210 research outputs found

    Zur Beziehung von Akzeptanz, Gerechtigkeit und LeistungsfÀhigkeit der sozialen Marktwirtschaft

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    Nicht nur vor dem Hintergrund der aktuellen Umfragen ist die Fragestellung des vorliegenden Beitrags dreiteilig. ZunĂ€chst geht es um die Frage, was wir ĂŒber die Akzeptanz der sozialen Marktwirtschaft eigentlich wissen - und wie die empirisch ermittelte Akzeptanz sich zur theoretisch begrĂŒndbaren verhĂ€lt. In einem zweiten Schritt soll analysiert werden, welche Rolle die (wahrgenommenen) Gerechtigkeit als Determinante der Akzeptanz spielt. Auch hier gibt es eine wirtschaftstheoretische Perspektive und eine empirische. In der Zusammenfassung werden Akzeptanz bzw. Gerechtigkeit der LeistungsfĂ€higkeit der sozialen Marktwirtschaft gegenĂŒbergestellt und ihre mögliche Interdependenz diskutiert - auch anhand von empirischen Daten. Die systematische Analyse der möglichen Ursachen der Akzeptanz einer Wirtschaftsordnung ist notwendig, um mögliche (wirtschafts-)politische Ansatzpunkte und Transmissionsmechanismen zur Verbesserung der Akzeptanz der Wirtschaftsordnung zu finden. Der Ausblick beinhaltet daher Hinweise auf solche Ansatzpunkte Diese zu finden ist insbesondere dann sinnvoll, wenn die Akzeptanz die LeistungsfĂ€higkeit bzw. StabilitĂ€t der Wirtschaftsordnung beeinflusst

    Does better information about hospital quality affect patients’ choice? Empirical findings from Germany

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    Background: Economic theory strongly suggests that better information about the quality of care affects patients’ choice of health service providers. However, we have little empirical evidence about the impact of information provided on provider’s choice in Germany. Problem: In Germany, we recently find publicly available information about hospital quality. For example, 50 percent of the hospitals in the Rhine-Ruhr area do now publish their quality data voluntarily in a comprehensive, understandable and well prepared publication. Empirically, we see a strong demand for this publication. However, we do not have information so far, if – and how – this information affect patients’ choice of hospitals. Data and methodology: We take cross sectional time series data from more than 700.000 patients in the Rhine-Ruhr area and in the Cologne-Bonn area (control group) for the time period 2003 to 2006, i.e. 16 quarters. We examine whether the publication of quality information affects market shares and number of cases of the hospitals as well as travelling distance that patients accept to get to the hospital of their choice. In order to account for hospital-specific heterogeneity, we use fixed and random effects models. Results: First: Hospitals, which publish their quality data voluntarily, do attract more patients – compared to such hospital, that do not publish their quality data. Second: In the group of the publishing hospitals, hospitals with a higher than average quality slightly increased their market shares, whereas hospitals with a lower than average quality lost market shares. Conclusion: The provision of quality data has a significant impact on hospital choice: a higher quality leads to a higher demand. Based on these finding decision makers in hospitals have strong incentives (i) to make quality information publicly available and (ii) to keep their quality of care high.Keywords: Quality of care, Information, Hospital Choice JEL Classifications: I 12, C 33

    KĂŒnftige Ausgabenentwicklung in der GKV und Ihre Finanzierung

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    Die unterschiedlichen Reformkonzepte der Parteien zur Finanzierung der Gesetzlichen Krankenversicherung spielten im Wahlkampf eine wichtige Rolle. Wie wird sich das Ausgabenvolumen der Gesetzlichen Krankenversicherung langfristig entwickeln? Welche Belastungen sind mit den unterschiedlichen Finanzierungsverfahren verbunden? --

    Die Entwicklung der Ausgaben in der Gesetzlichen Krankenversicherung bis 2050 – bleibende Herausforderung fĂŒr die deutsche Gesundheitspolitik

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    In diesem Papier wird das zukĂŒnftige Ausgabenvolumen der Gesetzlichen Krankenversicherung (GKV) bis zum Jahr 2050 projiziert. Die Ausgaben werden anhand von linearen Regressionsmodellen (OLS), Vektorautoregressionsmodellen (VAR) und Vektorfehlerkorrekturmodellen (VECM) geschĂ€tzt. Sie werden insbesondere durch den medizinisch-technischen Fortschritt und die Entwicklung der Einkommen getrieben. Sofern die jetzige, einkommensabhĂ€ngige Finanzierung der GKV beibehalten wird, ergeben sich fĂŒr das Jahr 2050 GKV-BeitragssĂ€tze zwischen 27 und 33 Prozent. WĂŒrde die Finanzierung im Jahr 2011 auf einkommensunabhĂ€ngige Kopfpauschalen umgestellt werden, ergĂ€ben sich Pauschalen von etwa 100 Euro. Diese wĂŒrden bis zum Jahr 2050 auf bis zu 670 Euro ansteigen. --

