An Informational Interpretation of monadology

In this paper, I will try to exploit the implication of Leibniz's statement in Monadology (1714) that "there is a kind of self-sufficiency which makes them [monads] sources of their own internal actions, or incorporeal automata, as it were" (Monadology, sect.18). Leibniz's monads are simple substances, with no shape, no magnitude; but they are supposed to produce the phenomena resulting from their activities, which for us humans look as the whole world, the nature. The activities of a monad are characterized by mental terms, perceptions (internal states) and appetites (which change the internal state). By means of perceptions, a monad becomes a "perpetual living mirror of the universe"; it can receive the information of other monads and it can send its own, in turn, to others. The communication and interconnection thus produced result in the physical and the psychical phenomena observed by us, humans. According to Leibniz, all monads are governed by the teleological law given by the God, and the world of phenomena are governed by the causal and mechanical law. Leibniz argues that there is a pre-established harmony among the monads so that this double character is no problem. Now, I will propose an informational interpretation of monadology, which regards the monads as an automaton governed by the God's program and arranged appropriately; and I will argue that Leibniz's scenario can be defended in terms of this interpretation. The crucial part of this interpretation is that the God's program and the monads' activities are related with the phenomenal world by means of a coding by God. This interpretation is also defended on the textual basis, with a special reference to Leibniz's distinction between primitive and derivative forces. Drawing on R. M. Adams's careful reading of Leibniz's texts (Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist, 1994), I will argue that his rendering is quite in conformity with my interpretation, although he does not seem to be aware of the notion of coding

An Informational Interpretation of monadology

In this paper, I will try to exploit the implication of Leibniz's statement in Monadology (1714) that "there is a kind of self-sufficiency which makes them [monads] sources of their own internal actions, or incorporeal automata, as it were" (Monadology, sect.18). Leibniz's monads are simple substances, with no shape, no magnitude; but they are supposed to produce the phenomena resulting from their activities, which for us humans look as the whole world, the nature. The activities of a monad are characterized by mental terms, perceptions (internal states) and appetites (which change the internal state). By means of perceptions, a monad becomes a "perpetual living mirror of the universe"; it can receive the information of other monads and it can send its own, in turn, to others. The communication and interconnection thus produced result in the physical and the psychical phenomena observed by us, humans. According to Leibniz, all monads are governed by the teleological law given by the God, and the world of phenomena are governed by the causal and mechanical law. Leibniz argues that there is a pre-established harmony among the monads so that this double character is no problem. Now, I will propose an informational interpretation of monadology, which regards the monads as an automaton governed by the God's program and arranged appropriately; and I will argue that Leibniz's scenario can be defended in terms of this interpretation. The crucial part of this interpretation is that the God's program and the monads' activities are related with the phenomenal world by means of a coding by God. This interpretation is also defended on the textual basis, with a special reference to Leibniz's distinction between primitive and derivative forces. Drawing on R. M. Adams's careful reading of Leibniz's texts (Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist, 1994), I will argue that his rendering is quite in conformity with my interpretation, although he does not seem to be aware of the notion of coding

Leibniz's Ultimate Theory

This is a short summary of my new interpretation of Leibniz’s philosophy, including metaphysics and dynamics. Monadology is the core of his philosophy, but according to my interpretation, this document must be read together with his works on dynamics and geometry Analysis Situs, among others. Monadology describes the reality, the world of monads. But in addition, it also contains a theory of information in terms of the state transition of monads, together with a sketch of how that information is transformed into the phenomena via coding. I will argue that Leibniz’s program has a surprisingly wide range, from classical physics to the theories of relativity (special and general) , and extending even to quantum mechanics

Darwin's Principle of Divergence

Darwin's famous book, is not an easy book for the reader. Especially, the central part of his doctrine addressing the problem of how a small difference between varieties of a single species may become larger and larger and become a large difference between two distinct species or between two genera etc. is often confusing. Darwin brings in the "principle of divergence" in order to answer this central question, but the problem is: what is the status of this principle of divergence? Is it an independent principle from that of natural selection? How does it work, and how, exactly, does Darwin explain the diversification of organic beings? In this paper, I will give a logical analysis of Darwin's whole reasoning on this problem, based on the text of as well as as of

Sherlock Holmes on Reasoning

In this paper, I will show that Sherlock Holmes was a good logician, according to the standard of the 19th century, both in his character and knowledge (sections 2 and 3). Holmes, in all probability, knew William Stanley Jevons’ clarification of deductive reasoning in terms of “logical alphabets” (section 4). And in view of his use of “analytic-synthetic” distinction and “analytic reasoning,” I will argue that Holmes knew rather well philosophy too, as far as logic and methodology are concerned (section 5). Further, I have argued that Holmes introduced new twists (presumably, following Jevons) into analytic reasoning: application to reasoning as regards causal sequences, and probabilistic elimination of hypotheses (sections 6 and 7). Also, in this context, I will clarify the significance of Holmes’ metaphor of the “little attic”: without fine assortment in your brain, it is hard to devise promising hypotheses (section 8). Finally, presenting a simple model of probabilistic inference, which became prevalent in the 19th century (section 9), I claim that the essence of Holmes’ reasoning consists of probabilistic inferences, “balance probabilities and choose the most likely,” which is nothing but probabilistic elimination of hypotheses in the light of evidence. I also argue that my claim fits in well with the text of Holmes stories (section 10)

