307 research outputs found
Confronting the Peppercorn Settlement in Merger Litigation: An Empirical Analysis and a Proposal for Reform
Shareholder litigation challenging corporate mergers is ubiquitous, with the likelihood of a shareholder suit exceeding 90%. The value of this litigation, however, is questionable. The vast majority of merger cases settle for nothing more than supplemental disclosures in the merger proxy statement. The attorneys that bring these lawsuits are compensated for their efforts with a court-awarded fee. This leads critics to charge that merger litigation benefits only the lawyers who bring the claims, not the shareholders they represent. In response, defenders of merger litigation argue that the lawsuits serve a useful oversight function and that the improved disclosures that result are beneficial to shareholders. This Article offers a new approach to assessing the value of these claims by empirically testing the relationship between merger litigation and shareholder voting on the merger. If the supplemental disclosures produced by the settlement of merger litigation are valuable, they should affect shareholder voting behavior. Specifically, supplemental disclosures that are, in effect, âcompelledâ by settlement should produce new and unfavorable information about the merger and lead to a lower percentage of shares voted in favor of it. Applying this hypothesis to a hand-collected sample of 453 large public company mergers from 2005-2012, we find no such effect. We find no significant evidence that disclosure-only settlements affect shareholder voting. These findings warrant a reconsideration of Delaware merger law. Specifically, under current law, supplemental disclosures are viewed by courts as providing a substantial benefit to the shareholder class. In turn, this substantial benefit entitles the plaintiffsâ lawyers to an award of attorneysâ fees. Our evidence suggests that this legal analysis is misguided and that supplemental disclosures do not in fact constitute a substantial benefit. As a result, and in light of the substantial costs generated by public company merger litigation, we argue that courts should reject disclosure settlements as a basis for attorney fee awards. Our approach responds to critiques of merger litigation as excessive and frivolous by reducing the incentive for plaintiffsâ lawyers to bring weak cases, but it would have an additional benefit. Current practice drags state court judges into the task of indirectly promulgating disclosure standards in connection with the approval of fee awards. We argue, instead, for a more efficient specialization between state and federal courts in the regulation of mergers: public company merger disclosure should be policed by the federal securities laws while state corporate law focuses on substantive fairness
Confronting the Peppercorn Settlement in Merger Litigation: An Empirical Analysis and a Proposal for Reform
Shareholder litigation challenging corporate mergers is ubiquitous, with the likelihood of a shareholder suit exceeding 90%. The value of this litigation, however, is questionable. The vast majority of merger cases settle for nothing more than supplemental disclosures in the merger proxy statement. The attorneys that bring these lawsuits are compensated for their efforts with a court-awarded fee. This leads critics to charge that merger litigation benefits only the lawyers who bring the claims, not the shareholders they represent. In response, defenders of merger litigation argue that the lawsuits serve a useful oversight function and that the improved disclosures that result are beneficial to shareholders. This Article offers a new approach to assessing the value of these claims by empirically testing the relationship between merger litigation and shareholder voting on the merger. If the supplemental disclosures produced by the settlement of merger litigation are valuable, they should affect shareholder voting behavior. Specifically, supplemental disclosures that are, in effect, âcompelledâ by settlement should produce new and unfavorable information about the merger and lead to a lower percentage of shares voted in favor of it. Applying this hypothesis to a hand-collected sample of 453 large public company mergers from 2005-2012, we find no such effect. We find no significant evidence that disclosure-only settlements affect shareholder voting. These findings warrant a reconsideration of Delaware merger law. Specifically, under current law, supplemental disclosures are viewed by courts as providing a substantial benefit to the shareholder class. In turn, this substantial benefit entitles the plaintiffsâ lawyers to an award of attorneysâ fees. Our evidence suggests that this legal analysis is misguided and that supplemental disclosures do not in fact constitute a substantial benefit. As a result, and in light of the substantial costs generated by public company merger litigation, we argue that courts should reject disclosure settlements as a basis for attorney fee awards. Our approach responds to critiques of merger litigation as excessive and frivolous by reducing the incentive for plaintiffsâ lawyers to bring weak cases, but it would have an additional benefit. Current practice drags state court judges into the task of indirectly promulgating disclosure standards in connection with the approval of fee awards. We argue, instead, for a more efficient specialization between state and federal courts in the regulation of mergers: public company merger disclosure should be policed by the federal securities laws while state corporate law focuses on substantive fairness
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Whistle-blowing by external auditors: seeking legitimacy for the South African audit profession?
