Les défis du commerce équitable dans l'hémisphère Nord

The fair trade born fifty years ago defines itself as an alternative approach to conventional trade. In the late 1980s, fair trade organizations began labelling fair products to facilitate their entry into the large-scale distribution. This article presents the concept and its evolution, as well as the debate on the introducion of fair products into the large-scale distribution. It also evaluates the situation of the legislation introduced in France.Le commerce équitable connaît depuis quelques années un intérêt grandissant de la part des industriels et de la grande distribution grâce à sa filière labellisée. Cet article présente le commerce équitable et son évolution, ainsi que le débat sur l'introduction de produits équitables dans la grande distribution. Il fait également le point sur la législation mise en place en France

Fair Trade Contracts for Some, an Insurance for Others

This article analyzes the impact of Fair Trade contracts between sub-groups of farmers and a Fair Trade organization on the spot market price. We analyze a three level vertical chain gathering perfectly competitive farmers upstream who offer their raw product on a spot market to manufacturers who then sell finished products to a downstream retailer. Absent Fair Trade, the entire raw product is sold on the spot market. When a Fair Trade organization offers a Fair Trade contract to a sub-group of farmers, it gathers a Guaranteed Minimum Price clause and a straight relationship between the sub-group of farmers and the retailer. This article highlights several conditions such that a snowball effect exists, i.e farmers outside of the Fair Trade contract also benefit from a higher spot market price.Guaranteed Minimum Price Contracts, Disintermediation, Fair Trade, Vertical Chain, Two-part Tariff Contracts

Guaranteed Minimum Price Contracts for Some, an Insurance for Others?

This paper analyzes the impact of guaranteed minimum price contracts between sub-groups of farmers and a fair trade manufacturer on the spot market price. We focus on the fair trade concept in the coffee supply chain as an example. We analyze a three level vertical chain gathering perfectly competitive farmers upstream who offer their raw product to manufacturers who then sell finished products to a downstream retailer. Without fair trade, all the raw product is sold on the spot market. When a sub-group of farmers benefit from a guaranteed minimum price contract offered by a fair trade certifier, we show that farmers outside of this fair trade agreement may also benefit from a higher spot market price in cases of a limited overproduction.Guaranteed Minimum Price Contracts, Fair Trade, Vertical Chain., Demand and Price Analysis, International Relations/Trade,

Fair Trade: In or Out the Market?

Cet article s'intéresse à l'évolution du concept de commerce équitable. Nous proposons un modèle simple en vue de donner des arguments théoriques dans le débat sur la vente de produits équitables dans la grande distribution. L'hypothèse principale est que certains consommateurs sont prêts à payer un prix plus élevé pour acheter un produit équitable. Nous mettons en évidence que les produits équitables ont plus de chance d'être dans les rayons des supermarchés si le certificateur du label équitable a pour objectif de maximiser les quantités certifiées plutôt que le prix payé aux producteurs. Nous soulignons également que la variable clé dans le choix du revendeur de vendre ou non des produits équitables n'est pas le pourcentage de consommateurs prêts à payer pour un bien équitable, mais combien ces consommateurs sont prêts à payer pour ce type de produit.Différentiation des produits;Discrimination en prix;Revente

Corporate-NGO partnerships in CSR activities: why and how?

This article describes, analyzes, and explains the emergence of partnerships between corporations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the ways in which corporations use such relationships as part of their corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities. Economics concepts and the management literature are reviewed, and illustrations are provided to describe such alliances and to explain their expansion. The findings show that firms engage in CSR for altruistic, defensive, and strategic reasons. The role of NGOs in these activities, as well as the related risks for both types of partners, is also explained and studied. NGOs are identified to have fundraising, stakeholder, and strategic functions in corporate-NGO partnerships. The findings also show that the main risks for NGOs, namely, a loss of credibility and legitimacy and their consequences, are related to the financial and existential dependency created by corporate-NGO partnerships

How do GM / non GM coexistence regulations affect markets and welfare?

This paper presents a theoretical economic model assessing the effect of the level of mandatory genetically modified (GM) / non-GM coexistence regulations on market and welfare outcome. We assume vertical differentiation of GM and non-GM goods on the consumer side. Producers are heterogeneous in their cost savings from GMO adoption. Producers of non-GM crops face a probability of having their harvest downgraded if gene flow from GM fields makes its GMO content above the labeling threshold. The government may impose to GMO producers mandatory ex ante isolation distances from non-GM fields in order to decrease the probability of non-GM harvest downgrading. It may also introduce an ex post compensation to non-GMO farmers for profit losses due to harvest downgrading, imposing GMO farmers’ participation to a compensation fund via a tax on GM seeds. Assuming endogenous crop choices and prices, we study the effects of ex ante regulation and ex post liability of GMO producers on market equilibrium as well as on global and interest group welfare.genetically modified organisms, coexistence, identity preservation, regulation, liability, vertical differentiation, law and economics, Marketing, Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies,

Les défis du commerce équitable dans l'hémisphère Nord

Le commerce équitable connaît depuis quelques années un intérêt grandissant de la part des industriels et de la grande distribution grâce à sa filière labellisée. Cet article présente le commerce équitable et son évolution, ainsi que le débat sur l'introduction de produits équitables dans la grande distribution. Il fait également le point sur la législation mise en place en France.Grande distribution

Fair Trade Contracts for Some, an Insurance for Others

This article analyzes the impact of Fair Trade contracts between sub-groups of farmers and a Fair Trade organization on the spot market price. We analyze a three level vertical chain gathering perfectly competitive farmers upstream who offer their raw product on a spot market to manufacturers who then sell finished products to a downstream retailer. Absent Fair Trade, the entire raw product is sold on the spot market. When a Fair Trade organization offers a Fair Trade contract to a sub-group of farmers, it gathers a Guaranteed Minimum Price clause and a straight relationship between the sub-group of farmers and the retailer. This article highlights several conditions such that a snowball effect exists, i.e farmers outside of the Fair Trade contract also benefit from a higher spot market price

How do GM / non GM coexistence regulations affect markets and welfare?

This paper presents a theoretical economic model assessing the effects of the level of mandatory genetically modified (GM) / non-GM coexistence regulations on market and welfare outcomes. We assume vertical differentiation of GM and non-GM goods on the consumer side. Producers are heterogeneous in their production cost for GM crops. Producers of non- GM crops face a probability of having their harvest downgraded if gene flow from GM fields raises its content in GMOs (genetically modified organisms) above the labeling threshold. The government may impose on GMO producers mandatory ex ante isolation distances from non- GM fields in order to decrease the probability of non-GM harvest downgrading. It may also introduce an ex post compensation to non-GMO farmers for profit losses due to harvest downgrading, imposing GMO farmers’ participation to a compensation fund via a tax on GM seeds. Assuming endogenous crop choices and prices, we study the effects of ex ante regulation and ex post liability of GMO producers on market equilibrium, on the achievement of coexistence, and on both global and interest group welfare