1,296 research outputs found
When prices hardly matter: Incomplete insurance contracts and markets for repair goods
This paper looks at markets characterized by the fact that the demand side is insured. In these markets a consumer purchases a good to compensate consequen¬ces of unfavorable events, such as an accident or an illness. Insurance policies in most lines of insurance base indemnity on the insured’s actual expenses, i.e., the insured would be partially or completely reimbursed when purchasing certain goods. In this setting we discuss the interaction between insurance and repair markets by focusing, on the one hand, upon the development of prices and the structure of markets with insured consumers, and, on the other hand, the resulting backlash on optimal insurance contracting. We show that even in the absence of ex post moral hazard the extension of insurance coverage will lead to an increase in prices as well as to a socially undesirable increase in the number of repair service suppliers, if repair markets are imperfect
When prices hardly matter: Incomplete insurance contracts and markets for repair goods
This paper locks at markets charaterized by the fact that the demand side is insured. In these markets a consumer purchases a good to compensate consequences of unfavorable events, such as an accident or an illness. Insurance policies in most lines of insurance base indemnity on the insured's actual expenses, i. e., the insured would be partially or completely reimbursed when purchased certain goods. In this setting we discuss the interaction between insurance and repair markets by focusing, on the one hand, upon on development of prices and the market structure in markets with insured customers, and, on the other hand, the resulting backlash on optimal insurance contracting. --insurance,incomplete contracts,repair markets
When prices hardly matter: Incomplete insurance contracts and markets for repair goods
This paper looks at markets characterized by the fact that the demand side is insured. In these markets a consumer purchases a good to compensate consequen¬ces of unfavorable events, such as an accident or an illness. Insurance policies in most lines of insurance base indemnity on the insured’s actual expenses, i.e., the insured would be partially or completely reimbursed when purchasing certain goods. In this setting we discuss the interaction between insurance and repair markets by focusing, on the one hand, upon the development of prices and the structure of markets with insured consumers, and, on the other hand, the resulting backlash on optimal insurance contracting. We show that even in the absence of ex post moral hazard the extension of insurance coverage will lead to an increase in prices as well as to a socially undesirable increase in the number of repair service suppliers, if repair markets are imperfect.insurance; incomplete contracts; repair markets
When prices hardly matter: Incomplete insurance contracts and markets for repair goods
This paper looks at markets characterized by the fact that the demand side is insured. In these markets a consumer purchases a good to compensate consequences of unfavorable events, such as an accident or an illness. Insurance policies in most lines of insurance base indemnity on the insured’s actual expenses, i.e., the insured would be partially or completely reimbursed when purchasing certain goods. In this setting we discuss the interaction between insurance and repair markets by focusing, on the one hand, upon the development of prices and the market structure in markets with insured customers, and, on the other hand, the resulting backlash on optimal insurance contracting.Incomplete Contracts, Insurance, Repair Markets
The mean circulation of the Atlantic Ocean north of 30S determined with the adjoint method applied to an ocean general circulation model
The large-scale mean circulation of the Atlantic Ocean is examined using a general circulation model (GCM) and its approximate adjoint. A cost function is specified that requires the model inputs to be consistent with hydrographic observations and observed air-sea fluxes of heat and freshwater, whereas the velocity field has to adjust to the modified thermohaline initial and boundary conditions. The optimized, quasi-steady model state is closer to the observed circulation state than previous prognostic steady-state models of comparable resolution. However, it is only partially consistent with the error estimates derived from the observations. In the western boundary region large deviations of the optimized surface fluxes from the observations