Growth, Development and Land-Use in a Simple Agrarian Economy with Endogeneous Population

The paper analyses the relation between demographic transformation, agricultural transformation and land-use pressure within a simple agrarian economy where population is treated both as a cause and consequence of economic changes. In this Malthusian-type of economy, population growth and food production are interrelated through two production activities. First, agricultural land and labour are tied up in production of agricultural products determining the current flow of consumption. Secondly, labour is used for converting the natural resource base in the form of wilderness, land into agricultural land. It is demonstrated that the economy can run into a poverty trap equilibrium which is the typical Malthusian situation. Alternatively, the equilibrium can be of a high income per capita type. Increasing returns to scale in food production together with an increasing amount of agricultural land, are the crucial factors behind this outcome. As increasing return to scale can be interpreted as if induced innovations take place, and can be seen in light of the presence of Boserup growth mechanisms.

EXPLOITING A LOCAL COMMON: EGOISTIC VS. ALTRUISTIC BEHAVIOR

The paper analyzes the exploitation of a local common where the behavior is steered by altruism rooted in social norms. The analysis is illustrated by using the Gordon-Schäfer model of a fishery. We start by reviewing the standard results when all exploiters are purely egoists; i.e., when own utility depends only on own profit. Under the assumption of identical harvesting efficiency for all owners, we then introduce social norms and find the consequences for the resource utilization and welfare under various degrees of altruism. It is demonstrated that more altruism generally leads to less harvesting effort, less economic overexploitation of the resource stock, and increased resource rent. In a next step, we open up for differences in harvesting technology. It is shown that a high degree of altruism, in addition to a large efficiency gap among the owners, restricts the possibility of an exploitation scheme where all owners participate in the harvesting activity. The possibility of a two-channel efficiency improvement as a result of more altruism is also demonstrated.Resource /Energy Economics and Policy,

Wildlife conflicts: Wolves vs. moose

During the last few decades, the grey wolf (Canis lupus) has re-colonised Scandinavia. The current population counts some 430 individuals. With the wolf re-colonisation, several conflicts have arisen. One important conflict is due to wolf predation on moose (Alces alces). This conflict is studied under the assumption of landowner profit maximisation as well as routinised harvesting behaviour. The analysis emphasises how compensation for the predation loss affects landowner management and harvest profitability. The solutions to the landowner problems are also compared to the overall (social planner) management situation, where traffic costs due to moose–vehicle and railway collisions are included

Growth, Development and Land-Use in a Simple Agrarian Economy with Endogeneous Population

The paper analyses the relation between demographic transformation, agricultural transformation and land-use pressure within a simple agrarian economy where population is treated both as a cause and consequence of economic changes. In this Malthusian-type of economy, population growth and food production are interrelated through two production activities. First, agricultural land and labour are tied up in production of agricultural products determining the current flow of consumption. Secondly, labour is used for converting the natural resource base in the form of wilderness, land into agricultural land. It is demonstrated that the economy can run into a poverty trap equilibrium which is the typical Malthusian situation. Alternatively, the equilibrium can be of a high income per capita type. Increasing returns to scale in food production together with an increasing amount of agricultural land, are the crucial factors behind this outcome. As increasing return to scale can be interpreted as if induced innovations take place, and can be seen in light of the presence of Boserup growth mechanisms

The Political Economy of Wildlife Exploitation

In this paper we analyze the exploitation of wildlife in a Third World context. In the model there are two agents: an agency managing a habitat area of fixed size and a group of peasants. The agency managing the habitat area has the legal right to exploit the wildlife, while the local people hunt illegally. Introducing the concept of relative harvesting dominance, we demonstrate that the stock utilization depends crucially on the prevailing economic and ecological conditions. It is also shown that the existing property-rights regime appears in different forms depending on these conditions.

Wildlife management, illegal hunting and conflicts. A bioeconomic analysis

The paper analyzes the conflict between illegal and legal exploitation of wildlife species in an East African context. In the model there are two agents, an agency managing a national park of fixed area and a group of local people living in the vicinity of the park. The park agency has the legal right to exploit the wildlife, while the local people hunt illegally. Because of the property rights, the park agency has incentives to invest in the stock of wildlife, while the behaviour of the local people is steered by short-term considerations. The model is analyzed in two steps. Firstly, the market solution is studied. Next, the model is examined when user and property rights are given to the local people.

Does the Existence of a Public Good Enhance Cooperation among Users of Common-Pool Resources?

Without resorting to the folk theorem or to altruistic preferences, we demonstrate that the problem of overharvesting among individually rational harvesters in a local commons vanishes if the harvesters share, and voluntarily contribute to, some public good. Formulating the model as a two-stage sequential game, the harvesting of a renewable natural resource takes place at the first stage. The observed harvesting surplus is then used for buying private goods and contributing to public goods at the second stage. In this setting, the model shows that the harvesters share an individual objective of maximizing total harvesting surplus.

Real Estate Price Formation: Energy Performance Certificates and the Role of Real Estate Agents

Improving energy efficiency in buildings is a major priority of industrialized countries. By eliminating market asymmetries, Energy Performance Certificates (EPCs) is a potential policy instrument when it comes to promoting energy efficiency of real estate. Real estate agents have an important role in providing information about dwellings for sale on the market. The aim of this paper is to study whether the introduction of EPCs changes the asking price setting of real estate agents. We take advantage of the fact that the introduction of a mandatory energy certification system represents a quasi-natural experiment, where we have data on house price and asking price. Based on the analysis, both of a hedonic model and a fixed effect model, we provide evidence that the implementation of EPCs did not affect the price setting of real estate agents. This indicates that real estate agents either disregard EPCs as providers of new information or believe that the market is indifferent to this kind of information. Our results also indicate that there are large similarities between the effects of energy labels on the asking prices and the transaction prices

Energy performance certificates - Informing the informed or the indifferent?

Energy Performance Certificates (EPCs) are intended to provide tenants and buyers with reliable information about the energy performance of buildings. As improved energy performance may increase building sale prices and rents, the EPCs are supposed to generate incentives for owners to invest in energy efficiency. The empirical evidence for a price premium associated with energy labels is, however, inconclusive and partly contradictory. By utilizing data from the Norwegian housing market, we reproduce the positive price premium effect found in earlier studies. However, when we check these results by taking advantage of the fact that the introduction of a mandatory energy certification system represents a quasi-natural experiment, we find no evidence of a price premium. On the contrary, we present evidence that there is no effect of the energy label itself