85 research outputs found
Russellian Monism and Mental Causation
© 2019 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.According to Russellian monism, consciousness is constituted at least partly by quiddities: intrinsic properties that categorically ground dispositional properties described by fundamental physics. If the theory is true, then consciousness and such dispositional properties are closely connected. But how closely? The contingency thesis says that the connection is contingent. For example, on this thesis the dispositional property associated with negative charge might have been categorically grounded by a quiddity that is distinct from the one that actually grounds it. Some argue that Russellian monism entails the contingency thesis and that this makes its consciousnessâconstituting quiddities epiphenomenalâa disastrous outcome for a theory that is motivated partly by its prospects for integrating consciousness into physical causation. We consider two versions of that argument, a generic version and an intriguing version developed by Robert J. Howell, which he bases on Jaegwon Kim's wellâknown âexclusion argument.â We argue that neither succeeds.Peer reviewe
Can A Quantum Field Theory Ontology Help Resolve the Problem of Consciousness?
The hard problem of consciousness arises in most incarnations of present day physicalism. Why should certain physical processes necessarily be accompanied by experience? One possible response is that physicalism itself should be modified in order to accommodate experience: But, modified how? In the present work, we investigate whether an ontology derived from quantum field theory can help resolve the hard problem. We begin with the assumption that experience cannot exist without being accompanied by a subject of experience (SoE). While people well versed in Indian philosophy will not find that statement problematic, it is still controversial in the analytic tradition. Luckily for us, Strawson has elaborately defended the notion of a thin subjectâan SoE which exhibits a phenomenal unity with different types of content (sensations, thoughts etc.) occurring during its temporal existence. Next, following Stoljar, we invoke our ignorance of the true physical as the reason for the explanatory gap between present day physical processes (events, properties) and experience. We are therefore permitted to conceive of thin subjects as related to the physical via a new, yet to be elaborated relation. While this is difficult to conceive under most varieties of classical physics, we argue that this may not be the case under certain quantum field theory ontologies. We suggest that the relation binding an SoE to the physical is akin to the relation between a particle and (quantum) field. In quantum field theory, a particle is conceived as a coherent excitation of a field. Under the right set of circumstances, a particle coalesces out of a field and dissipates. We suggest that an SoE can be conceived as akin to a particleâa SelfOnâwhich coalesces out of physical fields, persists for a brief period of time and then dissipates in a manner similar to the phenomenology of a thin subject. Experiences are physical properties of selfons with the constraint (specified by a similarity metric) that selfons belonging to the same natural kind will have similar experiences. While it is odd at first glance to conceive of subjects of experience as akin to particles, the spatial and temporal unity exhibited by particles as opposed to fields and the expectation that selfons are new kinds of particles, paves the way for cementing this notion. Next, we detail the various no-go theorems in most versions of quantum field theory and discuss their impact on the existence of selfons. Finally, we argue that the time is ripe for a rejuvenated Indian philosophy to begin tackling the three-way relationship between SoEs (which may become equivalent to jivas in certain Indian frameworks), phenomenal content and the physical world. With analytic philosophy still struggling to come to terms with the complex worlds of quantum field theory and with the relative inexperience of the western world in arguing the jiva-world relation, there is a clear and present opportunity for Indian philosophy to make a worldcentric contribution to the hard problem of experience
Tagging the world : descrying consciousness in cognitive processes
Although having conscious experiences is a fundamental feature of our everyday life,
our understanding of what consciousness is is very limited. According to one of the
main conclusions of contemporary philosophy of mind, the qualitative aspect of
consciousness seems to resist functionalisation, i.e. it cannot be adequately defined
solely in terms of functional or causal roles, which leads to an epistemic gap between
phenomenal and scientific knowledge. Phenomenal qualities, then, seem to be, in
principle, unexplainable in scientific terms. As a reaction to this pessimistic
conclusion it is a major trend in contemporary science of consciousness to turn away
from subjective experiences and re-define the subject of investigations in
neurological and behavioural terms. This move, however, creates a gap between
scientific theories of consciousness, and the original phenomenon, which we are so
intimately connected with.
The thesis focuses on this gap. It is argued that it is possible to explain features of
consciousness in scientific terms. The thesis argues for this claim from two
directions. On the one hand, a specific identity theory is formulated connecting
phenomenal qualities to certain intermediate level perceptual representations which
are unstructured for central processes of the embedding cognitive system. This
identity theory is hypothesised on the basis of certain similarities recognised between
the phenomenal and the cognitive-representational domains, and then utilised in
order to uncover further similarities between these two domains. The identity theory
and the further similarities uncovered are then deployed in formulating explanations
of the philosophically most important characteristics of the phenomenal domainâi.e.
why phenomenal qualities resist functionalisation, and why the epistemic gap occurs.
On the other hand, the thesis investigates and criticises existing models of reductive
explanation. On the basis of a detailed analysis of how successful scientific
explanations proceed a novel account of reductive explanation is proposed, which utilises so-called prior identities. Prior identities are prerequisites rather than
outcomes of reductive explanations. They themselves are unexplained but are
nevertheless necessary for mapping the features to be explained onto the features the
explanation relies on. Prior identities are hypothesised in order to foster the
formulation of explanatory claims accounting for target level phenomena in terms of
base level processesâand they are justified if they help projecting base level
explanations to new territories of the target level.
The thesis concludes that the identity theory proposed is a prior identity, and the
explanations of features of the phenomenal domain formulated with the aid of this
identity are reductive explanations proper. In this sense, the thesis introduces the
problem of phenomenal consciousness into scientific discourse, and therefore offers
a bridge between the philosophy and the science of consciousness: it offers an
approach to conscious experience which, on the one hand, tries to account for the
philosophically most important features of consciousness, whereas, on the other
hand, does it in a way which smoothly fits into the everyday practice of scientific
research
Conceivability and possibility : some dilemmas for Humeans
This research is published within the Project âThe Logic of Conceivabilityâ, funded by the European Research Council (ERC CoG), Grant Number 681404.The Humean view that conceivability entails possibility can be criticized via input from cognitive psychology. A mainstream view here has it that there are two candidate codings for mental representations (one of them being, according to some, reducible to the other): the linguistic and the pictorial, the difference between the two consisting in the degree of arbitrariness of the representation relation. If the conceivability of P at issue for Humeans involves the having of a linguistic mental representation, then it is easy to show that we can conceive the impossible, for impossibilities can be represented by meaningful bits of language. If the conceivability of P amounts to the pictorial imaginability of a situation verifying P, then the question is whether the imagination at issue works purely qualitatively, that is, only by phenomenological resemblance with the imagined scenario. If so, the range of situations imaginable in this way is too limited to have a significant role in modal epistemology. If not, imagination will involve some arbitrary labeling component, which turns out to be sufficient for imagining the impossible. And if the relevant imagination is neither linguistic nor pictorial, Humeans will appear to resort to some representational magic, until they come up with a theory of a âthird codeâ for mental representations.Publisher PDFPeer reviewe
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