occur. Additionally, the heat release of the ocean shows unrealistically high values at around 60N. At quasi-equilibrium, in large parts of the thermocline values for temperature and salinity along the Gulf Stream and the North Atlantic current are significantly lower than those in the hydrographic data, thus tending toward winter-time conditions. The model produces a meridional overturning cell with maximum values of 16 to 23 Sv for different experiments. The corresponding heat transports reach maximum values between 0.83 and 1.07 Ă— 105 W. Model deficiencies like the inappropriate spatial and temporal resolution obviously prevent realistic estimates of water mass distributions and surface fluxes not only in the area of the western boundary current. Another shortcoming of the presented results is the parameterization of eddies and subgrid-scale processes by poorly known diffusion coefficients. To overcome these problems at least partly, future models based on the adjoint method should have a seasonal and increased spatial resolution
Intermediation, Compensation and Collusion in Insurance Markets
Recent events involving major insurance companies and insurance brokerage firms highlight substantial incentive problems in commercial and reinsurance markets where intermediation takes place. We show that in markets with informed as well as uninformed consumers and heterogeneous risk profiles intermediation has the potential to improve social welfare. However, since intermediation reduces insurers’ market power, incentives for tacit collusion are higher compared to markets without intermediation. A controversial matter in the discussion concerning insurance intermediation is the issue of compensation customs. Our analysis provides explanations for the counterintuitive observation that brokers are usually compensated by insurance companies. The rationale for the latter is the fact that a fee paid by uninformed consumers limits the insurers’ ability to extract rents from informed consumers.insurance; brokerage; collusion; compensation; information
Intermediation, compensation and tacit collusion in insurance markets
Recent events involving major insurance companies and insurance brokerage firms highlight substantial incentive problems in commercial and reinsurance markets where intermediation takes place. We show that in markets with informed as well as uninformed consumers and heterogeneous risk profiles intermediation has the potential to improve social welfare. However, since intermediation reduces insurers’ market power, incentives for tacit collusion are higher compared to markets without intermediation. A controversial matter in the discussion concerning insurance intermediation is the issue of compensation customs. Our analysis provides explanations for the counterintuitive observation that brokers are usually compensated by insurance companies. The rationale for the latter is the fact that a fee paid by uninformed consumers limits the insurers’ ability to extract rents from informed consumers. -- Aktuelle Ereignisse in der deutschen und der US-amerikanischen Industrieversicherung deuten nachhaltige Anreizprobleme in der Beziehung zwischen Anbietern, Nachfragern und den beteiligten Versicherungsvermittlern an. In den USA wurde dem weltgrößten Versicherungsmakler Marsh & McLennan vorgeworfen, Industrieversicherungsverträge bewusst zu schlechteren Konditionen bzw. zu überhöhten Preisen vermittelt und im Gegenzug unverhältnismäßig hohe erfolgsabhängige Provisionen erhalten zu haben. In Deutschland verhängte das Bundeskartellamt sowohl im März 2005 als auch im September 2005 Bußgelder in Höhe von 150 Mio. Euro gegen 17 führende Industrieversicherer und deren Vorstände. Die beteiligten Industrieversicherungsunternehmen wurden unter anderem beschuldigt, seit 1999 Versicherungsbedingungen und -preise gemeinschaftlich verabredet zu haben. Im Fokus unseres Beitrages stehen unter anderem die folgenden Fragestellungen: Welchen Einfluss haben Vermittler auf Wettbewerbsintensität und Wohlfahrt in Versicherungsmärkten? Wie lassen sich Anreize zur Anbieterkollusion im Bereich der Industrieversicherung erklären? Welche Vorteile hat die vorherrschende Provisionierung, bei welcher der Vermittler vom Versicherer bezahlt wird, gegenüber einer Beratungsgebühr, die der beauftragende Kunde entrichtet? Die zuvor beschriebenen Forschungsfragen werden in einem modifizierten Hotelling-Oligopolmodell untersucht. Im betrachteten Versicherungsmarkt fragen sowohl informierte als auch uninformierte Nachfragergruppen mit jeweils unterschiedlichen Risikoprofilen Versicherungsprodukte nach. Die