The Evolution of Darwin's Evolutionary Thinking

(1) Darwin inherited Lyell’s methodology and applied it to the animate beings. This led him, eventually, to the principle of natural selection. This principle enabled him to expel God from biology. (2) Darwin diverged from Lyell on Man and Morality, presumably because of his experience in Tierra del Fuego. This led him to the thesis of continuity of man and animals, and he noticed the function of morality. (3) The process of Darwin’s theory construction may be likened to gradual evolution. Each element of his theory, by itself, is not revolutionary. But taken together and combined, these elements produced a revolutionary change

Three Essays on Ethics : I UTILITY AND PREFERENCES/ II DARWIN ON THE EVOLUTION OF MORALITY/ III SIDGWICK'S THREE PRINCIPLES AND HARE'S UNIVERSALIZABILITY

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Leibniz's Theory of Time

I have developed an informational interpretation of Leibniz’s metaphysics and dynamics, but in this paper I will concentrate on his theory of time. According to my interpretation, each monad is an incorporeal automaton programed by God, and likewise each organized group of monads is a cellular automaton (in von Neumann’s sense) governed by a single dominant monad (entelechy). The activities of these produce phenomena, which must be “coded appearances” of these activities; God determines this coding. A crucially important point here is that we have to distinguish the phenomena for a monad from its states (perceptions). Both are a kind of representation: a state represents the whole world of monads, and phenomena for a monad “result” from the activities of monads. But the coding for each must be different; R(W) for the first, Ph(W) for the second, where W is a state of the monadic world. The reason for this is that no monadic state is in space and time, but phenomena occur in space and time. Now, the basis of the phenomenal time must be in the timeless realm of monads. This basis is the order of state-transition of each monads. All the changes of these states are given at once by God, and these do not presuppose time. The coded appearances (which may well be different for different creatures) of this order occur in time (for any finite creatures), and its metric must depend on God’s coding for phenomena. For humans, in particular, this metric time is derived from spatial distance (metric space) via the laws of dynamics. Thus there may well be an interrelation between spatial and temporal metric. This means that the Leibnizian frame allows relativistic metric of space-time. I will show this after outlining Leibniz’s scenario

Monadology and Music

In this paper, I will present an analogy between Leibniz’s Monadology and musical works. A musical work is usually written down in a score. It is divided into many voice parts, and for every part, it gives all musical information necessary for performance. Now, since any such score specifies all notes of that musical work, at once, it can be regarded as atemporal; musical time does not flow in a score. And it does not specify spatial relations among the voice parts. Thus, the musical work described in a score exists as an informational entity. A score is a kind of “program” for playing. This program contains invariant structures, and such structures define the identity of the work. On the other hand, it allows freedom for performers. Any performer has to “interpret” the work, and his or her performance is an expression of that interpretation. Any such interpretation may be regarded as a kind of “coding” for transforming the specified invariant structures into actual sounds in space and time. This dual aspect of musical works is the basis of my analogy. It should be conducive to improving our interpretation of Monadology

Monadology, Information, and Physics Part 2: Space and Time

In Part 2, drawing on the results of Part 1, I will present my own interpretation of Leibniz’s philosophy of space and time. As regards Leibniz’s theory of geometry (Analysis Situs) and space, De Risi’s excellent work appeared in 2007, so I will depend on this work. However, he does not deal with Leibniz’s view on time, and moreover, he seems to misunderstand the essential part of Leibniz’s view on time. Therefore I will begin with Richard Arthur’s paper (1985), and J. A. Cover’s improvement (1997). Despite some valuable insights contained in their papers, I have to conclude their attempts fail in one way or another, because they disregard the order of state-transition of a monad, which is, on my view, one of the essential features of the monads. By reexamining Leibniz’s important text Initia Rerum (1715), I arrived at the following interpretation. (1) Since the realm of monads is timeless, the order of state-transition of a monad provides only the basis of time in phenomena. (2) What Leibniz calls “simultaneity” should be understood as a unique 1-to-1 correspondence of the states of different monads. (3) With this understanding, whatever is correct in Arthur’s and Cover’s interpretation can be reproduced in my interpretation. On this basis, (4) we can introduce a metric of time based on congruence of duration. (5) Leibniz connected time with space in Initia Rerum by means of motion, and introduced the notion of path (which is spatial) of a moving point; thus the congruence of duration can be reduced to congruence of distance. (6) Then, I can show both classical metric and relativistic metric can be reconstructed on the same basis, depending on the coding for phenomena. (7) The relativistic metric can be combined with Leibniz’s idea of internal living force, suggesting a relation of mass with energy. (8) However, since Leibniz has never shown the ground of constant speed of an inertial motion, there may be a vicious circle. (9) In order to avoid this, we can extend the notion of path to whole situation, thus yielding a trajectory of the whole phenomenal world. (10) Then, by applying optimality to possible paths, we may arrive at the law of motion, without vicious circle. A comparison of Leibniz’s dynamics with Barbour’s concludes Part 2