Long Live OPTA!

Although explicitly installed as a transitory body, the Dutch telecommunication controller OPTA displays the typical signs of government institutions that seek to become indispensable. A conflict in OPTA''s two main policy objectives – guarding consumer prices through controlling the network operator and encouraging entry into the telecommunication market – hinders OPTA in making itself redundant. It is shown that a market structure with a dominant owner of the network and a few fringe firms, among which OPTA referees for ever, is a stable Nash equilibrium. Some possible remedies for this undesirable state of affairs are discussed. Long live OPTA, but leaner and meaner, supervising a symmetrically competing market.Economics ;

"Tax ratios in macroeconomics: Do taxes really mater?

In various empirical studies so-called tax ratios (tax revenues expressed as a ratio of some aggregate tax base) are employed as approximations for tax burdens. The most difficult problem in calculating tax ratios is the way in which personal income tax revenues are attributed to labor and capital. We argue that the methodology of Mendoza et al. (1994) is seriously flawed in this respect. Using information from national sources, we calculate more accurate tax ratios for eight OECD countries that differ substantially from those of Mendoza et al. (1997) and which are also differently related to various economic variables.

Horizontal integration in the Dutch financial sector

In this paper, the consequences of cross-shareholding in an n-firm industry are analyzed. Our attention focuses on the case where firms have silent interests in each other. These interests can be direct or indirect. We analyze the effects of cross-shareholding on the price-cost margins in a Cournot and a Bertrand setting. In all cases, competition is reduced due to shareholding interlocks. As an empirical example the Dutch financial sector is used. Comparing the case of shareholding with the case of no-shareholding, the price-cost margins are found to be up to 2% higher in a Bertrand market, and at least 8% higher in a Cournot market. (C) 2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. JEL classification: G20; L13; L41