If fetuses are persons, abortion is a public health crisis

Pro-life advocates commonly argue that fetuses have the moral status of persons, and an accompanying right to life, a view most pro-choice advocates deny. A difficulty for this pro-life position has been Judith Jarvis Thomson’s violinist analogy, in which she argues that even if the fetus is a person, abortion is often permissible because a pregnant woman is not obliged to continue to offer her body as life support. Here, we outline the moral theories underlying public health ethics, and examine the COVID-19 pandemic as an example of public health considerations overriding individual rights. We argue that if fetuses are regarded as persons, then abortion is of such prevalence in society that it also constitutes a significant public health crisis. We show that on public health considerations, we are justified in overriding individual rights to bodily autonomy by prohibiting abortion. We conclude that in a society that values public health, abortion can only be tolerated if fetuses are not regarded as persons

Defining life from death: Problems with the somatic integration definition of life

To determine when the life of a human organism begins, Mark T. Brown has developed the somatic integration definition of life. Derived from diagnostic criteria for human death, Brown’s account requires the presence of a life‐regulation internal control system for an entity to be considered a living organism. According to Brown, the earliest point at which a developing human could satisfy this requirement is at the beginning of the fetal stage, and so the embryo is not regarded as a living human organism. This, Brown claims, has significant bioethical implications for both abortion and embryo experimentation. Here, we dispute the cogency of Brown’s derivation. Diagnostic criteria for death are used to determine when an organism irreversibly ceases functioning as an integrated whole and may vary significantly depending on how developed the organism is. Brown’s definition is derived from a specific definition of death applicable to postnatal human beings, which is insufficient for generating a general definition for human organismal life. We have also examined the bioethical implications of Brown’s view, and have concluded that they are not as significant as he believes. Whether the embryo is classified as a human organism is of peripheral interest—a far more morally relevant question is whether the embryo is a biological individual with an identity that is capable of persisting during development. This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Blackshaw, B and Rodger, D. (2019) Defining life from death: problems with the somatic integration definition of life. Bioethics Which will be published in final form at https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/14678519. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Use of Self-Archived Versions

Detached From Humanity: Artificial Gestation and the Christian Dilemma

The development of artificial womb technology (AWT) is continuing to proceed and raises important ethical and theological questions for Christians. While there has been extensive secular discourse on artificial wombs in recent years, there has been minimal Christian engagement with this topic. There are broadly two primary uses of artificial womb technology: first, ectogestation, which is a form of enhanced neonatal care, where only some of the gestation period takes place in an artificial womb, and second, ectogenesis, where the entire period of gestation occurs in an artificial womb. It is plausible that some form of ectogestation in the latter weeks or months of pregnancy could be possible within a decade or so, while ectogenesis for humans remains far more speculative. Ectogestation is likely to significantly reduce maternal and neonatal morbidity and mortality, and so there is a strong prima facie case for supporting its development. Ectogenesis, however, may bring several challenges, including the further commodification of children, and the potential pathologizing of pregnancy and childbirth. Its long-term effects on those created through this process are also unknown. If it becomes ubiquitous, we may also find the central theological significance of pregnancy and birth diminished. The dilemma for Christians is that the development of seemingly unproblematic ectogestation is likely to normalize the use of artificial gestation, and, in time, pave the way for ectogenesis

A fair exchange: why living kidney donors in England should be financially compensated

Every year, hundreds of patients in England die whilst waiting for a kidney transplant, and this is evidence that the current system of altruistic-based donation is not sufficient to address the shortage of kidneys available for transplant. To address this problem, we propose a monopsony system whereby kidney donors can opt-in to receive financial compensation, whilst still preserving the right of individuals to donate without receiving any compensation. A monopsony system describes a market structure where there is only one ‘buyer’—in this case the National Health Service. By doing so, several hundred lives could be saved each year in England, wait times for a kidney transplant could be significantly reduced, and it would lessen the burden on dialysis services. Furthermore, compensation would help alleviate the common disincentives to living kidney donation, such as its potential associated health and psychological costs, and it would also help to increase awareness of living kidney donation. The proposed system would also result in significant cost savings that could then be redirected towards preventing kidney disease and reducing health disparities. While concerns about exploitation, coercion, and the ‘crowding out’ of altruistic donors exist, we believe that careful implementation can mitigate these issues. Therefore, we recommend piloting financial compensation for living kidney donors at a transplant centre in England

Gestaticide: killing the subject of the artificial womb.

The rapid development of artificial womb technologies means that we must consider if and when it is permissible to kill the human subject of ectogestation-recently termed a 'gestateling' by Elizabeth Chloe Romanis-prior to 'birth'. We describe the act of deliberately killing the gestateling as and argue that there are good reasons to maintain that gestaticide is morally equivalent to infanticide, which we consider to be morally impermissible. First, we argue that gestaticide is harder to justify than abortion, primarily because the gestateling is completely independent of its biological parents. Second, we argue that gestaticide is morally equivalent to infanticide. To demonstrate this, we explain that gestatelings are born in a straightforward sense, which entails that killing them is as morally serious as infanticide. However, to strengthen our overall claim, we also show that if gestatelings are not considered to have been born, killing them is still equivalent to killing neonates with congenital anomalies and disabilities, which again is infanticide. We conclude by considering how our discussion of gestaticide has implications for the permissibility of withdrawing life-sustaining treatment from gestatelings. [Abstract copyright: © Author(s) (or their employer(s)) 2020. No commercial re-use. See rights and permissions. Published by BMJ.

Zooming in on Justice: The Case for Virtual Bioethics Conferencing.

Jecker et al. discuss principles for international bioethics conferencing that purportedly seek to make bioethics more global in scope. In particular, they address what they have perceived to be Islamophobia within bioethics. We agree that anti-discrimination and inclusivity should serve as core commitments for the field. Yet, we also see the need for the conversation to be broadened. So, while Islamophobia may be a real occurrence within mainstream bioethics, it may be better understood within a context of generalized religious aversion. In response, we propose an alternative interpretation of their principles for international bioethics conferencing—no longer holding in-person bioethics conferences. Whilst this proposal has some limitations, they are outweighed by the benefits of widening participation for minority and disadvantaged groups, removing significant cost barriers to attendance, promoting epistemic justice, and resulting in significantly diminished environmental degradation. If an obligation to move towards virtual conferencing is rejected, conference organizers must propose an alternative ethical framework for conferencing that avoids the implications of Jecker et al’s framework. Personal preference is not a sufficiently weighty reason to continue organizing in-person bioethics conferences

Re-charging Fluctuatingly

Written after a particularly positive day of self-care practices and awareness of the complimentary low mood

Normalised Root Mean Square and Amplitude of Sidebands of Vibration Response as Tools for Gearbox Diagnosis

Quick assessment of the condition of gearboxes used in helicopters is a safety requirement. One of the most widely used helicopter on-board-mounted condition monitoring system these days is the Health and Usage Monitoring System. It has been specifically designed to monitor the condition of all safety-critical components operating in the helicopter through calculation of so-called condition indicators (CIs) - signal processing routines designed to output a single number that represents the condition of the monitored component. Among number of available parameters, there is a couple of CIs that over the years of testing have earned a reputation of being the most reliable measures of the gear tooth condition. At the same time, however, it has been observed that in some cases, those techniques do not properly indicate the deteriorating condition with the propagation of a gear tooth fault with the period of operation. Hence, three more robust methods have been suggested, which are discussed in this article