Why Has the U.S. Financial Sector Grown so Much? The Role of Corporate Finance.

The share of finance in U.S. GDP has been multiplied by more than three over the postwar period. I argue, using evidence and theory, that corporate finance is a key factor behind this evolution. Inside the finance industry, credit intermediation and corporate finance are more important than globalization, increased trading, or the development of mutual funds for explaining the trend. In the non financial sector, firms with low cash flows account for a growing share of total investment. I build a simple equilibrium model to capture these salient features and I use it to interpret the data. I find that corporate demand is the main contributor to the growth of the finance industry, but also that efficiency gains in finance have been important to limit credit rationing. Overall, the model can account for a bit more than half of the financial sector's growth.

Financiers vs. Engineers: Should the Financial Sector be Taxed or Subsidized?

I study the allocation of human capital in an economy with production externalities, financial constraints and career choices. Agents choose to become entrepreneurs, workers or financiers. Entrepreneurship has positive externalities, but innovators face borrowing constraints and require the services of financiers in order to invest efficiently. When investment and education subsidies are chosen optimally, I find that the financial sector should be taxed in exactly the same way as the non-financial sector. When direct subsidies to investment and scientific education are not feasible, giving a preferred tax treatment to the financial sector can improve welfare by increasing aggregate investment in research and development.

Corporate Governance Over the Business Cycle

I provide empirical evidence that badly governed firms respond more to aggregate shocks than do well governed firms. I build a simple model where managers are prone to over-invest and where shareholders are more willing to tolerate such a behavior in good times. The model successfully explains the average profit differences as well as the cyclical behavior of sales, employment and investment for firms with different governance qualities. The quantitative results suggest that governance conflicts can explain 30% of aggregate volatilitybusiness cycles, corporate governance

Financing Europe's Fast Movers. Bruegel Policy Brief 2008/01, January 2008

Summary. Arguments about structural policies in Europe, including the EU’s Lisbon strategy, put a legitimate emphasis on labour and product market reforms, but often overlook the role of the financial system in fostering innovation and growth. Corporate finance is crucial for the emergence of new companies, well beyond the much-analysed technology sector. In a knowledge economy where companies rely less on physical investment, traditional bank loans are insufficient. While Europe has a world-class financial system for established companies, new instruments tailored to the needs of emerging firms remain underdeveloped in most EU countries

Financing Europe's fast movers

This policy brief deals with the link between corporate finance and growth. The discussions about structural reform in Europe, including the EUÂ?s Lisbon strategy, put a legitimate emphasis on labour and product market reforms, but often overlook the role of the financial system in fostering expansion. Thomas Philippon and Nicolas Véron analyse this gap and outline a number of possible policy responses.

Skill Biased Financial Development: Education, Wages and Occupations in the U.S. Financial Sector

Over the past 60 years, the U.S. financial sector has grown from 2.3% to 7.7% of GDP. While the growth in the share of value added has been fairly linear, it hides a dramatic change in the composition of skills and occupations. In the early 1980s, the financial sector started paying higher wages and hiring more skilled individuals than the rest of economy. These trends reflect a shift away from low-skill jobs and towards market-oriented activities within the sector. Our evidence suggests that technological and financial innovations both played a role in this transformation. We also document an increase in relative wages, controlling for education, which partly reflects an increase in unemployment risk: Finance jobs used to be safer than other jobs in the private sector, but this is not longer the case.

Competing on Speed

Two forces have reshaped global securities markets in the last decade: Exchanges operate at much faster speeds and the trading landscape has become more fragmented. In order to analyze the positive and normative implications of these evolutions, we study a framework that captures (i) exchanges' incentives to invest in faster trading technologies and (ii) investors' trading and participation decisions. Our model predicts that regulation that protect prices will lead to fragmentation and faster trading speed. Asset prices decrease when there is intermediation competition and are further depressed by price protection. Endogenizing speed can also change the slope of asset demand curves. On normative side, we find that for a given number of exchanges, faster trading is in general socially desirable. Similarly, for a given trading speed, competition among exchange increases participation and welfare. However, when speed is endogenous, competition between exchanges is not necessarily desirable. In particular, speed can be inefficiently high. Our model sheds light on important features of the experience of European and U.S. markets since the implementation of Reg. NMS, and provides some guidance for optimal regulations.

The Rise in Firm-Level Volatility: Causes and Consequences

We document that the recent decline in aggregate volatility has been accompanied by a large increase in firm level risk. The negative relationship between firm and aggregate risk seems to be present across industries in the US, and across OECD countries. Firm volatility increases after deregulation. Firm volatility is linked to research and development spending as well as access to external financing. Further, R&D intensity is also associated with lower correlation of sectoral growth with the rest of the economy.

The Risk-Adjusted Cost of Financial Distress

In this paper we argue that risk-adjustment matters for the valuation of financial distress costs, since financial distress is more likely to happen in bad times. Systematic distress risk implies that the risk-adjusted probability of financial distress is larger than the historical probability. Alternatively, the correct valuation of distress costs should use a discount rate that is lower than the risk free rate. We derive a formula for the valuation of distress costs, and propose two strategies to implement it. The first strategy uses corporate bond spreads to derive risk-adjusted probabilities of financial distress. The second strategy estimates the risk adjustment directly from historical data on distress probabilities, using several established asset pricing models. In both cases, we find that exposure to systematic risk increases the NPV of financial distress costs. In addition, the magnitude of the risk-adjustment can be very large, suggesting that a valuation of distress costs that ignores systematic risk significantly underestimates their true present value. Finally, we show that marginal distress costs computed using our new formula can be large enough to balance the marginal tax benefits of debt derived by Graham (2000), and we conclude that systematic distress risk can help explain why firms appear rather conservative in their use of debt.

Real Options in a Dynamic Agency Model, with Applications to Financial Development, IPOs, and Business Risk

We study investment options in a dynamic agency model. Moral hazard creates an option to wait and agency conflicts affect the timing of investment. The model sheds light, theoretically and quantitatively, on the evolution of firms' dynamics, in particular the decline of the failure rate and the decrease in the age of IPOs.