Is corruption anti labor?

This paper investigates the effect of corruption on trade openness in low-income and high-income countries. The results suggest corruption is anti-labor, since it reduces trade in low-income countries and increases trade in high-income countries.Openness; corruption; Stolper-Samuelson effects

Political economy determinants of non-agricultural trade policy

The authors investigate several existing political economy hypotheses on trade policy using cross-country trade-protection data for non-agricultural goods. The authors find that a left-leaning political regime leads to pro-labor trade policies only for a subset of trade policy measures. In addition, they find that income inequality and country-level corruption appear to be important determinants of trade policy. For various measures of trade protection, it appears that corruption tends to hurt labor interests by increasing trade protection in labor-abundant countries and reducing trade protection in capital-abundant countries. This finding suggests that corruption, among other factors, may move trade policy away from the desires of the median voter.International trade ; Corruption ; Tariff

Corruption and trade protection: evidence from panel data

This paper provides new estimates of the effects of corruption and poor institutions on trade protection. It exploits data on several measures of trade protection including import duty, international trade taxes, and the trade-GDP ratio. The paper complements the literature on the relationship between corruption and trade reform. It deviates from the previous literature in several ways. First, unobserved heterogeneity among countries have been controlled with properly specified fixed effects exploiting the time dimension present in the dataset. Secondly, instead of using tariff and non-tariff barriers, more general measures of trade protection have been used. The issue of endogeneity of corruption with respect to trade policy has been addressed using proper instruments for corruption used in previous studies. Moreover, two separate institutional measures have been used in the same regression to estimate their comparative impacts on trade policy. In general, we find that corruption and lack of contract enforcement have strong impacts to increase trade protection and negative effects on trade openness.Corruption ; Tariff ; International trade

Political asymmetry and common external tariff in a customs union

We present a three-nation model, where two of the nations are members of a Customs Union (CU) and maintain a common external tariff (CET) on the third (non-member) nation. The producing lobby is assumed to be union-wide and lobbies both governments to influence the CET. The CET is determined jointly by the CU. We follow the political support function approach, where the CU seeks to maximize a weighted sum of the constituents? payoff functions, the weights reflecting the influence of the respective governments in the CU. A central finding of this paper is that the CET rises monotonically with the degree of asymmetry in the weights if the two countries are equally susceptible to lobbying. If the weights are the same, but the respective governments are asymmetric in their susceptibilities to lobbying, the CET also rises monotonically with this asymmetry. However, an increase in one type of asymmetry, in the presence of the other type of asymmetry, may reduce the CET.Tariff

Is corruption anti labor?

This paper investigates the effect of corruption on trade openness in low-income and high-income countries. The results suggest corruption is anti-labor, since it reduces trade in low-income countries and increases trade in high-income countries

Political Asymmetry and Common External Tariff in a Customs Union

We present a three-nation model, where two of the nations are members of a Customs Union (CU) and maintain a common external tariff (CET) on the third (non-member) nation. The producing lobby is assumed to be union-wide and lobbies both governments to influence the CET. The CET is determined jointly by the CU. We follow the political support function approach, where the CU seeks to maximize a weighted sum of the constituents’ payoff functions, the weights reflecting the influence of the respective governments in the CU. A central finding of this paper is that the CET rises monotonically with the degree of asymmetry in the weights if the two countries are equally susceptible to lobbying. If the weights are the same, but the respective governments are asymmetric in their susceptibilities to lobbying, the CET also rises monotonically with this asymmetry. However, an increase in one type of asymmetry, in the presence of the other type of asymmetry, may reduce the CET

Is corruption anti labor?

This paper investigates the effect of corruption on trade openness in low-income and high-income countries. The results suggest corruption is anti-labor, since it reduces trade in low-income countries and increases trade in high-income countries

Interaction between corruption and the GATT-WTO trade effect: a panel data analysis

Abstract Using cross-country time series data for 133 countries between 1984 and 2010, and implementing a fixed effects Poisson estimator using the gravity model of trade, we study the interaction between corruption and the treatment effect of a country joining the GATT-WTO on bilateral trade. Our results suggest an asymmetric effect of corruption on the GATT-WTO, in that domestic corruption has a negative impact on the GATT exporters while corruption in the trade partners' has a positive impact on the GATT importers. The insight highlights the importance of accounting for institutional heterogeneity among countries to explain mixed results on the effectiveness of the GATT-WTO for global trade

Is Corruption Anti-Labor?

This paper investigates the effect of corruption on trade openness in low-income and high-income countries. The results suggest corruption is anti-labor, since it reduces trade in low-income countries and increases trade in high-income countries.Openness, corruption, Stolper-Samuelson effects.