From Corrupt to Knowledge Societies: How To Change Mentality?

In search of an answer to the questions of what a knowledge society is and how it emerges we draw connections between the macro-institutional theory of the American political economist Douglass C. North and the theory of micro-social mechanisms of the Swedish sociologist Peter Hedström. North considers the institutional framework of a society as determining, in principle, the structure of economic opportunities and incentives for social actors. Actors acquire those types of knowledge and skills that they perceive most “valuable” or “profitable” and, at the same time, using the acquired types of knowledge and skills, they perceive possibilities for new opportunities and incentives, i.e. for changing the institutional framework. In addition to being influenced by the structure of economic incentives, the actors’ perception of value/“profitability” is also impacted by “mental constructs”, which actors use in order to interpret the world around them. In Hedström’s view, on the other hand, desires, beliefs and opportunities of social actors determine their actions, which, in turn, have an impact on desires, beliefs and opportunities, and thus also the actions, of other actors. Desires and beliefs roughly correspond to the mental, while opportunities correspond to the structural component of the North’s approach. These theories imply that a society in which (1a) the majority of its members want to be successful and believe that success can be achieved only by investing an effort, and in which (1b) a system of rewards according to merits has been established – such a society will considerably differ from a corrupt society (2a) comprised of the majority desiring success, but believing that it can most expeditiously be achieved by exploiting social connections to powerful actors, and in which (2b) clientelism and corruption are not adequately sanctioned. Development of a knowledge society can be influenced (1) by developing a corresponding institutional framework of opportunities and incentives, (2) by disseminating an appropriate narrative through various modalities of public discourse in order to influence desires and beliefs of social actors, and particularly (3) through acting by example, which provides a means to prove credibility of proclaimed intentions

An Overview of Research on Political Attitudes in Croatia

The article presents an overview of research on political attitudes in Croatia since the beginning of 1990s. There is a considerable number of works investigating political attitudes, written mainly by political scientists, psychologists and sociologists. Admittedly, many of these works are available only in Croatian. The significance and diversity of topics covered by various authors indicate the necessity of further efforts in synthesizing this substantial body of interdisciplinary scientific knowledge. This article is a step in that direction

About Modelling of Complex Networks with Applications to Terrorist Group Modelling

Based on available data on various organisations and networks, the article explores some key properties of the structure of a terrorist organisation. Analytical focus is on lower levels of organisational hierarchy, where network structure with exponential distribution of the number of links among network nodes is clearly visible. Such networks tend to grow organically, are very efficient in information diffusion, and are robust regarding stochastic failures and targeted attacks. These network features are illustrated by recent example based on network data about September 11, 2001 attacks on New York and Washington

Essays on Political Actors and Attitudes: Do They Constitute Distributed Reflexivity? Part 1: Median Voter Theorem vs. Competence Fields

European political elites are faced with a loss of trust and the emergence of a growing number of sometimes rather obscure new political movements. How is this to be explained? What is the relationship between the logic that guides political attitudes of constituencies and the logic of political actors whose legitimacy is rooted in electoral choice of the constituencies? In this essay we approach this question from a systemic perspective, regarding this relationship as a problem solving feedback cycle. Classical approaches, such as the median voter theorem, view political actors as passively mirroring voters’ preferences. An alternative approach that we suggest, assumes that the perception of competences of political actors on the part of constituencies is key in the sense that it does not only reflect voters’ preferences, but it is also manipulable through the agency of political actors themselves. More generally, we argue that the perception of competence is socially constructed and contextually dependent

Essays on Political Actors and Attitudes: Do They Constitute Distributed Reflexivity? Part 2: A Dynamical Typology of Rationality

What is the relationship between the logic that guides political attitudes of constituencies and the logic of political actors, whose legitimacy is rooted in electoral choice of the constituencies? Classical approaches, such as the median voter theorem, view political actors as passively mirroring voters’ preferences. An alternative approach, that we suggested in the first part of this series of essays, assumes that how constituencies see the competences of political actors, is crucial, in the sense that it does not only reflect voters’ preferences, but it is also manipulable by the agency of political actors themselves. In this article we provide additional arguments in support of the thesis that the perception of competences is socially constructed and contextually dependent. We hypothesise that in times of well-being the logic of appropriateness prevails among both the constituencies and their political representatives, while in times of crisis constituencies resort to the logic of arguing, and leaders predominantly use the logic of consequences with some admixtures of the logic of arguing. Our arguments draw on Raymond Boudon’s neo-Weberian “judicatory” or “cognitivist” model of rationality; on the theory of securitisation developed by Barry Buzan and his collaborators, under the influence of “speech act” theory of John Austin; and on the typology of basic logics of action, first proposed by James March and Johan Olsen, and later refined by Thomas Risse, under the influence of Jürgen Habermas

Essays on Political Actors and Attitudes: Do They Constitute Distributed Reflexivity? Part 3: Long-Term Dynamics Towards Deliberative Democracy

In this final part of our series of essays we discuss the consequences of our earlier stated hypotheses that in times of well-being the logic of appropriateness prevails among both the constituencies and their political representatives, while in times of crisis constituencies resort to the logic of arguing, and leaders predominantly use the logic of consequences with some admixtures of the logic of arguing. Over a longer term we expect a gradual shift from the logic of consequences toward the logic of arguing in times of crises. However, we do not expect that such a shift necessarily leads to a greater societal problem-solving capacity, since self-referential communicative processes may lead to what we call “communicative bubbles”. Yet, we also argue that societies developing more deliberative strands of democracy have significant potential to come close to the condition of distributed reflexivity, characterized by the fact that each member of a society is able to start or join a discussion on any issue of his or her concern, to exercise his or her reasoning freely, and to make up his or her mind on any such issue, taking into account, when doing so, that other people have equal capacities and equal rights to do the same. We conclude that a plurality of deliberatively democratic societies have significant potential to develop genuine problem-solving capacities, and not merely communicative bubbles

Slovensko-hrvatski granični spor i Schellingova teorija pregovaranja

Bit je spora u različitim gledanjima dviju država na metodu utvrđivanja morske granice. Metodu razgraničenja regulira čl. 15. Konvencije UN-a o pravu mora koji nije posve jasan, što ga čini podložnim različitim interpretacijama