Concentration Levels in the U.S. Advertising and Marketing Services Industry: Myth vs. Reality

This paper analyzes changes in concentration levels in the U.S. Advertising and Marketing Services (A&MS) industry using publicly released data that have been largely ignored in past discussions of the industrial organization of this industry, namely those available from the U.S. Census Bureau's quinquennial Economic Census and the Service Annual Survey. We define the A&MS industry in terms of nine sectors, each of which is represented by a separate 5 digit NAICS category. In so doing, we have sought to redress some of the measurement problems surrounding estimates found in the existing literature. Our main findings are threefold. First, in the case of the core and largest sector, Advertising Agencies, firm level concentration as measured by Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) increased slightly but remained relatively low from 1977 to 2002. All of the HHI estimates readily satisfied the standard widely used to characterize an industry as "unconcentrated." We find mixed support for the hypotheses that the ranks of mid-sized agencies were depleted by ongoing waves of mergers and acquisitions and resulted in a polarized size structure. The size distributions of agency revenue have become more polarized in the sense that over time they appear more skewed, more dispersed, and exhibit greater inequality. The share of total receipts realized by small agencies fell while that of large agencies rose. However, the position of mid-sized agencies appears to have changed little over the period 1977- 2002, as measured by the shares of agencies and receipts they represent. Second, concentration levels in 1997 and 2002 varied across the nine sectors comprising the A&MS industry, but all were within the range generally considered as indicative of a competitive industry. Third, we developed concentration ratios at the level of holding companies (HC's) and find that the four largest HC's captured between a fifth and a quarter of total revenue from the A&MS industry, a share that remained quite stable over the period, 2002-2006. These estimates are lower by an order of magnitude than estimates often cited in the trade press. Reasons for the discrepancy are discussed.

Costs, Institutional Mobility Barriers, and Market Structure: Advertising Agencies as Multiproduct Firms

What accounts for the diversity and limited concentration that has long characterized the organization of the advertising agency industry? This question is addressed by treating an advertising agency as a multiproduct firm. The firm's product line or service mix is defined in terms of the set of different media categories where an agency places the advertising messages which it creates on behalf of its clients. Evidence is presented indicating that the structure of demand and costs in the advertising agency industry conforms to the conditions that MacDonald and Slivinski (1987) showed were required for an industry to sustain an equilibrium with diversified firms. Building on this framework, we formulate a set of three hypotheses relating to the realization of product-specific scale and scope economies. The first two hypotheses posit that given low fixed costs and minimal entry barriers, both media-specific scale and scope economies are available and can be exploited by relatively small-size agencies. The third hypothesis suggests that large agencies may experience diseconomies of scope as a consequence of excessive diversification induced by two pervasive industry institutional phenomena: (i) 'bundling' of agency services to match client demand for a mix of media advertising; and (ii) 'conflict policy' which prohibits an agency from serving competing accounts and operates as a mobility constraint. Utilizing a multiproduct cost function, we estimate media-specific scale and scope economies for a cross-section of 401 U.S. agencies in 1987. The results obtained support the set of three hypotheses outlined above.

The Internalization of Advertising Services: An Inter-IndustryAnalysis

The common perception appears to be that vertical integration of advertising services is more the exception than the rule in the U.S. advertising industry. This study investigates the extent of such outsourcing and examines inter-industry variation in the use of in-house rather than independent advertising agencies by U.S. advertisers. While the vast majority of large advertisers employ outside agencies, it comes as a surprise to find that when advertisers of all sizes are considered, about half operate some form of in-house agency. Internalization of advertising services is much more widespread than has hitherto been appreciated and varies widely across industries. To explain this variation, we draw on concepts from research on scale economies and transaction costs to develop a set of hypotheses which we test in cross sectional analyses of data covering 69 two digit SIC industries at two points in time, 1991 and 1999. Across industries, we find that the likelihood of internalization of advertising services decreases as the size of advertising outlays increase but increases as advertising intensity and technological intensity increase and is greater for "creative" industries.Advertising Agencies, In-House, Vertical Integration, Make or Buy

Intermedia Substitutability and Market Demand by National Advertisers

We assess substitutable and complementary relationships among eight national advertising media classes, as well as the magnitude of their own-price elasticities. We use a translog demand model, whose parameters we estimate by three-stage least squares, based on 1960-94 annual U.S. data.We find aggregate demand by national advertisers for each of the eight media is own-price inelastic, and that cross-price elasticities suggest slightly more substitute than complementary relationships, although both are rather weak. These patterns are consistent with long prevailing institutional arrangements and media selection practices.

Economic Factors Underlying the Unbundling of Advertising Agency Services

This paper addresses a longstanding puzzle involving the unbundling of services that has occurred over more than two decades in the U.S. advertising agency industry: How can the shift from the bundling to the unbundling of services be explained and what accounts for the slow pace of change? Using a cost-based theoretical framework of bundling due to Evans and Salinger (2005, 2008), we develop a simple model of an advertising agency's decision to unbundle its services as a tradeoff between the fixed cost to the advertiser of establishing and maintaining a relationship with an advertising agency and pecuniary economies of scale available in providing media services. The results from an econometric analysis of cross-sectional and pooled data collected by the U.S. Census Bureau for quinquennial censuses conducted between 1982 and 2002 support the key predictions of the model. We find that advertising agency establishments are more likely to unbundle if they are large and diversified in their service offerings and are less likely to do so with increasing age and greater geographical scope. We also find a strong trend toward unbundling over time, a result that is partially explained by increases in media prices over time.

Advertising Bans and the Substitutability of Online and Offline Advertising

The authors examine whether the growth of the Internet has reduced the effectiveness of government regulation of advertising. They combine nonexperimental variation in local regulation of offline alcohol advertising with data from field tests that randomized exposure to online advertising for 275 different online advertising campaigns to 61,580 people. The results show that people are 8% less likely to say that they will purchase an alcoholic beverage in states that have alcohol advertising bans compared with states that do not. For consumers exposed to online advertising, this gap narrows to 3%. There are similar effects for four changes in local offline alcohol advertising restrictions when advertising effectiveness is observed both before and after the change. The effect of online advertising is disproportionately high for new products and for products with low awareness in places that have bans. This suggests that online advertising could reduce the effectiveness of attempts to regulate offline advertising channels because online advertising substitutes for (rather than complements) offline advertising.Google (Firm)WPP (Firm

The use of preference and perception measures in new product development: an exposition and review.

Prepared for use in the Management Science in Marketing summer session at M.I.T., Sept., 1968