    Determinanten der Wartezeit auf einen Behandlungstermin in deutschen KrankenhÀusern: Ergebnisse einer Auswertung neuer Daten

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    Hintergrund: In Deutschland werden die Wartezeiten auf medizinische Dienstleistungen öffentlich und ordnungspolitisch immer wieder problematisiert. Dies gilt vor allem fĂŒr den niedergelassenen Ärztebereich. In der vorliegenden Arbeit wird erstmalig der akutstationĂ€re Sektor analysiert. Probleme: Es werden drei Fragestellungen untersucht: Erstens, ob ein Unterschied zwischen gesetzlich und privat Versicherten beim Zugang zu stationĂ€ren Dienstleistungen besteht. Zweitens, ob bei alternativen Erkrankungen aufgrund der Höhe der DRG Anreize bestehen, den Zugang differenziert auszugestalten. Drittens, ob Kliniken in alternativer TrĂ€gerschaft (öffentlich, privat, frei-gemeinnĂŒtzig) das Instrument der Wartezeit unterschiedlich nutzen. Methode: ZunĂ€chst sind PrimĂ€rdaten bei fast 800 Kliniken mittels fiktiver Patientenanrufe bei drei Krankheitsbildern aus den medizinischen Disziplinen Chirurgie, Kardiologie und Frauenheilkunde erhoben worden. Anschließend sind die aufgestellten Hypothesen mit Hilfe einer Ordinary-Least-Squares-Regression ergĂ€nzt um Tobit-SchĂ€tzungen getestet worden. Ergebnisse: Privatpatienten mĂŒssen durchschnittlich 1,6 Tage oder 18,9 % kĂŒrzer auf einen Behandlungstermin warten als gesetzlich versicherte Patienten, wenn der Versicherungsstatus abgefragt wird. Die höchste DRG ist nicht zwangslĂ€ufig mit der geringsten Wartezeit verknĂŒpft. Patienten öffentlich und privater HĂ€user erhalten signifikant eher einen Behandlungstermin als Patienten freigemeinnĂŒtziger HĂ€user. Gleichzeitig fragen private Einrichtungen im Vergleich zu öffentlichen Kliniken mit einer signifikant geringeren Wahrscheinlichkeit den Versicherungsstatus ab. Schlussfolgerungen: Der Zugang zu stationĂ€ren Dienstleistungen ist in AbhĂ€ngigkeit von den Parametern Versicherung, DRG und TrĂ€gerschaft nicht symmetrisch. Es besteht weiterer Forschungsbedarf insbesondere vor dem Hintergrund alternativer QualitĂ€tsparameter

    The influence of insurance status on waiting times in German acute care hospitals: an empirical analysis of new data

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    <p>Abstract</p> <p>Background</p> <p>There is an ongoing debate in Germany about the assumption that patients with private health insurance (PHI) benefit from better access to medical care, including shorter waiting times (LĂŒngen et al. 2008), compared to patients with statutory health insurance (SHI).</p> <p>Problem</p> <p>Existing analyses of the determinants for waiting times in Germany are a) based on patient self-reports and b) do not cover the inpatient sector. This paper aims to fill both gaps by (i) generating new primary data and (ii) analyzing waiting times in German hospitals.</p> <p>Methods</p> <p>We requested individual appointments from 485 hospitals within an experimental study design, allowing us to analyze the impact of PHI versus SHI on waiting times (Asplin et al. 2005).</p> <p>Results</p> <p>In German acute care hospitals patients with PHI have significantly shorter waiting times than patients with SHI.</p> <p>Conclusion</p> <p>Discrimination in waiting times by insurance status does occur in the German acute hospital sector. Since there is very little transparency in treatment quality in Germany, we do not know whether discrimination in waiting times leads to discrimination in the quality of treatment. This is an important issue for future research.</p

    Peri-operative chemotherapy for the treatment of resectable liver metastases from colorectal cancer: A systematic review and meta-analysis of randomized trials

