Privatisation Methods and Economic Growth in Transition Economies

In low-income countries privatization, if implemented appropriately, may play an important role in generating growth. Using data recently available from Central and Eastern Europe, we therefore investigate the impact of alternative methods of privatization on economic growth. Our analysis suggests that the use of conventional privatization methods to match owners with firms can be inefficient in economies with underdeveloped capital markets, particularly if wealth is poorly correlated with managerial and entrepreneurial ability. In these circumstances mass privatization, with firms being given away or sold at a nominal price, may be the appropriate policy choice

How transition paths differ: enterprise performance in Russia and China

We use enterprise data to analyse and contrast the determinants of enterprise performance in China and Russia. We find that in China, enterprise growth and efficiency is associated with rapid increases in factor inputs, but not correlated with ownership or institutional factors. However, in Russia, enterprise growth is not associated with increases in factor quantity (except for labor) or quality. The main determinants of company performance are instead demand and institutional factors at a regional level. We explore possible interpretations of these results, including the impact of institutional and managerial quality

Privatisation versus Competition: Changing Enterprise Behavior in Russia

We investigate whether competitive forces and privatization have yet begun to play an efficiency-enhancing role in Russia. We also explore the economic effects of harder bidget constraints on enterprise behaviour. The empirical work is based on a large enterprise panel of Russian firms 1990-1994, representing around 10% of Russian manufacturing output. We conclude that privatization is having an impact on enterprise efficiency and restructuring but domestic market structure and harder budget constraints for the most part are not. Intriguingly, Russian firms are found to be sensitive to the degree of import penetration.

Entrepreneurial entry: which institutions matter?

In this paper we explore the relationship between the individual decision to become an entrepreneur and the institutional context. We pinpoint the critical roles of property rights and the size of the state sector for entrepreneurial activity and test the relationships empirically by combining country-level institutional indicators for 44 countries with working age population survey data taken from the Global Enterprise Monitor. A methodological contribution is the use of factor analysis to reduce the statistical problems with the array of highly collinear institutional indicators. We find that the key institutional features that enhance entrepreneurial activity are indeed the rule of law and limits to the state sector. However, these results are sensitive to the level of development

Corruption and bureaucratic structure in a developing economy

We address the impact of corruption in a developing economy in the context of an empirically relevant hold-up problem - when a foreign firm sinks an investment to provide infrastructure services. We focus on the structure of the economy’s bureaucracy, which can be centralized or decentralized, and characterize the ‘corruptibility’ of bureaucrats in each case. Results are explained in terms of the noninternalization, under decentralization, of the ‘bribe externality’ and the ‘price externality.’ In welfare terms, decentralization is favoured, relatively speaking, if the tax system is less inefficient, funding is less tight, bureaucrats are less venal, or compensation for expropriation is ungenerous

Regulatory barriers and entry in developing economies

We model entry by entrepreneurs into new markets in developing economies with regulatory barriers in the form of licence fees and bureaucratic delay. Because laissez faire leads to ‘excessive’ entry, a licence fee can increase welfare by discouraging entry. However, in the presence of a licence fee, bureaucratic delay creates a strategic opportunity, which can result in both greater entry by first movers and a higher steady-state number of firms. Delay also leads to speculation, with entrepreneurs taking out licences to obtain the option of immediate entry if they later observe the industry to be profitable enough

Ownership Structures

In this paper, we analyse the effects of the massive Russian privatisation programme on the ownership of Russian firms and on the behaviour of formerly state owned enterprises. A large random sample of Russian firms is used to investigate the emerging ownership structures, patterns of control and enterprise behaviour. We find that workers have become the dominant owners in a majority ig Russian private firms; 65% of the total as against 19% being manager owned and 16% of being outsider owned. Higher- ownership appears to confer significantly more influence over decision-making on managers and outsiders, but not on workers. Most importantly however, we find no evidence that privatisation affects any major area of enterprise behaviour or performance.

Entrepreneurship in transition economies: the role of institutions and generational change

The transition economies have lower rates of entrepreneurship than are observed in most developed and developing market economies. The difference is even more marked in the countries of the former Soviet Union than those of Central and Eastern Europe. We link these differences partly with the legacy of communist planning, which needs to be replaced with formal market-supporting institutions. But many of these developments have now taken place, yet entrepreneurial activity still remains low in many places. To analyse this longer term issue, we highlight the necessarily slow pace of development of new informal institutions and the corresponding social attitudes, notably rebuilding the generalised trust. We argue that changes are even slower in the former Soviet Union than Central and Eastern Europe because communist rule was much longer, leading to a lack of institutional memory. We posit that changes in informal institutions may be therefore delayed until after full generational change

The Provision of Social Benefits in State Owned

We use evidence from a survey of approximately 200 Polish state-owned, privatized, and de novo private manufacturing firms to investigate the nature and scope of enterprises-level provision of social benefits, and in particular how enterprise-level social provision is changing with transition, privatization and the emergence of the new private sector. We find that social provision remains surprisingly widespread, and has not been greatly reduced in either the state-owned or the privatized sectors. De novo private firms offer a substantially smaller but still significant range of social provision aside from ownership form are firm sized and employee power ( the latter are not explicitly via the union structure), both of which are associated with higher levels of social provision. Money wages and the provision of social benefits appear to be complementary rather than substitutes. Assets used for the provision of social benefits are concentrated in state-owned firms, but there is relatively little social asset disposal; the de novo private sector is expanding the range of social benefits offered but is not investing significantly in social assets. Social provision has been declining in state-owned firms, less so in privatized firms, and increasingly (modestly) in new private firms. On average the declines determinants of the pace of change aside from ownership form are the size of the firm and its profitability, both of which are associated with increases or slower declines in social provision, in the case of the state-owned sector, provision also declines more slowly when they tax-based income policy (the "popwiek") binds.