118 research outputs found
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Backwards in Retrospect
This work has received funding from the European Research Council under the European Unionâs Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013)/ERC Grant agreement no 284123This Author Accepted Manuscript version of the article "Backwards in Retrospect" is embargoed until 26/08/2015 to meet the publisher requirements. The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-014-0370-
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The nature of philosophy and the philosophy of nature: Peter Godfrey-Smith: Philosophy of Biology. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014
Peter Godfrey-Smithâs introduction to the philosophy of biology is excellent. This review questions one implication of his book, namely that Darwinâs case for the efficacy of natural selection was hampered by his ignorance of the particulate nature of inheritance. I suggest, instead, that Darwin was handicapped by an inability to effectively engage in quantitative population thinking. I also question Godfrey-Smithâs understanding of the role that Malthusian struggle plays in linking natural selection to the origination of new adaptive traits, and I raise problems for his defence of apparently unproblematic conceptions of human nature. Finally, I highlight the welcome conception of a âphilosophy of natureâ developed by Godfrey-Smith.This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10539-015-9485-
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The Extended Evolutionary Synthesis: What is the debate about, and what might success for the extenders look like?
Abstract
Debate over the Extended Evolutionary Synthesis (EES) ranges over three quite different domains of enquiry. Protagonists are committed to substantive positions regarding (1) empirical questions concerning (for example) the properties and prevalence of systems of epigenetic inheritance; (2) historical characterizations of the modern synthesis; and (3) conceptual/philosophical matters concerning (among other things) the nature of evolutionary processes, and the relationship between selection and adaptation. With these different aspects of the debate in view, it is possible to demonstrate the range of cross-cutting positions on offer when well-informed evolutionists consider their stance on the EES. This overview of the multiple dimensions of debate also enables clarification of two philosophical elements of the EES debate, regarding the status of niche-construction and the role of selection in explaining adaptation. Finally, it points the way to a possible resolution of the EES debate, via a pragmatic approach to evolutionary enquiry.John Templeton Foundatio
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The Descent of Culture
This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from Oxford University Press via http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/aesthj/ayu03
Decision and Discovery in Defining âDiseaseâ
This version (May 17, 2005) was published in its final form as:
Schwartz PH. Decision and discovery in defining 'disease'. In: Kincaid H, McKitrick J, editors. Establishing medical reality: essays in the metaphysics and epistemology of biomedical science. Dordrecht: Springer; 2007. p. 47-63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/1-4020-5216-2_5The debate over how to analyze the concept of disease has often centered on the question of whether to include a reference to values, in particular the âdisvalueâof diseases, or whether to avoid such notions. âNormativists,âsuch as King ([1954], 1981) and Culver and Gert (1982) emphasize the undesirability of diseases, while âNaturalists,â most prominently Christopher Boorse (1977, 1987, 1997), instead require just the presence of biological dysfunction. The debate between normativism and naturalism often deteriorates into stalemate, with each side able to point out significant problems with the other. It starts to look as if neither approach can work. In this paper, I argue that the standoff stems from deeply questionable assumptions that have been used to formulate the opposing positions and guide the debate. In the end, I propose an alternative set of guidelines that offer a more constructive way to devise and compare theories
The emerging structure of the Extended Evolutionary Synthesis: where does Evo-Devo fit in?
