True, justified, belief? Partisanship weakens the positive effect of news media literacy on fake news detection

To investigate how people assess whether politically consistent news is real or fake, two studies (N = 1,008; N = 1,397) with adult American participants conducted in 2020 and 2022 utilized a within-subjects experimental design to investigate perceptions of news accuracy. When a mock Facebook post with either fake (Study 1) or real (Study 2) news content was attributed to an alternative (vs. a mainstream) news outlet, it was, on average, perceived to be less accurate. Those with beliefs reflecting News Media Literacy demonstrated greater sensitivity to the outlet’s status. This relationship was itself contingent on the strength of the participant’s partisan identity. Strong partisans high in News Media Literacy defended the accuracy of politically consistent content, even while recognizing that an outlet was unfamiliar. These results highlight the fundamental importance of looking at the interaction between user-traits and features of social media news posts when examining learning from political news on social media

Serious violent behavior and antisocial outcomes as consequences of exposure to ethnic‐political conflict and violence among Israeli and Palestinian youth

Peer Reviewedhttps://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/149258/1/ab21818.pdfhttps://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/149258/2/ab21818_am.pd

The spoiler effect: Framing attitudes and expectations toward peace

This study analyzes the impact of media framing on aggregate attitudes and expectations of Israelis toward the Oslo peace process with the Palestinians during a time period of eight years (1995-2003). It presents three main contributions: First, it provides a long-term analysis of the impact of media coverage of a peace process on public opinion, while controlling for the influence of real life events. Second, it presents empirical evidence that the strength of media framing effects varies among different facets of public opinion. Specifically, framing effects are stronger on aggregate future expectations compared with their effects on aggregate current attitudes. The fact that the information transmitted by the media evaluative tone was a central source of influence on future expectations underlines the central role of the media in political and social phenomena. Third, in line with previous studies, it shows that the public response to negative framing is much stronger than to positive framing. This may have a negative effect on a government's ability to rally the public in support of a peace process. Since most media coverage of the peace process and conflict focused on negative developments while ignoring positive ones, the media effect on public opinion was that of peace spoilers.framing effects, Israel, media and peace, media framing, negativity bias, Palestine, public expectations

"You're still worth it": The moral and relational context of politically motivated unfriending decisions in online networks.

Political disagreements in social media can result in removing (i.e., "unfriending") a person from one's online network. Given that such actions could lead to the (ideological) homogenization of networks, it is pivotal to understand the psychological processes intertwined in unfriending decisions. This requires not only addressing different types of disagreements but also analyzing them in the relational context they occur. This article proposes that political disagreements leading to drastic measures such as unfriending are attributable to more deeply rooted moral dissents. Based on moral foundations theory and relationship regulation research, this work presents empirical evidence from two experiments. In both studies, subjects rated political statements (that violated different moral foundations) with regard to perceived reprehensibility and the likelihood of unfriending the source. Study 1 (N = 721) revealed that moral judgments of a political statement are moderately related to the unfriending decision. Study 2 (N = 822) replicated this finding but indicated that unfriending is less likely when the source of the morally reprehensible statement is relationally close to the unfriender and provides emotional support. This research extends unfriending literature by pointing to morality as a new dimension of analysis and offers initial evidence uncovering the psychological trade-off behind the decision of terminating digital ties. Drawing on this, our findings inform research on the homogenization of online networks by indicating that selective avoidance (in the form of politically motivated unfriending) is conditional upon the relational context and the interpersonal benefits individuals receive therein

Data_Sheet_1_True, justified, belief? Partisanship weakens the positive effect of news media literacy on fake news detection.docx

To investigate how people assess whether politically consistent news is real or fake, two studies (N = 1,008; N = 1,397) with adult American participants conducted in 2020 and 2022 utilized a within-subjects experimental design to investigate perceptions of news accuracy. When a mock Facebook post with either fake (Study 1) or real (Study 2) news content was attributed to an alternative (vs. a mainstream) news outlet, it was, on average, perceived to be less accurate. Those with beliefs reflecting News Media Literacy demonstrated greater sensitivity to the outlet’s status. This relationship was itself contingent on the strength of the participant’s partisan identity. Strong partisans high in News Media Literacy defended the accuracy of politically consistent content, even while recognizing that an outlet was unfamiliar. These results highlight the fundamental importance of looking at the interaction between user-traits and features of social media news posts when examining learning from political news on social media.</p

ADHD and political participation: An observational study

Background and objective Over the past decade, researchers have been seeking to understand the consequences of adult attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) for different types of everyday behaviors. In this study, we investigated the associations between ADHD and political participation and attitudes, as ADHD may impede their active participation in the polity. Methods This observational study used data from an online panel studying the adult Jewish population in Israel, collected prior the national elections of April 2019 (N = 1369). ADHD symptoms were assessed using the 6-item Adult ADHD Self-Report (ASRS-6). Political participation (traditional and digital), news consumption habits, and attitudinal measures were assessed using structured questionnaires. Multivariate linear regression analyses were conducted to analyze the association between ADHD symptoms (ASRS score Results 200 respondents (14.6%) screened positive for ADHD based on the ASRS-6. Our findings show that individuals with ADHD are more likely to participate in politics than individuals without ADHD symptoms (B = 0.303, SE = 0.10, p = .003). However, participants with ADHD are more likely to be passive consumers of news, waiting for current political news to reach them instead of actively searching for it (B = 0.172, SE = 0.60, p = .004). They are also more prone to support the idea of silencing other opinions (B = 0.226, SE = 0.10, p = .029). The findings hold when controlling for age, sex, level of education, income, political orientation, religiosity, and stimulant therapy for ADHD symptoms. Conclusions Overall, we find evidence that individuals with ADHD display a unique pattern of political activity, including greater participation and less tolerance of others’ views, but not necessarily showing greater active interest in politics. Our findings add to a growing body of literature that examines the impact of ADHD on different types of everyday behaviors

ADHD and political participation: An observational study.

