Investigating the role of legitimacy in the political order of conflict-torn spaces

Conflict-affected spaces that are far from exhibiting a Weberian monopoly of the legitimate use of force have been categorised as ‘fragile’ and ‘failed’ states for years. However, there is a growing tendency to understand conflicts as a form of order and to adapt the definition of statehood accordingly. But while the post-Weberian approaches indeed help to overcome some of the flaws of the dominant understanding of statehood, they do not substantively consider the role of legitimacy. The statebuilding discourse illustrates the problematic implications of the limited understanding of legitimacy on the policy level. In response, this paper suggests in line with post-Weberian scholars to understand political order as a field with multiple authorities but to consider both force and legitimacy as sources underpinning obedience to social control. An analytical framework is developed that acknowledges multiple dimensions of legitimacy as well as its dynamics. This framework may help to analyse legitimacy in empirical cases to inductively advance the theoretical understanding of legitimacy and to enable statebuilding which strengthens those authorities and institutions that are actually considered to be legitimate

Afghanistan’s Taliban – legitimate jihadists or coercive extremists?

The military intervention in Afghanistan in 2001 was portrayed as a fight to oust the extremist Taliban. But the Taliban have long been regaining influence, with the military victory of the Afghan government and its foreign allies now seeming less likely than ever. In light of these developments, this article investigates what the affected people – rather than the foreign interveners – think about the Taliban, and whether they perceive them as coercive or legitimate. Building on a conceptual understanding of legitimacy that has been adjusted to the dynamics of conflict-torn spaces, the article suggests that people judge the Taliban on the basis of how their day-to-day behaviour is perceived. While the Taliban are a coercive threat in urban centres and other areas where they launch attacks, they nonetheless manage to construct legitimacy in some of the places which they control or can access easily. A major source of their legitimacy in these areas is the way in which they provide services – such as conflict resolution – which some people consider to be faster and fairer than the state’s practices

Kabul at war: the widening gap between the state and its citizens

There was an atmosphere of hope in Afghanistan in February 2020, when the United States and the Taliban signed an agreement on the withdrawal of international troops from the country, conditional of intra-Afghan negotiations between the Taliban and the government of Afghanistan. After more than 10,000 civilian casualties annually for six years, there appeared to be an opportunity to end the bloodshed. Cautious voices pointed out that a successful peace process was going to take many years and warned that the agreement was driven primarily by US domestic politics, with peace in Afghanistan being a marginal concern. While the number of civilian casualties in the first nine months of 2020 reduced by 30%, the war in Afghanistan remained one of the deadliest in the word. In addition, a wave of assassinations has targeted civilians across the country, even in Kabul City, adding to bombings and a rising criminal problem and resulting in wide-spread fear. The insecurity does not only affect hopes in the peace process, it also undermines people’s trust in the ability of the state to protect its citizens. In addition, as the state is trying to protect itself with added security measures, it becomes even more distant from the people, further undermining its own legitimacy

How to build (or lose) legitimacy during war

Florian Weigand introduces his new book Waiting for Dignity: Legitimacy and Authority in Afghanistan (published by Columbia University Press, 2022), looking at how legitimacy is built and lost during armed conflict. Drawing on 500 interviews, he examines the perspectives of ordinary people in Afghanistan as well as those of competing authorities: insurgents, warlords, members of parliament, security forces and community leaders. This post was originally published on LSE International Development blog

Conflict and transnational crime: borders, bullets and business in Southeast Asia

Exploring the links between armed conflict and transnational crime, Florian Weigand builds on in-depth empirical research into some of Southeast Asia’s murkiest borders. The disparate voices of drug traffickers, rebel fighters, government officials and victims of armed conflict are heard in Conflict and Transnational Crime, exploring perspectives that have been previously disregarded in understanding the field. Weigand’s nuanced comparative analysis of four border regions in Southeast Asia counters the stereotypical view that conflict zones are lawless areas in which all kinds of criminal activities flourish. Chapters illustrate the logic that determines the relationship between armed conflict and transnational crime. Further, the book analyses how smuggling economies function in conflict zones, explaining why some rebel groups are involved in the smuggling economy more than others, and why state actors actually play a much more crucial role. This crucial study will be a compelling read for international relations, political sociology and development studies scholars. The in-depth analysis of real-life situations will also greatly benefit policy-makers and aid organisations looking to better support areas at the heart of conflict and transnational crime

Intervention at risk: the vicious cycle of distance and danger in Mali and Afghanistan

In crisis-hit countries, intensive risk management increasingly characterizes the presence of international interveners, with measures ranging from fortified compounds to ‘remote programming’. This article investigates the global drive for ‘security’ from an ethnographic perspective, focusing on Afghanistan and Mali. By deploying the concepts of distance and proximity, the article shows how frontline ‘outsourcing’ and bunkering have generated an unequal ‘risk economy’ while distancing interveners from local society in a trend that itself generates novel risks. To conclude, the article asks whether alternative forms of proximity may help to break the vicious cycle of danger and distance at work in today’s crisis zones

How the Taliban are losing the peace in Afghanistan

Afghanistan’s Taliban are back in power. How did they get there? How can their discriminatory policies be explained? And what can be done about it? The article looks back at the failure of international engagement in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2021 and the dynamics that enabled the Taliban to reemerge. Having gained control of the country again in August 2021, the article unpacks the way they govern and control populations, how decisions are made within the divided movement, and how its highly oppressive policies have developed. The article concludes by looking at the Taliban’s approach toward the international community and the resulting limited pathways for constructive engagement

The Afghan local police – closing the security gap?

The Afghan Local Police (ALP) was designed as an international counterinsurgency programme that works by raising small, village-level defence forces from within rural Afghan communities. Despite being driven by counterinsurgency objectives – that is, seeking to defeat insurgents - its emphasis upon harnessing local populations reflects broader fashions in development and security policy circles. Such policies, in turn, are commonly seen as emerging from a body of theoretical literature that is rethinking the nature of political order in conflict-torn spaces. At face value the range of well-documented controversies surrounding the ALP suggests, however, that the practice is much more ‘messy’. Using the case study of the ALP in the district of Andar, we make two main arguments. First, the mess and ambiguity surrounding the ALP reveal a gap between objectives and practices, suggesting that interventions that work by seeking to harness the ‘local’ introduce problems that have yet to be fully recognised. Second, however, in explaining the ‘mess’ of the ALP we argue that the theoretically-driven work that is commonly taken to justify ‘bottom-up’ interventions, if taken seriously, is well-suited to understanding and even anticipating the supposedly unexpected consequences of intervenors seeking to tap local dynamics