The Extended Evolutionary Synthesis (EES) debate is gaining ground in contemporary evolutionary biology. In parallel, a number of philosophical standpoints have emerged in an attempt to clarify what exactly is represented by the EES. For Massimo Pigliucci, we are in the wake of the newest instantiation of a persisting Kuhnian paradigm; in contrast, Telmo Pievani has contended that the transition to an EES could be best represented as a progressive reformation of a prior Lakatosian scientific research program, with the extension of its Neo-Darwinian core and the addition of a brand-new protective belt of assumptions and auxiliary hypotheses. Here, we argue that those philosophical vantage points are not the only ways to interpret what current proposals to âextendâ the Modern Synthesis-derived âstandard evolutionary theoryâ (SET) entail in terms of theoretical change in evolutionary biology. We specifically propose the image of the emergent EES as a vast network of models and interweaved representations that, instantiated in diverse practices, are connected and related in multiple ways. Under that assumption, the EES could be articulated around a paraconsistent network of evolutionary theories (including some elements of the SET), as well as models, practices and representation systems of contemporary evolutionary biology, with edges and nodes that change their position and centrality as a consequence of the co-construction and stabilization of facts and historical discussions revolving around the epistemic goals of this area of the life sciences. We then critically examine the purported structure of the EESâpublished by Laland and collaborators in 2015âin light of our own network-based proposal. Finally, we consider which epistemic units of Evo-Devo are present or still missing from the EES, in preparation for further analyses of the topic of explanatory integration in this conceptual framework
Ethics and âfrackingâ: A review of (the limited) moral thought on shale gas development
Whilst claims about the ethicality of shale gas development via hydraulic fracturing (âfrackingâ) are commonplace in everyday discourse, little scholarly attention has been afforded explicitly to this aspect of unconventional fossil fuel extraction. The limited research that speaks to ethical considerations largely describes ethical concerns associated with development â extremely few claims in research literature make an ethical case for development. The most common ethical concerns cited in research stem from issues of distributive justice, with procedural justice, the precautionary principle, exposure to involuntary risks, rights-based arguments, and changes in community character and way of life as next most common. Additional research hints implicitly at ethical dilemmas associated with shale gas development, but does not openly identify these issues as having moral implications. Many ethical considerations relate closely to concerns about water quality and the volume/supply of water available for other purposes. The limited scholarship in this area reveals the import of understanding the ways in which ethics permeate thoughts about shale gas development for designing policy that responds to constituent needs and concerns. Even more limited than research on ethical claims in association with shale gas development is well-reasoned scholarship that analyses the extent to which ethical claims about development are well justified and philosophically justifiable. A comprehensive and systematic analysis of the range of ethical claims potentially relevant to shale gas development and their usefulness for informing policy on this topic would contribute greatly to informed decision-making on this controversial issue â something that science alone cannot achieve
Evolutionary psychology, adaptation and design
Abstract I argue that Evolutionary Psychologists â notion of adaptationism is closest to what Peter Godfrey-Smith (2001) calls explanatory adaptationism and as a result, is not a good organizing principle for research in the biology of human behavior. I also argue that adopting an alternate notion of adaptationism presents much more explanatory resources to the biology of human behavior. I proceed by introducing Evolutionary Psychology and giving some examples of alternative approaches to the biological explanation of human behavior. Next I characterize adaptation and explain the range of biological phenomena that can count as adaptations. I go onto introduce the range of adaptationist views that have been distinguished by philoso-phers of biology and lay out explanatory adaptationism in detail.
Whatâs wrong with evolutionary biology?
There have been periodic claims that evolutionary biology needs urgent reform, and this article tries to account for the volume and persistence of this discontent. It is argued that a few inescapable properties of the field make it prone to criticisms of predictable kinds, whether or not the criticisms have any merit. For example, the variety of living things and the complexity of evolution make it easy to generate data that seem revolutionary (e.g. exceptions to well-established generalizations, or neglected factors in evolution), and lead to disappointment with existing explanatory frameworks (with their high levels of abstraction, and limited predictive power). It is then argued that special discontent stems from misunderstandings and dislike of one well-known but atypical research programme: the study of adaptive function, in the tradition of behavioural ecology. To achieve its goals, this research needs distinct tools, often including imaginary agency, and a partial description of the evolutionary process. This invites mistaken charges of narrowness and oversimplification (which come, not least, from researchers in other subfields), and these chime with anxieties about human agency and overall purpose. The article ends by discussing several ways in which calls to reform evolutionary biology actively hinder progress in the field
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