Background and objectiveOver the past decade, researchers have been seeking to understand the consequences of adult attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) for different types of everyday behaviors. In this study, we investigated the associations between ADHD and political participation and attitudes, as ADHD may impede their active participation in the polity.MethodsThis observational study used data from an online panel studying the adult Jewish population in Israel, collected prior the national elections of April 2019 (N = 1369). ADHD symptoms were assessed using the 6-item Adult ADHD Self-Report (ASRS-6). Political participation (traditional and digital), news consumption habits, and attitudinal measures were assessed using structured questionnaires. Multivariate linear regression analyses were conducted to analyze the association between ADHD symptoms (ASRS score Results200 respondents (14.6%) screened positive for ADHD based on the ASRS-6. Our findings show that individuals with ADHD are more likely to participate in politics than individuals without ADHD symptoms (B = 0.303, SE = 0.10, p = .003). However, participants with ADHD are more likely to be passive consumers of news, waiting for current political news to reach them instead of actively searching for it (B = 0.172, SE = 0.60, p = .004). They are also more prone to support the idea of silencing other opinions (B = 0.226, SE = 0.10, p = .029). The findings hold when controlling for age, sex, level of education, income, political orientation, religiosity, and stimulant therapy for ADHD symptoms.ConclusionsOverall, we find evidence that individuals with ADHD display a unique pattern of political activity, including greater participation and less tolerance of others' views, but not necessarily showing greater active interest in politics. Our findings add to a growing body of literature that examines the impact of ADHD on different types of everyday behaviors

RESEARCHING MISLEADING INFORMATION WITHIN HYBRID MEDIA ECOLOGIES. WHERE WE ARE AND WHERE WE ARE GOING

On friday November 13, a group of coordinated attacks hit Paris causing more than 130 victims. The frantic moments following the first fragmented news, the spread of rumors and the wide media coverage of the following days, highlighted all the strength and fragility of an hybrid media system in which new and old media logics compete and integrate. During the hours following the attacks, we have witnessed the spread of testimonies published on social media and widely diffused by legacy media, we have observed the emergence of forms of cooperation aimed at supporting the search for the missing and we have participated in the ritual of collective mourning with the hashtag #PrayforParis. At the same time, however we have also read numerous reports that, although eventually proved to be false, have contributed to shape the representation of those events. Contemporary information ecologies, by simplifying processes of production and circulation of news, could also facilitate the diffusion of false information and/or unverified news. In this context, new digital elites (i.e. bloggers, social media power users etc.), legacy media actors and non-elites are still in search of a strategy for real time verification and debunking. Previous studies emphasized the importance of echo chamber effects and "confirmation bias" (the tendency to consider true information that confirms what we already believe true) as the cognitive process that, at the same time, makes misinformation easy to spread and difficult to debunk. Peer networks play an important role as a source of confirmation or disconfirmation of rumors. As a result, homophilic and polarized communities represent a fertile ground for disinformation. Recent studies also pointed out the combined effect of "confirmation bias" and online communities often characterized by a high degree of homogeneity. While widely analyzed from different disciplines, both the studies on spread of rumors, and false or misleading information still lack that level of conceptual coherence that would allow different approaches and academic backgrounds to fruitful collaborate. Recognizing this limit, several defining attempts have been carried on. By pinpointing the limits of existing predominantly actor-oriented taxonomies when applied to hybrid media ecologies, the first paper in this panel introduces an alternative process-based classification that distinguishes between “mis-information” (where a false information generated by a third actor is, in a short run, picked up and diffused by mainstream media, without verification and producing legitimization), “pseudo-information” (where “alternative” media sources produce information aimed at correcting the mainstream media system by giving voices to alternative takes on reality considered not adequately represented by traditional media) and “fake-information” (in which media actors specialized in the production of false information injects fake-news, mainly within social media ecologies for propaganda, to get attention and clicks, to earn revenues from online ads). The three following papers further elaborate on each of those category: By presenting a new model of news flow in the hybrid media ecologies, the second paper in this panel will dig deeper and shed more light on the processes behind “mis-information” with a specific focus on the effects of the SNS proliferation on news production, and especially on the quality and diversity of the information presented. The third paper in this panel discusses the role played by social media as platforms where news as well rumours circulates in response to a lack of transparency on mainstream media. The empirical analysis of the conversations originated on Weibo by the 2015 devastating explosions in Tianjin - northern China -, highlights an alternative take on the beneficial role of “pseudo-information” as a form of counter-power against the ruling regime in authoritarian contexts. The fourth and last paper, presents the findings from a multi-sided online ethnographic study of 12 Danish Facebook pages that during 2015, claimed to be run by radical Islamists living in Denmark and through aggressive and violent language, proclaimed that Muslims in the country were plotting to destroy the Danish society from within. Contents created by this orchestrated campaign of “fake-information”, received thousands of comments the majority of which contained counter-aggression towards not only the page admins but also Muslims and immigrants in general. This massive user attention turned the pages into sites of aggression and xenophobia, making them part of a much larger discursive struggle to define the ‘’truth’’ about Muslims and immigrants in the country. Combined, these papers explore some of the ways in which theoretical and empirical scholarly investigations can open up paths for a new cross-disciplinary research agenda on the spread of misleading information in contemporary hybrid media ecologies