A case for public interest considerations in merger control analysis with reference to competition law enforcement in developing countries: The example of South Africa

This article is written in defense of the diverse policy objectives of competition regimes in relation to merger control in the developing countries of Africa. While appreciating the criticisms, the essay uses South Africa as an example to explain the historical context and justify such a regime. It reviews the extent of PIC in line with the South African merger control regime, analyzes the various arguments for and against the inclusion of PICs in merger control analysis and comes to the conclusion that PICs ought to be considered in developing countries’ merger control as these considerations play a very key role in stabilizing the fragile economy of emerging markets. This essay equally suggests that clear procedures for analyzing the PICs should be adopted and put to paper in order to protect the process from being subjected to regulatory arbitrariness and abuse

From intermediary liability to intermediary responsibility: A juxtaposition of the EU and Nigerian Liability Regime for internet service providers over intellectual property rights infringements online

The huge annual increase in the number of internet users in Nigeria makes the country a fertile ground for investment by Internet Service Providers (ISPs). This increase also comes with a higher probability for the violation of intellectual property (IP) rights on the internet. With the current global trend in holding ISPs to a higher standard of responsibility for online IP rights violation as exemplified by the EU, this article presents an attempt to juxtapose the EU and Nigerian regime, while drawing out lessons the latter could learn from the former in its current legislative review process

Regulation of cartels in emerging economies: Optimal enforcement options for Nigeria

Prior to the return of democracy in 1999, the Nigerian economy was characterised by government-sponsored monopolies and subsidies in key sectors of the economy. This led to the concentration of market power in the hands of few firms. Post-1999 marked a departure from that norm and the commencement of a new policy direction towards a free-market economy, with successful attempts made at deregulating the economy. However, the country continued to suffer from the anticompetitive practices of these few dominant firms, owing to the absence of a competition law regime. With the enactment of the Federal Competition and Consumer Protection Act (FCCPA) 2019, and the establishment of a competition regulator, this article undertook a critical analysis of the provisions on cartels, especially, the leniency and settlement procedures. It made a comparative study of the 20-year-old regime in South Africa (SA), an emerging economy that has recorded giant strides in cartel regulation, and argued that notwithstanding the criticisms and disadvantages of the leniency program and settlement procedure, their benefits outweigh the setbacks. In sum, the article identified a number of murky areas of cartel regulation in the new Nigerian competition law, made appropriate recommendations, and suggested the best optimal enforcement models

Building Social Capital in a Hard-Knock Regulatory Terrain: Lessons for New Competition Authorities

This article examines the efforts of the Nigerian Competition Authority, the Federal Competition and Consumer Protection Commission (FCCPC) in building social capital in a difficult regulatory environment, and lessons new competition authorities can learn from the strides of the FCCPC

Benefits of Supranational and One-Stop-Shop Approach to Competition Regulation in Africa

African countries introduced competition laws to their legal and economic systems as they increasingly move from command to market economies. Over 25 African countries have adopted competition regimes. However, several others are yet to, leading to swathes of unregulated markets (on the spread of competition law in Africa, see Büthe and Kigwiru). This portends risk of under-development and non-attainment of the full economic potentials of the continent, despite its enormous natural, human and economic endowments. The menace could be remedied by adopting a one-stop-shop approach and establishing a supranational competition regulator for Africa. Proponents touted this approach due to the slow pace of accepting competition ideals and adopting substantive competition law in Africa. The rationale being that countries without adequate resources to support an efficient competition regime could collaborate to adopt a joint competition regulatory approach and thereby benefit from the experience and competence of the supranational authority. Critics, however, oppose the idea because of the challenge in aggregating conflicting national interests due to the lack of uniform economic development in Africa. This blog post offers a critical review of the benefits of a one-stop-shop approach to competition regulation in Africa