Who Are Better Informed Before Analysts’ Forecast Changes?

Using Korean data, we investigate information asymmetry among investors before analysts change their stock recommendations. By comparing trading activities between individuals, institutions, and foreign investors, we find that there is information asymmetry before analysts change their recommendations. Institutional investors buy/sell the stock before recommendation upgrades/downgrades, but individuals and foreign investors do not anticipate the upcoming news. We also document that the trade imbalance of institutional investors are associated with stock returns upon the announcements of recommendation changes. This result indicates that institutions take advantage of their superior information around the recommendation changes.     

Investment barriers and premiums on closed-end country funds

We investigate the cross-sectional relation between investment barriers and premiums on closed-end country funds (CECFs) traded in U.S. markets over the period from 1995 to 2004. We find that funds investing in markets with higher indirect investment barriers as measured by market turnover and country risk have higher premiums. We also document that the relation between the country risk and CECF premium is much stronger after the stock market liberalization. Since investors prefer to invest in emerging markets with high indirect barriers through country funds, they increase the premiums of the funds targeting those countries. In addition, we find that direct investment barriers as measured by the investable weight factor do not explain the large variation in the CECF premiums.Closed-end country funds Investment barriers Fund premium

Company stock in defined contribution plans and stock market returns

Purpose: We examine whether employee ownership in DC plans are explained by either shared capitalism or managerial entrenchment motives. Design/methodology/approach: We calculate the average monthly risk-adjusted return (alpha) of each portfolio by sorting firms into six portfolio groups based on the percentage of employer stock in market value of equity. Findings: We find that the zero-investment strategy of buying a portfolio without employee ownership and selling a portfolio with the largest employee ownership earns 1.32% of alpha per month. Further, we provide evidence that portfolios with higher employee ownership experience greater distress risk. Research limitations/implications: These findings suggest that the capital market significantly overvalues firms with employee ownership in DC plans, supporting managerial entrenchment motives. Originality/value: To the extent that there has been no research to provide time series evidence on the relation between employee ownership and stock returns, this study's novelty is that it could explain the mixed results presented by previous literature