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    <p>Abstract</p> <p>Background</p> <p>The role of peri-operative chemotherapy in patients with resected stage IV colorectal cancer (CRC) remains to be defined. This study was aimed at evaluating the effectiveness of peri-operative chemotherapy in patients with resected stage IV CRC by performing a meta-analysis of relevant trials.</p> <p>Methods</p> <p>We performed a literature search to identify trials comparing patients with stage IV CRC receiving peri-operative chemotherapy and surgery with patients undergoing surgery alone. The hazard ratio (HR) was estimated to assess any survival advantage of peri-operative chemotherapy.</p> <p>Results</p> <p>Eight trials conducted on a total of 1174 patients were identified by a literature search. In these trials, HR estimates suggested that peri-operative chemotherapy yielded no survival advantage over surgery alone (HR, 0.94; 95%CI, 0.8-1.10; <it>p </it>= 0.43). In a subset analysis on intra-arterial chemotherapy alone, no survival benefit was evident (HR, 1.0; 95% CI, 0.84-1.21; <it>p </it>= 0.96; I<sup>2 </sup>= 30%), whereas in the trials involving systemic chemotherapy, the difference between the groups approached statistical significance (HR, 0.74; 95% CI, 0.53-1.04; <it>p </it>= 0.08; I<sup>2 </sup>= 0%). Both peri-operative treatment groups had a significant recurrence-free survival benefit (HR, 0.78; 95% CI, 0.65-0.95; <it>P </it>= 0.01 for hepatic arterial infusion; and HR, 0.75; 95% CI, 0.62-0.91; <it>p </it>= 0.003 for systemic therapy). The toxicities of chemotherapy were acceptable in most trials.</p> <p>Conclusions</p> <p>This is the first meta-analysis demonstrating the importance of peri-operative chemotherapy in the treatment of resected stage IV CRC. Although the results must be carefully interpreted because of some limitations, critical issues were identified that must be resolved by future studies.</p

    Does better information about hospital quality affect patients’ choice? Empirical findings from Germany

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    Background: Economic theory strongly suggests that better information about the quality of care affects patients’ choice of health service providers. However, we have little empirical evidence about the impact of information provided on provider’s choice in Germany. Problem: In Germany, we recently find publicly available information about hospital quality. For example, 50 percent of the hospitals in the Rhine-Ruhr area do now publish their quality data voluntarily in a comprehensive, understandable and well prepared publication. Empirically, we see a strong demand for this publication. However, we do not have information so far, if – and how – this information affect patients’ choice of hospitals. Data and methodology: We take cross sectional time series data from more than 700.000 patients in the Rhine-Ruhr area and in the Cologne-Bonn area (control group) for the time period 2003 to 2006, i.e. 16 quarters. We examine whether the publication of quality information affects market shares and number of cases of the hospitals as well as travelling distance that patients accept to get to the hospital of their choice. In order to account for hospital-specific heterogeneity, we use fixed and random effects models. Results: First: Hospitals, which publish their quality data voluntarily, do attract more patients – compared to such hospital, that do not publish their quality data. Second: In the group of the publishing hospitals, hospitals with a higher than average quality slightly increased their market shares, whereas hospitals with a lower than average quality lost market shares. Conclusion: The provision of quality data has a significant impact on hospital choice: a higher quality leads to a higher demand. Based on these finding decision makers in hospitals have strong incentives (i) to make quality information publicly available and (ii) to keep their quality of care high

    Does better information about hospital quality affect patients’ choice? Empirical findings from Germany

    Get PDF
    Background: Economic theory strongly suggests that better information about the quality of care affects patients’ choice of health service providers. However, we have little empirical evidence about the impact of information provided on provider’s choice in Germany. Problem: In Germany, we recently find publicly available information about hospital quality. For example, 50 percent of the hospitals in the Rhine-Ruhr area do now publish their quality data voluntarily in a comprehensive, understandable and well prepared publication. Empirically, we see a strong demand for this publication. However, we do not have information so far, if – and how – this information affect patients’ choice of hospitals. Data and methodology: We take cross sectional time series data from more than 700.000 patients in the Rhine-Ruhr area and in the Cologne-Bonn area (control group) for the time period 2003 to 2006, i.e. 16 quarters. We examine whether the publication of quality information affects market shares and number of cases of the hospitals as well as travelling distance that patients accept to get to the hospital of their choice. In order to account for hospital-specific heterogeneity, we use fixed and random effects models. Results: First: Hospitals, which publish their quality data voluntarily, do attract more patients – compared to such hospital, that do not publish their quality data. Second: In the group of the publishing hospitals, hospitals with a higher than average quality slightly increased their market shares, whereas hospitals with a lower than average quality lost market shares. Conclusion: The provision of quality data has a significant impact on hospital choice: a higher quality leads to a higher demand. Based on these finding decision makers in hospitals have strong incentives (i) to make quality information publicly available and (ii) to keep their quality of care high
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