) dafür Sorge tragen, die Parteien zur Realisierung der sozial optimalen Lösung zu bewegen. Ein ähnlich hoher sozialer Überschuss kann auch dann erreicht werden, wenn bei imperfekter Jurisdiktion der Vertrauensgeber den größeren Teil dieses Überschusses verantwortet. -- In this paper, we discuss the heavily debated issue whether trust (formal institutions) can only serve as complement(s) or rather as substitute(s) of formal institutions (trust). We take trust as a specific, cooperative investment. The trustor is mainly interested in the reliability of the trustee. The value of a trust relationship amounts and equals to not less than the social surplus which it can generate. Without additional provisions such as trigger strategies, reputation effects etc., however, a trust relationship will not evolve in a one shot game. Not even incentive compatible contracts can solve the dilemma. In a perfect jurisdiction world, a social optimal solution is feasible in the case where both parties agree on "liquidated damages". A comparable social surplus can also be achieved in a non-perfect jurisdiction world. A necessary condition is that the trustor is responsible for the larger part of the social surplus.Vertrauen,Ökonomische Theorie des Rechts,Neue Institutionenökonomik

Can occupational norms foster cooperative behavior? An experimental study comparing cooperation by military officers and civilians

In this experimental study we examine the behavior of Bundeswehr officers and officer candidates regarding their willingness to cooperate. Due to the military training which focuses on comradeship and reliable teamwork even under extreme conditions, we expect a strong bond between soldiers and therefore more cooperation among them. Furthermore there are additional norms for soldiers that explicitly call for social responsibility and an appropriate behavior relative to civilians. For that reason we also expect more altruism and trust of soldiers compared to pure civilian groups. To explore these issues in an experimental setting, the subjects had to play the dictator game, the ultimatum game, and the trust game. These three established experiments allow us to measure and distinguish between different aspects of social and cooperative motivation. We find that soldiers are on average more altruistic, more cooperative, and more trusting as well as more trustworthy. These results do not only hold for the interaction among soldiers but in most cases also with regard to the behavior of soldiers towards civilians.In dieser experimentellen Studie untersuchen wir das kooperative Verhalten von Offizieren (bzw. Offiziersanwärtern) der Bundeswehr. Dabei betrachten wir ihre Interaktionen sowohl untereinander als auch gegenüber zivilen Probanden. Unsere Kernhypothesen sind, dass sich die angehenden Offiziere aufgrund ihrer stark auf Gemeinschaftssinn ausgerichteten Ausbildung (Kameradschaft) und einem auf gesellschaftliche Verantwortung hin orientierten Selbstverständnis (Sozialkapital) sowohl untereinander als auch gegenüber den zivilen Probanden kooperativer verhalten als eine rein zivile Vergleichsgruppe. Wir ziehen hierfür mit dem Diktatorspiel, dem Ultimatumspiel sowie dem Investitionsspiel (trust game) drei etablierte Standardexperimente heran, mit denen sich jeweils bestimmte Facetten (pro)sozialer bzw. kooperativer Motivation messen und voneinander unterscheiden lassen. Im Experiment verhalten sich Soldaten im Durchschnitt signifikant altruistischer, kooperativer, vertrauensvoller und vertrauenswürdiger. Dies gilt in den meisten Fällen nicht nur für das Verhalten unter Soldaten sondern auch von Soldaten gegenüber Zivilisten

Risk Differentiation for Critical Infrastructure Protection

Critical infrastructures, e.g., electricity transmission / distribution, public transport and health care systems, need to be protected against various internal and external risks which can be safety- and / or security-relevant. Predominately probability-based methods are hitherto used for analysing the whole spectrum of risks. We think this is an insufficient approach, presumably leading to inefficient resource allocation and biased risk perception, as it does not consider the different natures of risk. This paper looks at the key difference between safety- and security-relevant risks, highlights resulting implications for critical infrastructure protection and describes a possible approach for handling these different types of risk

A new focus on risk reduction: An ad hoc decision support system for humanitarian relief logistics

Particularly in the early phases of a disaster, logistical decisions are needed to be made quickly and under high pressure for the decision‐makers, knowing that their decisions may have direct consequences on the affected society and all future decisions. Proactive risk reduction may be helpful in providing decision‐makers with optimal strategies in advance. However, disasters are characterized by severe uncertainty and complexity, limited knowledge about the causes of the disaster, and continuous change of the situation in unpredicted ways. Following these assumptions, we believe that adequate proactive risk reduction measures are not practical. We propose strengthening the focus on ad hoc decision support to capture information in almost real time and to process information efficiently to reveal uncertainties that had not been previously predicted. Therefore, we present an ad hoc decision support system that uses scenario techniques to capture uncertainty by future developments of a situation and an optimization model to compute promising decision options. By combining these aspects in a dynamic manner and integrating new information continuously, it can be ensured that a decision is always based on the best currently available and processed information. And finally, to identify a robust decision option that is provided as a decision recommendation to the decision‐makers, methods of multi‐attribute decision making (MADM) are applied. Our approach is illustrated for a facility location decision problem arising in humanitarian relief logistics where the objective is to identify robust locations for tent hospitals to serve injured people in the immediate aftermath of the Haiti Earthquake 2010.Frank Schätter, Marcus Wiens and Frank Schultman

