What is at stake in taking responsibility? Lessons from third-party property insurance

Third-party property insurance (TPPI) protects insured drivers who accidentally damage an expensive car from the threat of financial ruin. Perhaps more importantly though, TPPI also protects the victims whose losses might otherwise go uncompensated. Ought responsible drivers therefore take out TPPI? This paper begins by enumerating some reasons for why a rational person might believe that they have a moral obligation to take out TPPI. It will be argued that if what is at stake in taking responsibility is the ability to compensate our possible future victims for their losses, then it might initially seem that most people should be thankful for the availability of relatively inexpensive TPPI because without it they may not have sufficient funds to do the right thing and compensate their victims in the event of an accident. But is the ability to compensate one's victims really what is at stake in taking responsibility? The second part of this paper will critically examine the arguments for the above position, and it will argue that these arguments do not support the conclusion that injurers should compensate their victims for their losses, and hence that drivers need not take out TPPI in order to be responsible. Further still, even if these arguments did support the conclusion that injurers should compensate their victims for their losses, then (perhaps surprisingly) nobody should to be allowed to take out TPPI because doing so would frustrate justice

When Good Policies Go Bad: Controlling Risks Posed By Flawed Incentive-Based Compensation

The recent Wells Fargo scandal revealed the harm that can result from flawed incentive-based compensation arrangements. Large financial institutions have both a legal and an ethical obligation to ensure that any incentive-based compensation arrangements that are in place will not encourage risky or fraudulent employee behavior. The continued existence of inappropriate and poorly structured arrangements demonstrates that existing regulations are inadequate to ensure compliance and protect consumers. Regulations should include increased penalties and should more evenly distribute the burden of oversight and compliance between the public and private sectors. In addition to regulatory reform, the government should prosecute culpable high-level executives more aggressively. Arguably, white-collar criminals are in a position to be more effectively deterred by the threat of incarceration than other types of criminals

On the Relevance of Neuroscience to Criminal Responsibility

Various authors debate the question of whether neuroscience is relevant to criminal responsibility. However, a plethora of different techniques and technologies, each with their own abilities and drawbacks, lurks beneath the label “neuroscience”; and in criminal law responsibility is not a single, unitary and generic concept, but it is rather a syndrome of at least six different concepts. Consequently, there are at least six different responsibility questions that the criminal law asks—at least one for each responsibility concept—and, I will suggest, a multitude of ways in which the techniques and technologies that comprise neuroscience might help us to address those diverse questions. In a way, on my account neuroscience is relevant to criminal responsibility in many ways, but I hesitate to state my position like this because doing so obscures two points which I would rather highlight: one, neither neuroscience nor criminal responsibility are as unified as that; and two, the criminal law asks many different responsibility questions and not just one generic question

What do you mean I should take responsibility for my own ill health

Luck egalitarians think that considerations of responsibility can excuse departures from strict equality. However critics argue that allowing responsibility to play this role has objectionably harsh consequences. Luck egalitarians usually respond either by explaining why that harshness is not excessive, or by identifying allegedly legitimate exclusions from the default responsibility-tracking rule to tone down that harshness. And in response, critics respectively deny that this harshness is not excessive, or they argue that those exclusions would be ineffective or lacking in justification. Rather than taking sides, after criticizing both positions I also argue that this way of carrying on the debate – i.e. as a debate about whether the harsh demands of responsibility outweigh other considerations, and about whether exclusions to responsibility-tracking would be effective and/or justified – is deeply problematic. On my account, the demands of responsibility do not – in fact, they can not – conflict with the demands of other normative considerations, because responsibility only provides a formal structure within which those other considerations determine how people may be treated, but it does not generate its own practical demands

Book Review of "Torts, Egalitarianism and Distributive Justice" by Tsachi Keren-Paz

In "Torts, Egalitarianism and Distributive Justice" , Tsachi Keren-Paz presents impressingly detailed analysis that bolsters the case in favour of incremental tort law reform. However, although this book's greatest strength is the depth of analysis offered, at the same time supporters of radical law reform proposals may interpret the complexity of the solution that is offered as conclusive proof that tort law can only take adequate account of egalitarian aims at an unacceptably high cos

Responsibility: distinguishing virtue from capacity

Garrath Williams claims that truly responsible people must possess a “capacity … to respond [appropriately] to normative demands” (2008:462). However, there are people whom we would normally praise for their responsibility despite the fact that they do not yet possess such a capacity (e.g. consistently well-behaved young children), and others who have such capacity but who are still patently irresponsible (e.g. some badly-behaved adults). Thus, I argue that to qualify for the accolade “a responsible person” one need not possess such a capacity, but only to be earnestly willing to do the right thing and to have a history that testifies to this willingness. Although we may have good reasons to prefer to have such a capacity ourselves, and to associate ourselves with others who have it, at a conceptual level I do not think that such considerations support the claim that having this capacity is a necessary condition of being a responsible person in the virtue sense

Segmentation du muscle pectoral sur une mammographie

National audienceL'objectif de cette étude est la segmentation du muscle pectoral sur une mammographie. Ce travail a pour but de faciliter le recalage géométrique de paires d'images mammographiques par l'extraction fiable de points de repère. La sémantique de l'image est exploitée pour extraire des points de repère basés sur l'anatomie. La technique d'extraction utilisée est basée sur les contours actifs pour lesquels nous proposons de construire différentes énergies

Stress and the Common Cold

Stress is very common among people especially in today’s world. People also seem to be getting colds much more often than they used to. Does stress cause people to get sick more often? In the present study 40 participants, all Lindenwood University students ages 18 to 29 years old took a stress test and a health questionnaire in an attempt to determine whether or not the more stressed a person is the more often they will get sick. The participants were asked to spare five minutes of their time to complete the two surveys. This study determined that there is a link between the levels of stress a person is under and how often they encounter symptoms of a cold. This study lets further experimentation take place to find a way to decrease stress in the people of today’s society