Child pedestrian safety en route to and from rural schools: A case study

This research examines the safety hazards faced by child pedestrians at rural schools within the Waipa District. The main objectives of this research were to identify hazards child pedestrians face, to identify current counter-measures to these hazards, and to evaluate the regulations and policies pertaining to these counter-measures and child pedestrian safety. Meeting these objectives then allowed the design of possible counter-measures to the hazards faced by rural child pedestrians. The ultimate goal of this research was to improve child pedestrian safety at rural schools

Snapchat\u27s Gift: Equity Culture in High-Tech Firms

Snap, Inc., the company that owns the platform Snapchat, controbersially offered nonvoting common shares to the public in 2017. This Article asks what it means to invest in Snap or other (mostly technology-based) companies in which common shareholders collectibely have little or no power to influence corporate policy. In particular, why do such investors expect to be compensated? This Article explores the familiar rationales for equity investing, including stock appreciation and dividends, and the logical shortcomings of those rationales in these circumstances. Adopting Henry Manne\u27s two systems approach to corporate affairs through both law and economics, we show that corporation law fails to ensure that corporations return business profits to shareholders. A similar analysis of the market for corporate control concludes that, without shareholder boting, the market for corporate control also fails to ensure a return to shareholders. Shareholders who invest in firms in the absence of legal or market mechanisms to secure a return on their inbestment, howeber, are not irrational. Instead, inbestors rely on cultural understandings of appropriate reciprocity. This Article employs Marcel Mauss\u27s cultural anthropology classic, The Gift, to explain the equity culture in which shareholders invest in Snap and other high-technology firms, and in which such firms operate. This Article concludes by suggesting some ramifications of understanding shareholding, and consequently management, in terms of equity culture. This Article also complements the substantial work of behabioral economics in explaining inbestor choice and organizational behabiors. The field of corporate finance traditionally has been organized around the figure of the rationally self-interested indibidual. Behabioral economics argues that people are not as rational as orthodox corporate finance assumes. This Article argues that people in markets are not as individual as corporate finance assumes

Snapchat\u27s Gift: Equity Culture in High-Tech Firms

Snap, Inc., the company that owns the platform Snapchat, controversially offered nonvoting common shares to the public in 2017. This Article asks what it means to invest in Snap or other (mostly technology-based) companies in which common shareholders collectibely have little or no power to influence corporate policy. In particular, why do such investors expect to be compensated? This Article explores the familiar rationales for equity investing, including stock appreciation and dividends, and the logical shortcomings of those rationales in these circumstances. Adopting Henry Manne\u27s two systems approach to corporate affairs through both law and economics, we show that corporation law fails to ensure that corporations return business profits to shareholders. A similar analysis of the market for corporate control concludes that, without shareholder boting, the market for corporate control also fails to ensure a return to shareholders. Shareholders who invest in firms in the absence of legal or market mechanisms to secure a return on their investment, however, are not irrational. Instead, investors rely on cultural understandings of appropriate reciprocity. This Article employs Marcel Mauss\u27s cultural anthropology classic, The Gift, to explain the equity culture in which shareholders invest in Snap and other high-technology firms, and in which such firms operate. This Article concludes by suggesting some ramifications of understanding shareholding, and consequently management, in terms of equity culture. This Article also complements the substantial work of behavioral economics in explaining investor choice and organizational behaviors. The field of corporate finance traditionally has been organized around the figure of the rationally self-interested individual. Behavioral economics argues that people are not as rational as orthodox corporate finance assumes. This Article argues that people in markets are not as individual as corporate finance assumes

Unicorns, Guardians, and the Concentration of the U.S. Equity Markets

I. Introduction II. The Republican Equity Market of the Twentieth Century ... A. Law as Response to Marketplace Power in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries ... B. Corporation Law and the Threat to the Republic ... C. Securities Law, Disclosure, and Bureaucratization … D. Participation III. Private Equity Markets ... A. Introduction ... B. The Rise of the Private Equity Market and the Relative Decline of the Initial Public Offering Market ... C. Reasons for the Rise of the Private Equity Market and the Decline of the Initial Public Offering Market ... 1. Cost ... 2. Deep, Nonpublic Pools of Capital ... 3. Interest Rate Environment … 4. Modest Capital Requirements of New Businesses ... D. Requiem for the Public Equity Market? IV. The Contemporary Public Equity Markets ... A. Introduction ... B. Rise of the Institutional Investor ... C. The Shift from Actively Managed to Passively Managed Funds ... D. Possible Consequences of Institutional-Investor Dominance ... E. Guardians V. Conclusio