Does the process really matter? Some reflections on the “ legitimating effect” of the European Convention. CES Working Paper, no. 102, 2003

The European Convention, set up by the Heads of state and governments during the Laeken Summit of December 2001, was presented by its initiators as a means of strengthening the legitimacy of the EU. Is this a rhetorical argument of politicians, which could be explained by the intense electoral cycle of 2002- 2004? Or is there something, in the process of the Convention, that could change the nature of the EU constitution? This paper argues that the Convention is not likely to transform the nature of the EU. The arguments put forward by its members, and the partial compromises reached at this stage, show that the conventionnels are willing to rationalize the acquis, rather than launch a new phase of integration; this Convention will not be remembered as a European Philadelphia. I then turn to the process of the Convention in order to assess its potential effect in terms of legitimation of the EU. I argue that the EU’s alleged “democratic deficit” is merely a problem of standards: though the EU can be seen as a fully accountable and legitimate polity in Madisonian terms (Moravcsik), it is still seen as an unsatisfying arrangement when interpreted in more demanding “republican” terms (Habermas). This is the reason why the Convention might be useful: if it managed to reduce cognitive and normative dissonance, it could help soften conflicts of interpretation of the nature of the EU among leaders. Moreover, by clarifying the role of the EU, it could reduce public expectations and the frustrations they engender. I conclude that the Convention is an exercise of reappraisal and confirmation of the EU’s founding pact, but that even this rather modest role is important in terms of legitimacy because of the nature of the EU constitutional process: since the existing treaties are the result of a long piecemeal and instrumental process of bargaining among member states, the EU lacks clear and accepted normative foundations. Even if it only clarifies and confirms the status quo, the Convention, and the public debates to which the ratification of the treaty might give rise after the IGC, might help root the EU’s founding pact in the public’s conscience

The Convention on the Future of Europe - Transatlantic Perspectives

[Introduction by Virginie Guiraudon, Forum Editor]. In June 2000, the Convention on the Future of Europe delivered its project for a draft Constitution to the European Council as a basis for negotiations during the 2003-2004 Intergovernmental Conference. Although it is too early to tell how different the final outcome will be from the Convention draft, it is time to reflect on the Convention as process, and situate this EU experiment in deliberative negotiating. In this "EUSA Review Forum", three authors look back at the work of the Convention and analyze it in a historical and transatlantic light

Towards ‘accountable independence’? Parliamentary controls of the European Central Bank and the rise of a new democratic model

The independence of the European Central Bank is legally defined in very clear and strict terms. Although most scholars in economics describe this status as a crucial condition of the Bank's efficiency, it is frequently criticised by politicians and political scientists as a contradiction to democratic theory.This paper will examine the emerging practice of parliamentary control of the ECB, from its installation until September 1999, in order to understand which kind of ‘accountability’ is elaborated in this unprecedented relationship between ‘politicians’ and lsquo;technocrats’. It will first show that MEPs have rejected all forms of parliamentary control based on a logic of constraint. It will then describe the numerous institutional links created between the Bank and the EU political organs to favour their cooperation. Finally it will analyse the recent initiatives taken by MEPs to influence central bankers and to convince them to submit their decisions to public debates.The hypothesis developed from these empirical analyses is that a new kind of ‘accountability’ is emerging in the EU. From a horizontal point of view (inter-institutional controls), it is based on influence rather than traditional parliamentary constraint. From a vertical point of view (accountability to citizens), it focuses on responsiveness rather than on classic responsibility.FLWINinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishe

Between democracy and the rule of law

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Le PSC peut-il survivre à l'opposition?

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La cittadinanza europea tra società civili et Stati

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The politics of regulation

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