Theorizing ideas and discourse in political science: intersubjectivity, neo-institutionalisms, and the power of ideas

Oscar Larsson’s (2015) essay condemns discursive institutionalism for the “sin” of subjectivism. In reality, however, discursive institutionalism emphasizes the intersubjective nature of ideas through its theorization of agents’ “background ideational abilities” and “foreground discursive abilities.” It also avoids relativism by means of Wittgenstein’s distinction between experiences of everyday life and pictures of the world. Contrary to Larsson, what truly separates post-structuralism from discursive institutionalism is the respective approaches’ theorization of the relationship of power to ideas, with discursive institutionalists mainly focused on persuasive power through ideas, while post-structuralists focus on the structural power in ideas or on coercive power over ideas

Forgotten Democratic Legitimacy: “Governing by the Rules” and “Ruling by the Numbers”

Introduction: During the euro’s sovereign debt crisis, European leaders have become obsessed with rules, numbers, and pacts. This has reinforced an approach that began with the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, which set out numerical targets for inflation, deficits, and debt for member-states adopting the Single Currency, was formalized by the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) of 1999, but accelerated during the Eurozone crisis beginning in 2010. In quick succession EU leaders signed up for the so-called ‘Six-Pack,’ the ‘Two-Pack,’ and the ‘Fiscal Compact,’ each more stringent on the nature of the rules, more restrictive with regard to the numbers, and more punitive for member-states that failed to meet the requirements. In the absence of any deeper political integration that could provide greater democratic representation and control over an everexpanding supranational governance, the EU has ended up with ‘governing by the rules’ and ‘ruling by the numbers’ in the Eurozone. What has become clear as a result of the crisis of the Euro is that the EU is not just missing an economic union and a fiscal union; it is also missing a political union. During the crisis, the EU abandoned any pretense to respecting the long-standing ‘democratic settlement’ in which Commission, Council, and European Parliament all contributed in their different ways to decision-making via the ‘Community Method.’ Instead, Eurozone governance combined excessive intergovernmentalism—as EU member-state leaders generated the stability-based rules in the European Council while treating the Commission largely as a secretariat—with increased supranationalism. While the ECB pressed the member-states to engage in austerity and structural reform in a quid pro quo for its own more vigorous monetary interventions, the Commission gained enhanced budgetary oversight powers to apply the restrictive numerical targets. In all of this, moreover, the European Parliament was largely sidelined

Rethinking EU governance: from ‘old’ to ‘new’ approaches to who steers integration*

*I wish to thank the guest editors of this Special Issue, Mark Pollack and Mareike Kleine, for their impressive stewardship of the entire project along with their extremely perceptive and careful editorial suggestions for my own article. I would also like to thank the anonymous referees for their very helpful comments and their close reading of the manuscript. The manuscript has its origins in a working paper for the Istituto Affari Internazionali, and benefited from comments by Lorenzo Vai and Pier Domenico Tortola. Its elaboration was undertaken under the auspices of the EU Commission Horizon 2020 project: ‘European Legitimacy in Governing through Hard Times’ (# 649456—ENLIGHTEN), and further benefited from comments by Ramona Coman, Amandine Crespy and Frederik Ponjaert. Thanks to them for their insightful suggestions as well as to participants in the workshops at Princeton and the EUI, including the two commentators on my article, Gerda Falkner and Lewis G. Miller, and especially, needless to say, Andrew Moravcsik himself.EU scholars have long been divided on the main drivers of European integration. The original approaches were at odds on whether EU level intergovernmental actors or supranational actors were better able to exercise coercive or institutional power to pursue their interests, with Andrew Moravcsik's liberal intergovernmentalism serving as a baseline for one side of those debates. Newer approaches are similarly divided, but see power in terms of ideational innovation and consensus‐focused deliberation. The one thing old and new approaches have in common is that they ignore the parliamentarists, new and old. What all sides to the debates have failed to recognize is the reality of a ‘new’ EU governance of more politically charged dynamics among all three main EU actors exercising different kinds of power. This has roots not only in the national level's increasing ‘politics against policy’ and its bottom up effects on the EU level. It also stems from EU institutional interactions at the top, and its ‘policy with politics’.Accepted manuscrip

The European Union: democratic legitimacy in a regional state?