Auditing is often cited as playing an important role in managing agency-related costs and, accordingly, being integral to the sound functioning of capital markets. There may, however, be more to the attest function than a technical rational practice. By virtue of relying heavily on claims to technical expertise, professionalism, prudential judgement and public confidence, auditing is both a source of legitimacy for organisations and, paradoxically, dependent on claims to legitimacy for its continued existence. From this perspective, recent regulatory developments, purportedly enacted to increase arms-length control over the profession, may not only be about improving perceived audit quality and practice but also about ensuring continued faith in the well-established âritualsâ of the assurance function. A reporting duty imposed on South African external auditors, akin to whistle-blowing, is used as a case study to explore this perspective. In doing so, this paper contributes to the scant body of interpretive research on auditing, simultaneously offering one of the first insights into auditing regulation from an African perspective
The Problem of Sunsets
An increasing percentage of corporations are going public with dual class stock in which the shares owned by the founders or other corporate insiders have greater voting rights than the shares sold to public investors. Some commentators have criticized the dual class structure as unfair to public investors by reducing the accountability of insiders; others have defended the value of dual class in encouraging innovation by providing founders with insulation from market pressure that enables them to pursue their idiosyncratic vision.
The debate over whether dual class structures increase or decrease corporate value is, to date, unresolved. Empirical studies have failed to provide conclusive evidence as to the effect of dual class structures, and calls for regulators or stock exchanges to adopt prohibitions banning dual class structures outright have been unsuccessful, although several index providers have banned dual class stock from major indexes such as the S&P 500.
As a result, some commentators have advocated a compromise position permitting corporations to go public with dual class structures but requiring that they include mandatory time-based sunset provisions. The sunset provisions would automatically convert the dual class structure to a single share structure after the passage of a pre-determined period of time. The Council of Institutional Investors has asked the New York Stock Exchange and Nasdaq to refuse to list the shares of dual class firms unless they contain a time-based sunset provision that would convert within seven years.
This Article does not take a position on whether dual class structures are value-enhancing, but it does challenge the proposition that time-based sunsets are an appropriate response to the debate over dual class structures and that they should be imposed through regulation or stock exchange rules. To the extent that dual class structures are problematic, sunsets do not solve that problem. Moreover, time-based sunsets are an arbitrary response to the concern that developments such as the decline in a founderâs economic interest or the transfer of high-vote shares to third parties may reduce the attractiveness of the dual class structure. In addition, time-based sunsets create potential moral hazard problems. Further, because of their problematic incentives, minority shareholders cannot address the limitations of time-based sunsets through a retention vote.
This Article observes that event-based sunsets, which have received less attention, focus on the specific developments that are likely to erode the potential value of dual class structures, and calls for market participants to explore them further through private ordering. Nonetheless, it argues that, at the present time, investors and policymakers lack sufficient information about either dual class or sunsets to justify using regulation, index requirements, or stock exchange rules to force companies into adopting sunsets. Last, it argues that, rather than relying on compulsory sunsets to evade the difficult policy issues raised by dual class, the debate should encompass a more thorough framing of the role and importance of shareholder voting rights
Should Corporations Have a Purpose?
Corporate purpose is the hot topic in corporate governance. Critics are calling for corporations to shift their purpose away from shareholder value as a means of addressing climate change, equity and inclusion, and other social values. We argue that this debate has overlooked the critical predicate questions of whether a corporation should have a purpose at all and, if so, what role it serves.
We start by exploring and rejecting historical, doctrinal, and theoretical bases for corporate purpose. We challenge the premise that purpose can serve a useful function either as a legal constraint on managerial discretion or as a tool to promote the interests of stakeholders over those of shareholders.
Instead, we identify an instrumental function for corporate purpose. Because a corporation consists of a variety of constituencies with differing interests and objectives, an articulated, measurable, and enforceable corporate purpose enables those constituencies both to select those corporations with which they wish to identify and to navigate the terms of that association through contract or regulation. We highlight the role of purpose in enabling a corporation to commit to core policies of its business model and for which the corporation has a comparative advantage. Critically, our instrumental view highlights the role of purpose as a voluntary tool to facilitate the goals of corporate participants rather than a regulatory instrument to promote specific public policies
The âValueâ of a Public Benefit Corporation
We examine the âvalueâ a PBC form provides for publicly-traded corporations. We analyze the structure of the PBC form and find that other than requiring a designated social purpose it does not differ significantly in siting control and direction with shareholders. We also examine the purpose statements in the charters of the most economically significant PBCs. We find that, independent of structural limitations on accountability, these purpose statements are, in most cases, too vague and aspirational to be legally significant, or even to serve as a reliable checks on PBC behavior. We theorize, and provide evidence, that without a legal or structural tool for binding a PBC to specific social objectives, the operational decisions of the publicly traded PBC may be subject to change according to the vision and preferences of individual officers, directors and shareholders. Our conclusions provide support for a more defined and enforceable PBC purpose statement for publicly-traded PBCs. Otherwise, publicly-traded PBCs are likely to operate no differently than traditional, publicly-traded corporations
The New Titans of Wall Street: A Theoretical Framework for Passive Investors