Use of digital healthcare solutions for care delivery during a pandemic-chances and (cyber) risks referring to the example of the COVID-19 pandemic

During pandemics, regular service provisioning processes in medical care may be disrupted. Digital health promises many opportunities for service provisioning during a pandemic. However, a broad penetration of medical processes with information technology also has drawbacks. Within this work, the authors use the COVID-19 pandemic to analyze the chances and the risks that may come with using digital health solutions for medical care during a pandemic. Therefore, a multi-methods approach is used. First we use a systematic literature review for reviewing the state of the art of digital health applications in healthcare. Furthermore, the usage of digital health applications is mapped to the different processes in care delivery. Here we provide an exemplary process model of oncological care delivery. The analysis shows that including digital health solutions may be helpful for care delivery in most processes of medical care provisioning. However, research on digital health solutions focuses strongly on some few processes and specific disciplines while other processes and medical disciplines are underrepresented in literature. Last, we highlight the necessity of a comprehensive risk-related debate around the effects that come with the use of digital healthcare solutions

Motivation-based Attacker Modelling for Cyber Risk Management: A Quantitative Content Analysis and a Natural Experiment

Cyber-attacks have a tremendous impact on worldwide economic performance. Hence, it is vitally important to implement effective risk management for different cyber-attacks, which calls for profound attacker models. However, cyber risk modelling based on attacker models seems to be restricted to overly simplified models. This hinders the understanding of cyber risks and represents a heavy burden for efficient cyber risk management. This work aims to forward scientific research in this field by employing a multi-method approach based on a quantitative content analysis of scientific literature and a natural experiment. Our work gives evidence for the oversimplified modelling of attacker motivational patterns. The quantitative content analysis gives evidence for a broad and established misunderstanding of attackers as being illicitly malicious. The results of the natural ex- periment substantiate the findings of the content analysis. We thereby contribute to the improvement of attacker modelling, which can be considered a necessary prerequisite for effective cyber risk management

Offizier und Gentleman? Eine experimentelle Untersuchung berufsbezogener Normen am Beispiel des Offiziers

In dieser experimentellen Studie untersuchen wir das kooperative Verhalten von Offizieren (bzw. Offiziersanwärtern) der Bundeswehr. Dabei betrachten wir ihre Interaktionen sowohl untereinander als auch gegenüber zivilen Probanden. Unsere Kernhypothesen sind, dass sich die angehenden Offiziere aufgrund ihrer stark auf Gemeinschaftssinn ausgerichteten Ausbildung (Kameradschaft) und einem auf gesellschaftliche Verantwortung hin orientierten Selbstverständnis (Sozialkapital) sowohl untereinander als auch gegenüber den zivilen Probanden kooperativer verhalten als eine rein zivile Vergleichsgruppe. Wir ziehen hierfür mit dem Diktatorspiel, dem Ultimatumspiel sowie dem Investitionsspiel drei etablierte Standardexperimente heran, mit denen sich jeweils bestimmte Facetten (pro)sozialer bzw. kooperativer Motivation messen und voneinander unterscheiden lassen. Im Experiment verhalten sich Soldaten im Durchschnitt signifikant altruistischer, kooperativer, vertrauensvoller und vertrauenswürdiger. Dies gilt in den meisten Fällen nicht nur für das Verhalten unter Soldaten sondern auch von Soldaten gegenüber Zivilisten.In this experimental study we examine the behavior of Bundeswehr officers and officer candidates regarding their willingness to cooperate. Due to the military training which focuses on comradeship and reliable teamwork even under extreme conditions, we expect a strong bond between soldiers and therefore more cooperation among them. Furthermore there are additional norms for soldiers that explicitly call for social responsibility and an appropriate behavior relative to civilians. For that reason we also expect more altruism and trust of soldiers compared to pure civilian groups. To explore these issues in an experimental setting, the subjects had to play the dictator game, the ultimatum game, and the trust game. These three established experiments allow us to measure and distinguish between different aspects of social and cooperative motivation. We find that soldiers are on average more altruistic, more cooperative, and more trusting as well as more trustworthy. These results do not only hold for the interaction among soldiers but in most cases also with regard to the behavior of soldiers towards civilians