Renormalization group analysis of the QCD quark potential to order v^2

A one-loop renormalization group analysis of the order v^2 relativistic corrections to the static QCD potential is presented. The velocity renormalization group is used to simultaneously sum ln(m/mv) and ln(m/mv^2) terms. The results are compared to previous calculations in the literature.Comment: 13 pages. important change: running of soft Lagrangian include

The QCD heavy-quark potential to order v^2: one loop matching conditions

The one-loop QCD heavy quark potential is computed to order v^2 in the color singlet and octet channels. Several errors in the previous literature are corrected. To be consistent with the velocity power counting, the full dependence on |p' + p|/|p' - p| is kept. The matching conditions for the NRQCD one-loop potential are computed by comparing the QCD calculation with that in the effective theory. The graphs in the effective theory are also compared to terms from the hard, soft, potential, and ultrasoft regimes in the threshold expansion. The issue of off-shell versus on-shell matching and gauge dependence is discussed in detail for the 1/(m k) term in the potential. Matching on-shell gives a 1/(m k) potential that is gauge independent and does not vanish for QED.Comment: 28 pages, References added and minor changes to section III, results unchange

Is symmetry identity?

Wigner found unreasonable the "effectiveness of mathematics in the natural sciences". But if the mathematics we use to describe nature is simply a coded expression of our experience then its effectiveness is quite reasonable. Its effectiveness is built into its design. We consider group theory, the logic of symmetry. We examine the premise that symmetry is identity; that group theory encodes our experience of identification. To decide whether group theory describes the world in such an elemental way we catalogue the detailed correspondence between elements of the physical world and elements of the formalism. Providing an unequivocal match between concept and mathematical statement completes the case. It makes effectiveness appear reasonable. The case that symmetry is identity is a strong one but it is not complete. The further validation required suggests that unexpected entities might be describable by the irreducible representations of group theory

A Critique Of The Disturbance Theory Of Indeterminacy In Quantum Mechanics

Heisenberg's gendanken experiments in quantum mechanics have given rise to a widespread belief that the indeterminacy relations holding for the variables of a quantal system can be explained quasiclassically in terms of a disturbance suffered by the system in interaction with a quantal measurement, or state preparation, agent. There are a number of criticisms of this doctrine in the literature, which are critically examined in this article and found to be ininconclusive, the chief error being the conflation of this disturbance with the projection postulate. We present a critique of the disturbance theory based on the fact that the required disturbance will in general depend on the interaction time of the system and state-preparer. This point is exploited in the construction of a spin-interaction model which acts as a counterexample to the disturbance doctrine, while remaining faithful to the spirit of Heisenberg's gedanken experiments. Several consequences of this result are discussed. © 1981 Plenum Publishing Corporation.111-212

The Characterisation of Structure: Definition versus Axiomatisation

Abstract. We argue that neither the set-theoretical nor the category-theoretical conceptions of structure serve the needs of structural realism, in that they cannot clarify what it means to say that being B is or has structure S, which claim is central to structural realism. Such a clarification is warranted by any viable ac-count of reference, which almost any variety of realism needs. There is however a view that can adopt both set-theoretical and category-theoretical conceptions of structure; this is the view that adopts Bas van Fraassen’s extension of Nelson Good-man’s concept of representation-as from art to science. Yet the ensuing fountain of perspectives is a move away from realism, structural realism included. We then suggest that a new theory of structure is needed, one that takes the word ‘struc-ture ’ to express a primitive fundamental concept; the concept of structure should be axiomatised rather than defined in terms of other concepts. We sketch how such a theory can clarify what it means to say that being B is or has structure S in