31 research outputs found
Value Disagreement and Two Aspects of Meaning
The problem of value disagreement and contextualist, relativist and metalinguistic attempts of solving it are laid out. Although the metalinguistic account seems to be on the right track, it is argued that it does not sufficiently explain why and how disagreements about the meaning of evaluative terms are based on and can be decided by appeal to existing social practices. As a remedy, it is argued that original suggestions from Putnam's 'The Meaning of "Meaning"' ought to be taken seriously. The resulting dual aspect theory of meaning can explain value disagreement in much the same way as it deals with disagreement about general terms. However, the account goes beyond Putnam's by not just defending a version of social externalism, but also defending the thesis that the truth conditional meaning of many evaluative terms is not fixed by experts either and instead constantly contested as part of a normal function of language
Harming Yourself and Others: A Note on the Asymmetry of Agency in Action Evaluations
Principles are investigated that allow one to establish a preference ordering between possible actions based on the question of whether the acting agent himself or other agents will benefit or be harmed by the consequences of an action. It is shown that a combination of utility maximization, an altruist principle, and weak negative utilitarianism yields an ordering that seems to be intuitively appealing, although it does not necessarily reflect common everyday evaluations of actions
Evaluating Time-Continuous Action Alternatives from the Perspective of Negative Utilitarianism: a Layered Approach.
A layered approach to the evaluation of action alternatives with continuous
time for decision making under the moral doctrine of Negative Utilitarianism is presented and briefly discussed from a philosophical perspective
Reference and Indexicality
Tese arquivada ao abrigo da Portaria nº 227/2017 de 25 de Julho-Registo de Grau EstrangeiroThis thesis is a general defence of a context-dependent description theory of reference with
special regards to indexical reference on the basis of a truth-conditional theory of meaning. It
consists of two parts. In the first part, the roots of the Frege-Russell view are laid out and
contrasted with various aspects of direct reference theory and the New Theory of Reference.
Two description-based accounts of the reference of proper names, nominal and external description
theory, are defended against various known counter-arguments such as Kripke’s circularity
objection and the Church-Langford translation test. It is shown how the resulting analysis of
de dicto belief ascriptions can be made compositional, but also argued that compositionality
is not mandatory. The second part deals with forms of indexical and non-indexical contextdependence.
Taking into account a range of typological data, referential features of indexical
expressions like their egocentricity, token-reflexivity, and the vagueness of spatial and temporal
indexicals are laid out. Kaplan’s Logic of Demonstratives is then reformulated, but following
Cresswell (1990) it is argued that full quantification over modal indices is needed. Various indicators
and demonstratives are analyzed on the basis of a description theory of reference in
a variant of first-order predicate logic with non-traditional predication theory and two sorts of
reified contexts. Examples analyzed include: I, now, here, actually, we, the former president, the
left entrance, context-shifting indexicals, and demonstratives like Japanese are. Finally, essential
indexicality is addressed and it is conceded that description theory cannot deal with attitudes
de se. In defense of indirect reference it is argued that the cognitive phenomena underlying
essential indexicality, as for example I-thoughts, aren’t aspects of the public meaning of natural
language expressions and that speaking of a ‘language of thinking’ or ‘reference in thinking’ are
unfitting metaphors for general semiotic reasons
Metalinguistic Value Disagreement
SRFH/BPD/84612/2012,
PTDC/MHC-FIL/0521/2014In a series of publications Burgess, Plunkett and Sundell have developed a metalinguistic negotiation view that they call ‘Conceptual Ethics.’ I argue that their position adequately captures our intuition that some cases of value disputes are metalinguistic, but that they reverse the direction of justification when they state that speakers ‘negotiate’ the best use of a term or concept on the basis of its prior social role. Borrowing ideas from Putnam (1975b), I instead suggest distinguishing two meanings of general terms and value predicates. Core meaning represents the lowest common denominator between speakers and is primarily based on our needs to coordinate behavior. In contrast to this, the noumenal meaning of a general term or value predicate is intended to capture an aspect of reality and represents what a term really means. Like many other disputes about theoretical terms, terms for abstract objects, and predicates, metalinguistic value disputes are about noumenal meaning on the basis of a shared core meaning. This direction towards reality is what sets the account apart from mere metalinguistic negotiation.publishersversionpublishe
Towards a Model of Argument Strength for Bipolar Argumentation Graphs
UID/FIL/00183/2013Bipolar argument graphs represent the structure of complex pro and contra arguments for one or more standpoints. In this article, ampliative and exclusionary principles of evaluating argument strength in bipolar acyclic argumentation graphs are laid out and compared to each other. Argument chains, linked arguments, link attackers and supporters, and convergent arguments are discussed. The strength of conductive arguments is also addressed but it is argued that more work on this type of argument is needed to properly distinguish argument strength from more general value-based components of such argu- ments. The overall conclusion of the article is that there is no justifiably unique solution to the problem of argument strength outside of a particular epistemological framework.publishersversionpublishe
Value Disagreement and Dual Aspect Semantics
FCT Fellowship SRFH/BPD/84612/2012,
FCT Project PTDC/MHC-FIL/0521/2014publishersversionpublishe
Nonindexical Context-Dependence and the Interpretation as Abduction Approach
Abstract
Inclusive nonindexical context-dependence occurs when the preferred interpretation of an utterance implies its lexically-derived meaning. It is argued that the corresponding processes of free or lexically mandated enrichment can be modeled as abductive inference. A form of abduction is implemented in Simple Type Theory on the basis of a notion of plausibility, which is in turn regarded a preference relation over possible worlds. Since a preordering of doxastic alternatives taken for itself only amounts to a relatively vacuous ad hoc model, it needs to be combined with a rational way of learning from new evidence. Lexicographic upgrade is implemented as an example of how an agent might revise his plausibility ordering in light of new evidence. Various examples are given how this apparatus may be used to model the contextual resolution of context-dependent or semantically incomplete utterances. The described form of abduction is limited and merely serves as a proof of concept, but the idea in general has good potential as one among many ways to build a bridge between semantics and pragmatics since inclusive context-dependence is ubiquitous