High Unemployment in Germany: Why do Foreigners Suffer Most?

In Germany, immigrant unemployment is not only higher than native unemployment; italso reacts more to changes in the situation on the labor market. Decomposing the gapbetween native and immigrant unemployment into a baseline and a labor-marketsituation component, I find that the unemployment rate of immigrants would lie at 5.6 percentagepoints for zero native unemployment (the baseline component of the gap). Anincrease in overall unemployment by 1 percentage point leads to a 0.7 percentage pointshigher increase in immigrant unemployment than in native unemployment (the situationcomponent). The large part of this difference, about 3/4 of the baseline and 4/5 of thesituation component, can be explained by differences in the endowments with classicalhuman capital (educational degrees and experience) between immigrants and natives.Also controlling for country-specific human capital, particularly language skills, thesituation component becomes insignificant and the baseline effect again decreases by1/2. Adding controls for social networks, the baseline effect also becomes insignificant.Thus, human capital and social networks can possibly fully explain the differencebetween native and immigrant unemployment in Germany.Immigration, integration, unemployment, human capital, language skills, discrimination, social networks

Does Educational Choice Erode the Immigration Surplus?

Many countries pursue an immigration policy that is targeted at attracting high skilled workers. Borjas (1995) has shown that assuming perfect labor markets immigration leads to a welfare gain for the native population, the so-called immigration surplus. Thus, as the labor market for high skilled workers exhibits few frictions, high skilled immigration should lead to a welfare gain. Nevertheless, this argumentation implicitly assumes that immigration has no influence on the qualification structure of natives. In this paper I show that if natives anticipate high skilled immigration, fewer natives acquire a high education level. In labor markets that are not frictionless this effect can be such strong that high skilled immigration leads to a welfare loss for natives. Moreover, if high skilled migration is expected but not realized, this expectation generates a welfare loss.Immigration, native welfare, education structure, immigration surplus.

Why go to France or Germany, if you could as well go to the UK or the US? Selective Features of Immigration to four major OECD Countries

Building on a new data set which is combined from national micro-data bases, we highlight differences in the structure of migrants to four countries, viz. France, Germany, the UK and the US, which receive a substantial share of all immigrants to the OECD world. Looking at immigrants by source countries, we illustrate the important role of distance, both geographical and cultural, immigration policies and migrant networks. Differentiating immigrants by their educational attainments, we observe interesting patterns in the skill composition, employment opportunities and wages for migrants to the different destination countries. Focusing on migration between the four countries in our data set, we find that migration within Western Europe is small and rather balanced in terms of skill structures, while there appears to be a brain drain from Europe to the US.migration, immigration policy, education, employment, wages, brain drain

How do Migrants Choose their Destination Country? An Analysis of Institutional Determinants

For a long time, migration has been subject to intensive economic research. Nevertheless, empirical evidence regarding the determinants of migration still appears to be incomplete. In this paper, we analyze the effects of socio-economic and institutional determinants, especially labor-market institutions, on migrants' choices. Based on a large data set constructed from micro-data for France, Germany, the UK and the US, we study their decisions to migrate to one of the four countries using a Multinomial Choice framework. Our estimates confirm a number of conventional results such as positive effects of wages and immigrant networks and negative effects of unemployment rates. In addition, we find that employment protection, union coverage and unemployment benefits have positive effects on migration. Also good education and health systems tend to attract migrants, while generous pension systems may deter them. Based on separate estimations for high- and low-skilled migrants, there is evidence that the effects of labor-market institutions differ across skill groups.migration, labour-market institutions, micro-data, Multinomial Choice

Deutschland und die Migration: Wer kommt, wer geht?

Die Nettozuwanderung nach Deutschland ist in den letzten Jahren immer stärker zurückgegangen. Waren 2001 noch 273 000 Personen zugewandert, waren es 2007 nur noch 44 000. 2008 kam es zum ersten Mal seit 1984 wieder zu einer Nettoabwanderung, und auch 2009 verließen mehr Menschen Deutschland als zuwanderten. Hinter diesen Zahlen verbirgt sich ein deutlich umfassenderes Wanderungsgeschehen. So sind 2009 insgesamt 721 000 Personen zu- und 734 000 Personen abgewandert. Der vorliegende Beitrag geht der Frage nach, welche Personengruppen in den letzten Jahren nach Deutschland zu- und welche abgewandert sind. Anhand der Wanderungsstatistik wird zunächst gezeigt, dass vorwiegend junge Menschen zwischen 18 und 25 Jahren zugewandert sind, während es bei den Über-25-Jährigen zu einer immer stärkeren Abwanderung gekommen ist. Zudem ergab eine Projektionsrechnung, dass relativ zur deutschen Bevölkerung besonders viele Personen zwischen 18 und 25 Jahren ohne Schulabschluss, aber auch solche mit Hochschulabschluss zugewandert sind, während besonders viele Über-50-Jährige ohne Schulabschluss abgewandert sind.Einwanderung Internationale Wanderung Wanderungsstatistik Deutschland

Restrictive Immigration Policy in Germany: Pains and Gains Foregone?

Many European countries restrict immigration from new EU member countries. The rationale is to avoid adverse wage and employment effects. We quantify these effects for Germany. Following Borjas (2003), we estimate a structural model of labor demand, based on elasticities of substitution between workers with different experience levels and education. We allow for unemployment which we model in a price-wage-setting framework. Simulating a counterfactual scenario without restrictions for migration from new EU members countries, we find moderate negative wage effects, combined with increased unemployment for some types of workers. Wage-setting mitigates wage cuts.migration, labor

Arbeitsmarktintegration von Geflüchteten: erste große Erfolge auf einem noch langen Weg

Seit dem Jahr 2016 ist die Beschäftigung von Personen aus den acht hauptasylherkunftsländern sehr stark angestiegen. Allerdings erreicht sie bei weitem noch nicht das Niveau anderer Ausländergruppen, und die meisten der Geflüchteten sind noch immer auf staatliche Transferleistungen angewiesen. In den letzten Jahren wird dabei immer weniger Asylsuchenden Flüchtlingsschutz gewährt, sodass auch die Unsicherheit über den Verbleib im Land wieder zunehmend zu einem Problem für die Integration in den Arbeitsmarkt werden dürfte. Um diese Personengruppe noch gezielter zu fördern, sollten das Angebot an Sprachfördermaßnahmen für Geflüchtete ausgebaut und der Zugang zur vollständigen Ausbildungen für sie weiter erleichtert werden

Restrictive immigration policy in Germany: pains and gains foregone?

Many European countries restrict immigration from new EU member countries. The rationale is to avoid adverse wage and employment effects. We quantify these effects for Germany. Following Borjas (in Q J Econ CXVIII(4):1335–1374, 2003), we estimate a structural model of labor demand, based on elasticities of substitution between workers with different experience levels and education. We allow for unemployment which we model in a price-wage-setting framework. Simulating a counterfactual scenario without restrictions for migration from new EU members countries in Germany, we find moderate negative wage and employment effects for incumbent foreigners, but positive effects for natives. Our results indicate that for the native German population as a whole the immigration restrictions are not welfare enhancing