Income, relative income, and self-reported health in Britain 1979-2000

According to the relative income hypothesis, an individual’s health depends on the distribution of income in a reference group, as well as on the income of the individual. We use data on 231,208 individuals in Great Britain from 19 rounds of the General Household Survey between 1979 and 2000 to test alternative specifications of the hypothesis with different measures of relative income, national and regional reference groups, and two measures of self assessed health. All models include individual education, social class, housing tenure, age, gender and income. The estimated effects of relative income measures are usually weaker with regional reference groups and in models with time trends. There is little evidence for an independent effect of the Gini coefficient once time trends are allowed for. Deprivation relative to mean income and the Hey-Lambert-Yitzhaki measures of relative deprivation are generally negatively associated with individual health, though most such models do not perform better on the Bayesian Information Criterion than models without relative income. The only model which performs better than the model without relative income and which has a positive estimated effect of absolute income on health has relative deprivation measured as income proportional to mean income. In this model the increase in the probability of good health from a ceteris paribus reduction in relative deprivation from the upper quartile to zero is 0.010, whereas as an increase in income from the lower to the upper quartile increases the probability by 0.056. Measures of relative deprivation constructed by comparing individual income with incomes within a regional or national reference group will always be highly correlated with individual income, making identification of the separate effects of income and relative deprivation problematic.relative income, relative deprivation, income inequality, health.

Income, Relative Income, and Self-Reported Health in Britain 1979-2000

According to the relative income hypothesis, an individual's health depends on the distribution of income in a reference group, as well as on the income of the individual. We use data on 231,208 individuals in Great Britain from 19 rounds of the General Household Survey between 1979 and 2000 to test alternative specifications of the hypothesis with different measures of relative income, national and regional reference groups, and two measures of self assessed health. All models include individual education, social class, housing tenure, age, gender and income. The estimated effects of relative income measures are usually weaker with regional reference groups and in models with time trends. There is little evidence for an independent effect of the Gini coefficient once time trends are allowed for. Deprivation relative to mean income and the Hey-Lambert-Yitzhaki measures of relative deprivation are generally negatively associated with individual health, though most such models do not perform better on the Bayesian Information Criterion than models without relative income. The only model which performs better than the model without relative income and which has a positive estimated effect of absolute income on health has relative deprivation measured as income proportional to mean income. In this model the increase in the probability of good health from a ceteris paribus reduction in relative deprivation from the upper quartile to zero is 0.010, whereas as an increase in income from the lower to the upper quartile increases the probability by 0.056. Measures of relative deprivation constructed by comparing individual income with incomes within a regional or national reference group will always be highly correlated with individual income, making identification of the separate effects of income and relative deprivation problematic.Relative income, relative deprivation, income inequality, health

Deprivation and volunteering by general practices: cross sectional analysis of a national primary care system

No abstract available

Doctor Behaviour Under a Pay for Performance Contract: Further Evidence from the Quality and Outcomes Framework

Since 2003, 25% of UK general practitioners’ income has been determined by the quality of their care. The 65 clinical quality indicators in this scheme (the Quality and Outcomes Framework) are in the form of ratios, with financial reward increasing linearly with the ratio between a lower and upper threshold. The numerator is the number of patients for whom an indicator is achieved and the denominator is the number of patients the practices declare are suitable for the indicator. The number declared suitable is the number of patients with the relevant condition less the number exception reported by the practice for a specified range of reasons. Exception reporting is designed to avoid harmful treatment resulting from the application of quality targets to patients for whom they were not intended. However, exception reporting also gives GPs the opportunity to exclude patients who should in fact be treated in order to achieve higher financial rewards. This is inappropriate use of exception reporting or ‘gaming’. Practices can also increase income if they are below the upper threshold by reducing the number of patients declared with a condition (prevalence), or by increasing reported prevalence if they were above the upper threshold. This study examines the factors affecting delivered quality (the proportion of prevalent patients for indicators were achieved) and tests for gaming of exceptions and for prevalence reporting being responsive to financial incentives.Quality. Incentives. Gaming. Pay for performance.

Are General Practitioners Good for Endogenous Supply and Health

We investigate the impact of area general practitioner (GP) supply on individual health in England. If no allowance is made for the endogeneity of GP supply, the effect is positive but not statistically significant. When GP supply is instrumented by age related capitation the effect is markedly greater and statistically significant. A 10% increase in GP supply leads to an increase in the proportion of the population reporting very good health by 6% from 36%. The estimated cost per quality adjusted life year gained from an additional GP is between £527 and £5740.

Doctor Behaviour Under a Pay for Performance Contract: Evidence from the Quality and Outcomes Framework

Since 2003, 25% of UK general practitioners’ income has been determined by the quality of their care. The 65 clinical quality indicators in this scheme (the Quality and Outcomes Framework) are in the form of ratios, with financial reward increasing linearly with the ratio between a lower and upper threshold. The numerator is the number of patients for whom an indicator is achieved and the denominator is the number of patients the practices declares are suitable for the indicator. The number declared suitable is the number of patients with the relevant condition less the number exception reported by the practice for a specified range of reasons. Exception reporting is designed to avoid harmful treatment resulting from the application of quality targets to patients for whom they were not intended. However, exception reporting also gives GPs the opportunity to exclude patients who should in fact be treated in order to achieve higher financial rewards. This is inappropriate use of exception reporting or ‘gaming’. Practices can also increase income if they are below the upper threshold by reducing the number of patients declared with a condition (prevalence), or by increasing reported prevalence if they were above the upper threshold. This study examines the factors affecting delivered quality (the proportion of prevalent patients for indicators were achieved) and tests for gaming of exceptions and for prevalence reporting being responsive to financial incentives.Quality. Incentives. Gaming. Pay for performance.

Incentives and Targets in Hospital Care: Evidence from a Natural Experiment

Performance targets are commonly used in the public sector, despite their well known problems when organisations have multiple objectives and performance is difficult to measure. It is possible that such targets may work where there is considerable consensus that performance needs to be improved. We investigate this possibility by examining the response of the English National Health Service (NHS) to waiting time targets. Long waiting times have been a key issue for the NHS for many years. Using a natural policy experiment exploiting differences between countries of the UK, supplemented with a panel of data on English hospitals, we examine whether high profile targets to reduce waiting times met their goals of reducing waiting times without diverting activity from other less well monitored aspects of health care. Using this robust design, we find that targets led to a fall in waiting times without apparent reductions in other aspects of patient care.health care, waiting times, targets, incentives