Plurality Voting under Uncertainty

Understanding the nature of strategic voting is the holy grail of social choice theory, where game-theory, social science and recently computational approaches are all applied in order to model the incentives and behavior of voters. In a recent paper, Meir et al.[EC'14] made another step in this direction, by suggesting a behavioral game-theoretic model for voters under uncertainty. For a specific variation of best-response heuristics, they proved initial existence and convergence results in the Plurality voting system. In this paper, we extend the model in multiple directions, considering voters with different uncertainty levels, simultaneous strategic decisions, and a more permissive notion of best-response. We prove that a voting equilibrium exists even in the most general case. Further, any society voting in an iterative setting is guaranteed to converge. We also analyze an alternative behavior where voters try to minimize their worst-case regret. We show that the two behaviors coincide in the simple setting of Meir et al., but not in the general case.Comment: The full version of a paper from AAAI'15 (to appear

On Extractors and Exposure-Resilient Functions for Sublogarithmic Entropy

We study deterministic extractors for oblivious bit-fixing sources (a.k.a. resilient functions) and exposure-resilient functions with small min-entropy: of the function's n input bits, k << n bits are uniformly random and unknown to the adversary. We simplify and improve an explicit construction of extractors for bit-fixing sources with sublogarithmic k due to Kamp and Zuckerman (SICOMP 2006), achieving error exponentially small in k rather than polynomially small in k. Our main result is that when k is sublogarithmic in n, the short output length of this construction (O(log k) output bits) is optimal for extractors computable by a large class of space-bounded streaming algorithms. Next, we show that a random function is an extractor for oblivious bit-fixing sources with high probability if and only if k is superlogarithmic in n, suggesting that our main result may apply more generally. In contrast, we show that a random function is a static (resp. adaptive) exposure-resilient function with high probability even if k is as small as a constant (resp. log log n). No explicit exposure-resilient functions achieving these parameters are known

Equilibrium in Labor Markets with Few Firms

We study competition between firms in labor markets, following a combinatorial model suggested by Kelso and Crawford [1982]. In this model, each firm is trying to recruit workers by offering a higher salary than its competitors, and its production function defines the utility generated from any actual set of recruited workers. We define two natural classes of production functions for firms, where the first one is based on additive capacities (weights), and the second on the influence of workers in a social network. We then analyze the existence of pure subgame perfect equilibrium (PSPE) in the labor market and its properties. While neither class holds the gross substitutes condition, we show that in both classes the existence of PSPE is guaranteed under certain restrictions, and in particular when there are only two competing firms. As a corollary, there exists a Walrasian equilibrium in a corresponding combinatorial auction, where bidders' valuation functions belong to these classes. While a PSPE may not exist when there are more than two firms, we perform an empirical study of equilibrium outcomes for the case of weight-based games with three firms, which extend our analytical results. We then show that stability can in some cases be extended to coalitional stability, and study the distribution of profit between firms and their workers in weight-based games

Skill Biased Financial Development: Education, Wages and Occupations in the U.S. Financial Sector

Over the past 60 years, the U.S. financial sector has grown from 2.3% to 7.7% of GDP. While the growth in the share of value added has been fairly linear, it hides a dramatic change in the composition of skills and occupations. In the early 1980s, the financial sector started paying higher wages and hiring more skilled individuals than the rest of economy. These trends reflect a shift away from low-skill jobs and towards market-oriented activities within the sector. Our evidence suggests that technological and financial innovations both played a role in this transformation. We also document an increase in relative wages, controlling for education, which partly reflects an increase in unemployment risk: Finance jobs used to be safer than other jobs in the private sector, but this is not longer the case.