Passive investors â ETFs and index funds â are the most important development in modern day capital markets, dictating trillions of dollars in capital flows and increasingly owning much of corporate America. Neither the business model of passive funds, nor the way that they engage with their portfolio companies, however, is well understood, and misperceptions of both have led some commentators to call for passive investors to be subject to increased regulation and even disenfranchisement. Specifically, this literature takes a narrow view both of the market in which passive investors compete to manage customer funds and of passive investorsâ participation in the capital markets.We respond to this failure by providing the first comprehensive theoretical framework for passive investment and its implications for corporate governance. To start, we explain that, to understand passive funds, it is necessary to understand the institutional context in which they operate. Two key insights follow. First, because passive funds are simply a pool of assets â their incentives are a product of the overall business operations of fund sponsors. Second, although passive funds are locked into their investments, their shareholders are not. Like all mutual fund investors, shareholders in index funds can exit at any time by selling their shares and receiving the net asset value of their ownership interest. Consequently, the sponsors of passive funds must compete on both price and performance with other investment options â including both other passive funds and actively-managed funds -- for investor dollars. As we explain, this competition provides passive fund sponsors with a variety of incentives to engage. Furthermore, the size of the major fund sponsors and the breadth of their holdings affords them economies of scale enabling them to engage effectively.An examination of passive investor engagement in corporate governance demonstrates that passive investors behave in accordance with this theory. Passive investors are devoting greater sophistication and resources to engagement with their portfolio companies and are exploiting their comparative advantages â their size, breadth of portfolio and resulting economies of scale -- to focus on issues with a broad market impact, such as potential corporate governance reforms, that have the potential to reduce the underperformance and mispricing of portfolio companies. Passive investors use these tools, as opposed to analyzing firm-specific operational issues, to reduce the relative advantage that active funds gain through their ability to trade.We conclude by exploring the overall implications of the rise of passive investment for corporate law and financial regulation. We argue that, although existing critiques of passive investors are unfounded, the rise of passive investing raises new concerns about ownership concentration, conflicts of interest and common ownership. We evaluate these concerns and the extent to which they warrant changes to existing regulation and practice
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We can even feel that we are poor, but we have a strong and rich spirit : learning from the lives and organization of the women of Tira Chapeu, Cape Verde.
This study explores, through participant observation and interviewing, the meaning of the experience of Cape Verdean women who participate in a base group of the national women\u27s organization of Cape Verde, Organizacao das Mulheres de Cabo Verde (OMCV). The study addresses the significance of this type of organizational activity for Third World women, seeking to illuminate the perspective of women who participate in it. It also has three underlying purposes: (1) to fulfill a goal of feminist research to see the world from women\u27s viewpoint; (2) to aid outside \u27helpers\u27 of such organizations to understand them more fully; (3) to contribute to theory-building about women organizing by examining multiple theoretical perspectives in light of a Cape Verdean group\u27s reality. Based on 20 months of field research carried out during 1989-1991 with the OMCV base group in a low-income peri-urban neighborhood of the capital city, the study asks: What are the relationships between important themes in the women\u27s lives and the activities and issues of their group? To answer this question, I studied the women\u27s words about their lives and their group, revealed in individual interviews, group discussions, and informal conversation, and blended these with my participant observation experiences with the women, their group, and their community, situated within the national context. The study chronicles and reflects on this process of doing research across cultures using an interactive, interpretive approach within an openly feminist research program. From the study of the women\u27s life stories, four major themes emerged: (1) the economic imperative and women\u27s responsibility for survival, (2) the dynamics of help ties, (3) self-respect, pride, and status, and (4) issues of change and resistance. In the analysis of how these themes relate to women\u27s organization activity, the help relationship symbolized by the madrinha, or godmother, appears key in defining group purposes, functioning, and relations. I suggest that the women\u27s organization expresses tensions evident in Cape Verdean society at large involving gender, economics, and social relations and status, while it also serves as a subtle challenge to the status quo in the consciousnesses of women
The ISCIP Analyst, Volume V, Issue 3
This repository item contains a single issue of The ISCIP Analyst, an analytical review journal published from 1996 to 2010 by the Boston University Institute for the Study of Conflict, Ideology, and Policy
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The emergence of integrated private reporting
Purpose: Private social and environmental reporting (SER) has grown considerably in recent years, consistent with a rise in institutional investor engagement and dialogue with investee companies. We interpret the emergence of integrated private reporting through the lens of institutional logics. We frame the emergence of integrated private reporting as a merging of two hitherto separate and possibly rival institutional logics.
Methodology/Approach: We interviewed 19 companies listed on the FTSE100 and 20 UK institutional investors. The interviews were semi-structured and analysed in an interpretive fashion.
Findings and Implications: We provide evidence to suggest that private SER is beginning to merge with private financial reporting and that, as a result integrated private reporting is emerging. This trend is mirroring the international trend in public reporting toward an integrated approach. Specifically, we find that specialist social responsible investment managers are starting to attend private financial reporting meetings whilst mainstream fund managers are starting to attend private meetings on environmental, social and governance (ESG) issues. Further, senior company directors are becoming increasingly conversant with ESG issues. We interpret our findings as two possible scenarios: (i) there is a genuine hybridisation occurring in UK institutional investment such that integrated private reporting is emerging, or; (ii) the financial logic is absorbing and effectively neutralising the responsible investment logic.
Originality: This is the first research investigating the evolution of private integrated reporting
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