Terrorism and Beyond: Exploring the Fallout of the European Foreign Fighter Phenomenon in Syria and Iraq

The foreign fighter phenomenon in Syria and Iraq has led to many worries about the potential negative consequences that might occur in the near future. The scenario of returned foreign fighters launching attacks in the West is by far the most prominent one. This article aims to broaden the discussion on the potential fallout of the phenomenon by examining three particular dimensions: the physical threat (including the terrorist threat), ideological consequences, and societal consequences. After presenting these dimensions, three historical cases of jihadi foreign fighting (Afghanistan, Bosnia and Somalia) are examined to see to what extent different types of fallout materialized. The final part of the article attempts to gauge which indicators or signs of potential fallout are already observable in the case of the on-going conflict in Syria and Iraq. If we seek to prepare ourselves for the future fallout of today’s foreign fighter phenomenon, we must look beyond the terrorist threat.Security and Global Affair

Peace, Terrorism, Armed Conflict and War Crimes

Terrorism has often been associated with armed conflict. The so-called Islamic State is the most prominent example of a group that rose to power amidst armed conflict. Against this backdrop, it sounds rather strange to associate terrorism with peace. Terrorism, however, has also been called, “the peacetime equivalent of war crimes”. This raises the question how the concepts of terrorism, peace, armed conflict and war crimes relate. This article defines these concepts and applies them in the context of International Humanitarian Law, which is also known as the law of armed conflict. It also discusses today’s fight against IS in light of the November 2015 Paris Attacks, thereby questioning the consequences and desirability of a war paradigm.Security and Global Affair

The aftermath: meaning-making after terrorist attacks in Western Europe

Western Europe has been confronted with several terrorist attacks over the past years. This dissertation investigates what happens after such attacks. Scholars emphasise that terrorism is not just about killing, as terrorists want to capture the attention of the audience. Yet, what these audiences do after attacks has remained understudied. This dissertation looks into the meaning-making process after jihadist attacks in Brussels, Nice, Berlin and Manchester (2016-2017). The study focuses on two core actors groups - the authorities and citizens - and the use of frames, rituals and symbols. Special attention is paid to the first day, the first week and the first anniversary of the attack, for which the author has visited the commemorations. Overall, this dissertation shows how terrorism is not a successful communication strategy. After performing the opening acts, the terrorists are quickly pushed off stage, doomed to stand behind the curtains and watch a different play unfold. Security and Global Affair

Twenty years of countering jihadism in Western Europe: from the shock of 9/11 to ‘jihadism fatigue’

This article provides a reflection on the jihadist threat, the policies and actors that deal with this threat and the impact of jihadism and counterterrorism in Western Europe in the past twenty years. It describes how the threat, counterterrorism policies and their impact have developed over time and demonstrates how threat perceptions in society and the political arena have not always been aligned with the actual threat. There have been periods of disbalance between the threat and responses to it, leading to both overreactions and inflated threat descriptions and fear levels, as well as periods with limited attention that might have contributed to unpleasant surprises at a later stage. Against this backdrop, the article criticises the incident-driven approach to counterterrorism and warns against both overreactions as well as ‘jihadism fatigue’.Security and Global Affair

Career Foreign Fighters: Expertise Transmission Across Insurgencies

The literature on foreign fighters devotes considerable attention to the questions of why individuals join armed groups outside of their nation-states and their propensity for engaging in political violence after they return to their home countries. But what happens to those who do not return but go on to join new groups or even new wars?This paper examines career foreign fighters who have traversed from one insurgency to another. We present an original dataset of over 50 individuals who served as foreign fighters in multiple insurgencies. More than half of those who could be identified as having served with more than one armed group achieved leadership positions, which is historically atypical for foreign fighters. Some become top leadership while a significant percentage also facilitate terror attacks.The Syrian conflict has produced a policy debate about whether it is more dangerous to allow foreign fighters to return or to leave them unaccounted. This study provides the first evidence that foreign fighters who survive their first tours accumulate resources, develop skills, and transfer their abilities to new violent actors. Our findings indicate that career foreign fighters pose a greater and broader security threat than returning, one-off foreign fighters.Security and Global Affair

Dealing with Jihadism: A policy comparison between the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, France, the UK and the US (2010 to 2017)

This report offers an understanding of counter-terrorism and counter-radicalisation policies in the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Its emphasis is on developments following the 11 September 2001 attacks, and addresses the phenomenon referred to as jihadism. The report identifies three developments: 1) the development of counterterrorism and counterradicalisation as actual policy domains, 2) increased coordination of policy and initiatives for information-sharing, 3) unclear demarcation of the policy domain. Security and Global Affair

Beleidsdomein aanpak jihadisme: een vergelijking tussen Nederland, België, Denemarken, Duitsland, Frankrijk, het VK en de VS

Deze studie brengt in kaart wat in Nederland, België, Denemarken, Duitsland, Frankrijk, het Verenigd Koninkrijk en de Verenigde Staten wordt gegaan tegen ‘jihadisme’. Er is vooral gekeken naar hoe terrorismebestrijding en de aanpak van radicalisering in de bovengenoemde landen is opgezet. Hierbij is enerzijds gekeken naar beleidsplannen en strategieën en anderzijds naar welke actoren actief zijn op het gebied van terrorismebestrijding en het tegengaan van radicalisering. Alle landen ondernemen activiteiten op deze twee gebieden, hoewel er tussen de landen onderling wel verschillen zijn. Coördinatie van beleid en informatiedeling worden in toenemende mate belangrijk vanwege de inzet op een brede aanpak. Daarnaast kent de aanpak van ‘jihadisme’, vooral waar het de aanpak van radicalisering betreft, geen heldere grenzen door de toetreding van niet-traditionele veiligheidspartners en niet-overheidspartners.Security and Global Affair

Verdieping bewaken en beveiligen, editie juli 2023 (2/2023)

De ‘Verdieping Bewaken en Beveiligen’ brengt verdieping aan op actuele gebeurtenissen en ontwikkelingen gerelateerd aan het stelsel Bewaken en Beveiligen. Deze Verdieping wordt aangeboden aan experts die werkzaam zijn bij de stelselpartners en de ketenpartners van het stelsel. Daarnaast wordt dit product aangeboden aan geïnteresseerden in een bredere kring rond het stelsel, waaronder academici, journalisten en politici.Security and Global Affair

Terrorism and Beyond: Exploring the Fallout of the European Foreign Fighter Phenomenon in Syria and Iraq

The foreign fighter phenomenon in Syria and Iraq has led to many worries about the potential negative consequences that might occur in the near future. The scenario of returned foreign fighters launching attacks in the West is by far the most prominent one. This article aims to broaden the discussion on the potential fallout of the phenomenon by examining three particular dimensions: the physical threat (including the terrorist threat), ideological consequences, and societal consequences. After presenting these dimensions, three historical cases of jihadi foreign fighting (Afghanistan, Bosnia and Somalia) are examined to see to what extent different types of fallout materialized. The final part of the article attempts to gauge which indicators or signs of potential fallout are already observable in the case of the on-going conflict in Syria and Iraq. If we seek to prepare ourselves for the future fallout of today’s foreign fighter phenomenon, we must look beyond the terrorist threat.</p