The Role of National Parliaments in European Decision-Making

National parliaments can be considered as victims of the European integration process. National parliaments ceded legislative powers to the EU and often lost leverage over their national executive branch, which continued to play a central role in EU decision-making. Different domestic parliamentary scrutiny systems have been established to enhance parliamentary involvement and control over EU affairs. In 2006 the Barroso Commission provided an additional impetus for parliaments to get involved, by offering to transmit its policy proposals directly to national parliaments with an open invitation to comment on them. The Lisbon Treaty foresees the possibility that national parliaments carry out subsidiarity checks on policy proposals. This paper argues that the different national and European provisions for parliamentary involvement do not amount to much. However, if we consider the combined effect of the different avenues in a dynamic perspective, they might jointly trigger a reassertion of national parliamentary influence in the European policy process

Who calls the shots in the committees of the new European Parliament? CEPS Special Report No. 97, 21 November 2014

This CEPS Special Report analyses the composition of the 20 committees in the new European Parliament and how representative they are of the 28 member states, identifying which policy areas or committees are of particular interest to MEPs from certain countries. It also examines the allocation of committee chairs and party coordinator positions to assess whether the country of origin matters and if so, why. The study reveals that in general the countries’ share of representatives in the committees is very similar in most of the cases to their representation in Parliament. Still, some policy areas have a special relevance for some countries and attract their MEPs in larger numbers. Due to the procedure used in the allocation of the committee chairs, which favours the largest political groups and the largest national parties within them, MEPs from larger member states tend to hold most of these coveted positions. The internal process followed by the political groups in appointing their coordinators in the respective committees is predisposed towards MEPs with seniority, experience and good connections. All in all, the strategic relevance that national parties attach to these positions makes a difference

EU Democratic Legitimacy and National Parliaments. CEPS Essay No. 7, 25 November 2013

The role of national parliaments in the EU has been at the centre of a long debate. Since the Maastricht treaty, new powers to the EU level have been accompanied not only by an increasing role of the European Parliament (EP) in the legislative process, but also by a number of declarations and protocols to ensure that national parliaments received the information and documents required to effectively monitor their governments in EU affairs. The Lisbon Treaty extended the guarantees and also included new modes of direct participation. The proper use of the mechanisms in place, namely, the subsidiarity checks, the political dialogue with the Commission and the inter-parliamentary cooperation with the European Parliament, has become of vital importance in view of recent developments in EU economic policy and beyond. The choice for increasing inter-governmentalism in decision-making and the centralisation of the implementing and supervisory powers in the Commission and the Central Bank have raised questions about political accountability and the appropriate involvement of parliaments. However, the extent to which national parliaments should be more involved is also rather controversial. This essay examines the difficulty of defining and addressing the question of the democratic legitimacy in the EU. It examines the role of the national parliaments in the treaties and explores ways in which they can contribute to improving that legitimacy

A new balance of power in the Council? Yes, but not yet… CEPS Commentary, 19 December 2014

On the 1st of November, the double majority system established by the Lisbon Treaty for qualified majority voting (QMV) in the Council entered into force. The shift in the balance of power, however, will not be effective before April 2017, given the possibility for member states to invoke the Nice rules until that date. While acknowledging that the new voting system in the Council promises to do away with the difficult negotiations of the past among member states to reallocate voting weights, this commentary finds that it is questionable whether it will achieve its ultimate aim to substantially improve democratic legitimacy and efficiency

Common Misconceptions about Elections to the European Parliament. CEPS Commentary, 23 May 2014

Much commentary on the EP elections has followed the line that the European Parliament somehow has less democratic legitimacy because the participation rate is low, and that these elections are taken less seriously because people’s trust in the EU institutions in general and the European Parliament in particular is low. However, both arguments lose much of their validity if the numbers are judged in a wider context

Rounding out a satisfactory Trio Presidency: Greece sets the stage for its Italian successor. CEPS Commentary, 3 July 2014

Expectations of the Greek presidency were not high: the budget was limited, the legislative term was drawing to a close and the European Parliament dissolved in mid-April for the elections. However, Greece made the most of its resources to progress on some very important dossiers and brought about a satisfactory close to the Trio presidency previously held by Ireland and Lithuania. The Greek presidency managed to finalise work on the Trio priorities, mainly in relation to banking union, the Digital Agenda, the competitiveness of EU enterprises and the Compact for Growth and Jobs. It also advanced legislation to tackle tax evasion as a necessary complement to spending cuts, and set the agenda for migration and maritime affairs, in close cooperation with Italy

The new European Parliament: Workable but impaired? CEPS Commentary, 27 June 2014

The ongoing selection of the next President of the European Commission has underscored the growing importance of the European Parliament in EU decisionmaking and in promoting democratic legitimacy at EU level. Strikingly, the new Parliament will be more Eurosceptical, radical and fragmented than ever before, which, among other things, will constrain the building of majorities to pass legislation and adopt decisions. The close relationship between the outcome of the EP elections and the governability of the EP should prompt a serious debate on the matter

The Three Logics of EU Enlargement: Interests, Identities and Arguments

Five rounds of enlargement have now been completed. The original European Economic Community has grown from Six to Twenty-Five members and the process has not yet come to an end. Still, we know very little about how enlargement processes work and how their effects are felt by and transmitted to the European Union

Enhancing the Legitimacy of EMU Governance. CEPS Special Report No. 98/December 2014

This CEPS Special Report investigates ways to enhance the legitimacy of economic governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) without introducing Treaty changes. It suggests changes in the governance framework at both the institutional and economic level. Input-oriented legitimacy can be improved by increasing parliamentary oversight on decisions related to EMU and increasing the accountability of the Eurogroup. Output-oriented legitimacy can be improved by strengthening the ability of EMU to reduce the emergence of negative externalities and to mitigate their impact, through market and fiscal risk-sharing mechanisms

Comitology committees in the enlarged European Union

The EU\u2019s administrative systems relies to a considerable extend on the delegation of executive tasks to the European Commission, which is in turn controlled in this task through a plethora of implementing committees \u2013 the so-called \u2018comitology\u2019 system. Considering the centrality of comitology for the implementation of EU legislation, the paper addresses the question whether the \u2018big bang enlargement\u2019 of 2004/2007 has had a significant impact on comitology, and whether any observable changes to the comitology system can be related to the arrival of the new member states. The paper first recalls some of the fundamental aspects of the comitology system, distinguishing between formal and informal arrangements, and highlighting the major changes which have taken place. It then looks at the impact of the 2004/2007 enlargement on the comitology system, analysing how implementing committees have been working and how the new members are adapting. By way of conclusion, the paper examines the main implications of these changes for the system as a whole and considers the most important challenges for the future