'Das 'Demokratiedefizit' der EU stellt für die einzelnen EU-Mitgliedsstaaten ein größeres Problem dar als für das EU-System insgesamt. Die Legitimität der EU ist nur insofern problematisch, wenn sie mit nationalstaatlich verfassten Demokratien wie etwa den Vereinigten Staaten verglichen wird, deren Legitimität auf dem Grundsatz des Regierens 'durch, von und für die Bürger' sowie 'mit den Bürgern' beruht. Stattdessen scheint es angebracht die EU als Regionalstaat zu betrachten, in dem die Souveränität geteilt ist, die Grenzen variabel und Identitäten gemischt sind, es multiple Ebenen und Formen des Regierens gibt, und in dem die Demokratie unvollständig ist, da das Regieren 'für und mit den Bürgern' über die Herrschaft 'durch und von den Bürgern' gestellt wird. Diese Art der Regierungsform belastet die nationale Politik und erfordert einen besseren Diskurs, um die Veränderungen auf nationaler Ebene legitimieren zu können.' (Autorenreferat)'The 'democratic deficit' represents a greater problem for EU member-states individually than for the EU as a whole. Legitimacy for the EU is problematic mainly if it is contrasted with a national democracy such as the US, which has finality as a nation-state and legitimacy predicated on government 'by, of, and for the people' as well as 'with the people'. Instead, the EU is best considered as a regional state, with divided sovereignty, variable boundaries, multiple levels and modes of governance, composite identity, and an incomplete democracy in which government for and with the people is emphasized over and above government by and of the people. This puts special burdens on national politics and demands better discourse to legitimize the changes in national polities.' (author's abstract)

"Theorizing Democracy in Europe: The Impact of the EU on National and Sectoral Policy-making Processes"

[From the Introduction]. In this paper, I begin with a consideration of the relationship between institutional structures and policymaking processes, then examine the nature of the ‘macro’ policymaking patterns in the EU and its member-states, and finally explore the ‘micro’ patterns of relations in policy sectors. I illustrate with the cases of Britain, France, Germany, and Italy

Why are neoliberal ideas so resilient in Europe’s political economy?

Despite the economic crisis that hit full force in 2008 in the US and Europe, political leaders have made little attempt to rethink the neoliberal ideas that are in large part responsible for the boom and bust, let alone to come to terms with how immoderate the ‘Great Moderation’ really was. Much the contrary, neoliberal ideas seem to continue to constitute the ruling ideas. In the financial markets, where the crisis began, reregulation remains woefully inadequate, while the only ideas in play are neoliberal, either for more ‘market-enhancing’ regulation or in favor of greater laissez-faire. The biggest puzzle, however, is the response to the crisis by Eurozone countries that have embraced ‘market discipline’ through austerity and, in so doing, have condemned themselves to slow or no growth. This is in contrast to the US, which has posted better economic results, despite being torn between Republican fundamentalists advocating austerity and a more pragmatic leadership focused on growth

European emergency politics and the question of legitimacy

Emergency politics raises theoretical questions about the legitimacy of executive authorities’ governing activities in times of crisis, and in particular whether ensuring effective outcomes (output) can make up for the temporary suspension of political responsiveness (input) and accountable procedures (throughput). Answers depend not only on the specifics of the emergency actions but also on executives’ rhetorical power to legitimize such actions via ideational/discursive coercion, structuring, or persuasion. After outlining the theoretical issues involved, this contribution considers the legitimacy and rhetorical power of political executives in multilateral emergency politics and technical executives in supranational emergency politics. It uses the cases of the Council and the ECB in the Eurozone and Covid-19 crises in illustration, considering their legitimacy over time, between a crisis’ fast-burning phase of emergency politics and its slow-burning phase of legitimizing normalization or delegitimation.Accepted manuscrip

Theorizing institutional change and governance in European responses to the Covid-19 pandemic

Published versio

Does discourse matter in the politics of building social pacts on social protection?: international experiences

Includes bibliographyDiscourse always matters in the politics of building social pacts on social protection —for failure as much as for success. And by discourse, we mean not just the ideas behind the social pacts but the policy debates and political discussions surrounding the negotiation of those pacts. Over the past three decades, with globalization a major driving force in the international economy, new social pacts have been negotiated and older ones renegotiated. Many of these negotiations have been underpinned by neoliberal ideas focused on increasing flexibility in labor markets through greater management ability to hire and fire at will, on improving worker productivity or reducing unemployment through labor market activation policies, and on cutting the costs of the welfare state through reducing benefits and introducing competition in services. But they have also been moderated by social-democratic and social liberal ideas emphasizing respect for workers' rights and job protections, the improvement of working hours, working conditions, and worker training, and the maintenance or enhancement of workers' benefits and social services over the lifecycle