956 research outputs found
Optimal liability sharing and court errors: an exploratory analysis
We focus in this paper on the effects of court errors on the optimal sharing of liability between firms and financiers, as an environmental policy instrument. Using a structural model of the interactions between firms, financial institutions, governments and courts we show, through numerical simulations, the distortions in liability sharing between firms and financiers that the imperfect implementation of government policies implies. We consider in particular the role played by the efficiency of the courts in avoiding Type I (finding an innocent firm guilty of inappropriate care) and Type II (finding a guilty firm innocent of inappropriate care) errors. This role is considered in a context where liability sharing is already distorted (when compared with first best values) due not only to the courts' own imperfect assessment of safety care levels exerted by firm but also to the presence of moral hazard and adverse selection in financial contracting, as well as of noncongruence of objectives between firms and financiers on the one hand and social welfare maximization on the other. Our results indicate that an increase in the efficiency of the court system in avoiding errors raises safety care levels, thereby reducing the probability of accident, and allowing the social welfare maximizing government to impose a lower liability [higher] share for firms [financiers] as well as a lower standard level of care
Incomplete Contracts with Asymmetric Information: Exclusive v. Optional Remedies
Law and economics scholars have always had a strong interest in contract remedies. Perhaps the most explored issue in contract law has been the desirability of various contract remedies, such as expectation damages, specific performance, or liquidated damages, to name the most common. Scholars have been debating for years, from various perspectives, the comparative advantage of these remedies. Yet, most scholars have assumed that each of these remedies is exclusive, and their work has compared a single remedy contract to another single remedy contract. Interestingly, an analysis that assumes these remedies are optional (or cumulative) has not yet been explored, in spite of the fact that contract law provides the non-breaching party with a variety of optional remedies to choose from in case of a breach, and in spite of the fact that parties themselves write contracts which provide such an option. In this paper we attempt to start filling in this gap by studying the relationship between these remedies. Specifically, we study the conditions at which a contract that grants the non-breaching party an option to choose from optional remedies is superior to an exclusive remedy contract. We show that under conditions of double-sided uncertainty and asymmetric information between a seller (who might breach) and a buyer (who never breaches) the interaction of the parties\u27 distributions should determine whether a contract provides for exclusive or optional remedies. Specifically, if the buyer\u27s conditional expected valuation is larger than the seller\u27s conditional expected valuation (in both cases - conditional that their expected valuation is above the buyer\u27s mean valuation), then a contract which provides the buyer an option to choose between liquidated damages or specific performance (or actual damages) is superior. Our analysis in this paper informs transactional lawyers of the relevant economic factors they should consider when deciding the optimal composition of remedies in a given context. Moreover, our analysis is relevant for courts that interpret contracts because it will help them to better understand whether rational parties would have agreed that a particular remedy would be an exclusive remedy or an optional remedy when the language of the contract is ambiguous. Lastly, our analysis provides yet another economic rationale for why courts should enforce parties\u27 liquidated damages clauses even if it seems ex-post over, or under, compensatory. We present a model which shows when parties will agree on a non-exclusive liquidated damages clause. Under such a contract the parties stipulate ex-ante that the buyer will have the option to choose upon breach whether she prefers an optional remedy, such as actual damages or specific performance, to the pre-determined liquidated damages. We focus on the ex-ante design of the contract in light of the new information that the parties anticipate they will gain after they draft the contract. Therefore, we assume that no renegotiation or investments are involved. We demonstrate the optimal way to design contract clauses which takes advantage of the information that the seller and the buyer receive between the time they enter into the contract and the time of the actual breach. We further suggest that parties indeed use such clauses and that courts honor them. After laying out the basic model we provide some extensions to it. As is well known, an exclusive liquidated damages contract is equivalent to granting the seller a call option to breach and pay, where the exercise price is equal to the amount of the agreed liquidated damages. What is perhaps less known is that a non-exclusive, or optional, contract, where the buyer can choose performance, is equivalent to giving the buyer a consecutive call option with the same exercise price. Yet, the consecutive call option to the buyer does not have to have the same exercise price but can rather have a higher one. We call this new contract a two-price contract and show that it is even more efficient than the basic contract we have explored before. Next, we introduce more rounds of sequential options and show that while the regular ex-ante contract can achieve on average about 4 Indeed, in an environment of asymmetric information renegotiation costs are high. More on this below. 90% of the first-best allocative efficiency, an n-rounds contract approaches the first best, as n goes to infinity. We show numerically that within just 4 rounds, 96% of the allocative efficiency can be achieved. Section two describes the legal background against which we have designed our model. Section three surveys the literature that evaluates contract remedies from an economic perspective. Section four presents a simple model with two-sided incomplete information and with a liquidated damages clause. In section four we compare the performance of a regime with optional remedies with a regime of exclusive remedy and then determine the conditions at which each regime should be applied. Section five discusses some interesting extensions meant to approach the first-best allocative efficiency. The appendix provides a more rigorous mathematical demonstration of the model
Unemployment, crime and social insurance
We study an individual's incentive to search for a job in the presence of random criminal opportunities. These opportunities extenuate moral hazard, as the individual sometimes commits crime rather than searching. Even when he searches, he applies less effort. We then revisit the design of optimal unemployment insurance in this environment. If the individual is more likely to remain unemployed and unpunished when he commits crime than when he searches for a job (as suggested by empirical studies), declining unemployment benefits reduce the payoff from crime relative to that from searching. Compared to the canonical models of optimal unemployment insurance, this provides a further incentive to reduce benefits over time
Inside Ownership, Risk Sharing and Tobin's q -Ratios: Evidence from REITs
Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/73828/1/1540-6229.00070.pd
On the Deterrent Effect of Individual Versus Collective Liability in Criminal Organizations
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