10 research outputs found

    Recognition, Vulnerability and Trust

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    ABSTRACT This paper examines the question of whether recognition relations are based on trust. Theorists of recognition have acknowledged the ways in which recognition relations make us vulnerable to others but have largely neglected the underlying ‘webs of trust’ in which such relations are embedded. In this paper, I consider the ways in which the theories of recognition developed by Jürgen Habermas and Axel Honneth, not only point to our mutual vulnerability but also implicitly rely upon mutual relations of trust. The paper first offers a novel examination of the relation between recognition, vulnerability and trust in Habermas’ account of communicative action with the aim of arguing that such a consideration helps to elucidate important features of recognition. My claim is that a consideration of the dynamics of recognition and vulnerability in language-use, leads to an acknowledgment of the forms of trust that not only underpin communicative action, but recognition more generally. I conclude by considering the elements that are underplayed in Habermas’ account by turning to an examination of Axel Honneth’s alternative affective theory of recognition, specifically considering the interrelation between vulnerability and recognition. In doing so, I also turn to a consideration of the kind of trust that must be assumed in Honneth’s account of mutual recognition and point to a recognitive notion of trust

    Recognizability, Perception and the Distribution of the Sensible: Honneth, Rancière and Butler

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    This paper explores the relation between perception and recognizability in the work of Honneth, Rancière and Butler. Recognizability is the term employed here to indicate the perceptual process that necessarily occurs prior to a normative or ethical act of recognition and that provides the conditions that make recognition possible. The notion of recognizability points to the fact that perception is not merely a disinterested surveying of the perceptual field but indicates that it is already evaluative in the sense that others are immediately distinguishable from other objects. When recognizability fails, it is not because the other has not been seen in a literal sense but instead that she has been intentionally ignored or invisibilized. The suggestion made here is that despite their different approaches, a comparison and dialogue between these three thinkers highlights the importance of this constellation of issues for critical theory.Este artigo explora a relação entre percepção e reconhecibilidade nos trabalhos de Honneth, Rancière e Butler. O termo reconhecibilidade é utilizado para indicar o processo perceptivo que necessariamente antecede um ato normativo ou ético de reconhecimento e que fornece as condições que tornam o reconhecimento possível. A noção de reconhecibilidade aponta o fato de que a percepção não corresponde a uma mera observação desinteressada do campo perceptivo e indica que tal apreensão já é valorativa, uma vez que outras pessoas são imediatamente distinguíveis de outros objetos. Quando a reconhecibilidade fracassa, não é porque a outra pessoa não foi vista no sentido literal, mas sim porque ela foi intencionalmente ignorada ou invisibilizada. A sugestão que faço aqui é a de que, embora possuam abordagens distintas, uma comparação e um diálogo entre esses três pensadores explicita a importância dessa constelação de questões para a teoria crítica.Este artículo explora la relación entre percepción y reconocibilidad en las obras de Honneth, Rancière y Butler. El término reconocibilidad es utilizado para indicar el proceso perceptual que necesariamente precede a un acto normativo o ético de reconocimiento, y que proporciona las condiciones que hacen posible el reconocimiento. La noción de reconocibilidad muestra que la percepción no corresponde a una mera aprehensión desinteresada del campo perceptivo e indica que ella ya es evaluativa, en el sentido que otras personas se distinguen inmediatamente de otros objetos. Cuando falla la reconocibilidad, no es porque la otra persona no haya sido vista en el sentido literal, sino, por el contrario, porque ha sido intencionalmente ignorada o invisibilizada. Sugiero aquí que, aunque tienen enfoques diferentes, una comparación y un diálogo entre estos tres pensadores explica la importancia de esta constelación de temas para la teoría crítica
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