zentralen Modellergebnisse, die anhand des aktuellen Kartellverfahrens gegen deutsche Industrieversicherungsunternehmen verdeutlicht werden, lassen sich wie folgt zusammenfassen: Die Existenz von Vermittlern führt in Versicherungsmärkten mit teilweise uninformierten Nachfragern einerseits zu Wohlfahrtsgewinnen und erhöht andererseits den Wettbewerbsdruck auf die Anbieter. Infolgedessen steigen die Anreize zur Kollusion auf der Anbieterseite. Aus gesamtwirtschaftlicher Sicht ist die Wahl des Entlohnungssystems auf einem Konkurrenzmarkt im gewählten Modell irrelevant, wenn eine Falschberatung von uninformierten Kunden ausgeschlossen ist. Die Teilnehmer des Anbieterkartells können in einem Provisionierungssystem höhere Konsumentenrenten abschöpfen als in einem Vergütungssystem mit Beratungsgebühr.insurance,brokerage,collusion,compensation,information
Entlohnung und Regulierung unabhängiger Versicherungsvermittler
Unabhängige Vermittler erbringen im Rahmen Ihrer Tätigkeiten wichtige Dienstleistungen für Versicherungsunternehmen und Versicherungsnehmer. Zum einen soll für Versicherungsnehmer in vielen Bereichen passender Versicherungsschutz besorgt werden (Produktauswahl). Darüber hinaus können Vermittler im Rahmen ihrer Beratung zum Teil wichtige risikorelevante Umstände von Versicherungsnehmern beobachten, die Versicherungsunternehmen zu Berechnung adäquater Prämien benötigen (Risikoklassifikation). Ziel des Beitrages ist es, die Auswirkungen unterschiedlicher Entlohnungssysteme für unabhängige Versicherungsvermittler auf zentrale Marktfunktio-nen zu untersuchen. Darüber hinaus soll eingehender analysiert werden, inwieweit die Neuregelungen zum Vermittlerrecht in Deutschland dazu geeignet sind, die Beratungsqualität bzw. Effizienz der Intermediation durch unabhängige Vermittler im Bereich komplexer Risiken zu erhöhen
A technique for the determination of surface heat and freshwater fluxes from hydrographic observations, using an approximate adjoint ocean circulation model
A technique to determine the large-scale time-averaged ocean circulation from hydrographic observations and surface flux estimates is described. It is based on an inversion of the Bryan-Cox ocean general circulation model. We have constructed an approximate adjoint to that model which is computationally simpler and more economic than the exact adjoint. The optimization algorithm, although not optimal in a statistical sense, allows calculation of all state variables such that they are consistent with the equilibrium dynamics of the circulation model and agree as closely as possible with the observed data. To verify the technique, we have performed identical twin experiments with the circulation model in an idealized geometry. It is found that in principle the true model state including surface fluxes can be recovered with acceptable accuracy, even if no information on the surface fluxes is available. Under ideal conditions, the resulting rms errors of the surface fluxes were as low as 3 W/m2 and 0.2 m/year for heat and freshwater, respectively. Regions of deep-water formation due to convection show however larger errors on a small spatial scale, depending on the nonlinear, threshold-like nature of convective adjustment. The optimized solutions are distinctly sensitive to the integration time interval, with optimal values around three years. The results suggest that the procedure is suitable to obtain a consistent description of the oceanic state, and in particular more accurate estimates of the air-sea heat and freshwater fluxes
Entlohnung und Regulierung unabhängiger Versicherungsvermittler
Unabhängige Vermittler erbringen im Rahmen Ihrer Tätigkeiten wichtige Dienstleistungen für Versicherungsunternehmen und Versicherungsnehmer. Zum einen soll für Versicherungsnehmer in vielen Bereichen passender Versicherungsschutz besorgt werden (Produktauswahl). Darüber hinaus können Vermittler im Rahmen ihrer Beratung zum Teil wichtige risikorelevante Umstände von Versicherungsnehmern beobachten, die Versicherungsunternehmen zu Berechnung adäquater Prämien benötigen (Risikoklassifikation). Ziel des Beitrages ist es, die Auswirkungen unterschiedlicher Entlohnungssysteme für unabhängige Versicherungsvermittler auf zentrale Marktfunktio-nen zu untersuchen. Darüber hinaus soll eingehender analysiert werden, inwieweit die Neuregelungen zum Vermittlerrecht in Deutschland dazu geeignet sind, die Beratungsqualität bzw. Effizienz der Intermediation durch unabhängige Vermittler im Bereich komplexer Risiken zu erhöhen.insurance intermediation; compensation; regulation
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