A Cloud-Oriented Cross-Domain Security Architecture

The Monterey Security Architecture addresses the need to share high-value data across multiple domains of different classification levels while enforcing information flow policies. The architecture allows users with different security authorizations to securely collaborate and exchange information using commodity computers and familiar commercial client software that generally lack the prerequisite assurance and functional security protections. MYSEA seeks to meet two compelling requirements, often assumed to be at odds: enforcing critical, mandatory security policies, and allowing access and collaboration in a familiar work environment. Recent additions to the MYSEA design expand the architecture to support a cloud of cross-domain services, hosted within a federation of multilevel secure (MLS) MYSEA servers. The MYSEA cloud supports single-sign on, service replication, and network-layer quality of security service. This new cross domain, distributed architecture follows the consumption and delivery model for cloud services, while maintaining the federated control model necessary to support and protect cross domain collaboration within the enterprise. The resulting architecture shows the feasibility of high-assurance, cross-domain services hosted within a community cloud suitable for interagency, or joint, collaboration. This paper summarizes the MYSEA architecture and discusses MYSEA's approach to provide an MLS-constrained cloud computing environment.Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

A Cloud-Oriented Cross-Domain Security Architecture

The Monterey Security Architecture addresses the need to share high-value data across multiple domains of different classification levels while enforcing information flow policies. The architecture allows users with different security authorizations to securely collaborate and exchange information using commodity computers and familiar commercial client software that generally lack the prerequisite assurance and functional security protections. MYSEA seeks to meet two compelling requirements, often assumed to be at odds: enforcing critical, mandatory security policies, and allowing access and collaboration in a familiar work environment. Recent additions to the MYSEA design expand the architecture to support a cloud of cross-domain services, hosted within a federation of multilevel secure (MLS) MYSEA servers. The MYSEA cloud supports single-sign on, service replication, and network-layer quality of security service. This new cross domain, distributed architecture follows the consumption and delivery model for cloud services, while maintaining the federated control model necessary to support and protect cross domain collaboration within the enterprise. The resulting architecture shows the feasibility of high-assurance, cross-domain services hosted within a community cloud suitable for interagency, or joint, collaboration. This paper summarizes the MYSEA architecture and discusses MYSEA's approach to provide an MLS-constrained cloud computing environment.Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

SecureCore Software Architecture: SecureCore Operating System (SCOS) functional specification

This document describes the interface to the SecureCore operating systems (SCOS) for Phase 0 of the SecureCore project. Phase 0 is a rapid prototype with only enough specified functionality to demonstrate progress and potential capabilities of the SecureCore project. The SCOS interface includes a software emulation of the Secret-Protecting (SP) processor extensions [1]. Because this is a Phase 0 functional specification, this document is considered to be a rapid-prototype specification within a spiral life cycle model. This document is expected to change as experience is gained with the Least Privilege Separation Kernel (LPSK) environment or as better approaches are identified.NSF Grant no. CNS-0430566 and CNS-0430598 with support from DARPA AT