265 research outputs found
Expansion of Higher Education and Time-Consistent Taxation
This paper analyzes educational choices and political support for subsidies to higher education in the presence of a time-consistency problem in income redistribution. There may be political support for so generous subsidization that it motivates the median voter to obtain higher education. As a result of increasing own income, the median voter prefers in the future lower taxes than without higher education. Therefore, the expansion of participation in higher education during the second half of the 20th century may have partly been driven by the aim to limit the political support for overly generous income redistribution.education, time-consistency problem, voting, subsidies to education
Educating Europe
The mobility of labor reduces national incentives to invest in internationally applicable education. The European Union could overcome this by allowing member states to institute graduate taxes or income-contingent loans, collected also from migrants. This paper presents calculations on how a graduate tax system could look for Finland. To protect citizens against Leviathan governments, graduate taxes or income-contingent loans could be based on voluntary contracts. Education would then be financed publicly only for those accepting also to share the returns. With EU enlargement, such reforms could generate a triple dividend.graduate taxes, European Union, individual accounts, income-contingent loans, migration
Public Education in an Integrated Europe: Studying for Migration and Teaching for Staying?
Both current and especially new member states of the European Union face incentives to distort the provision of public education away from internationally applicable education towards country-specific skills. This would mean educating too few engineers, economists and doctors, and too many lawyers. Such an outcome could be avoided by introducing graduate taxes or income-contingent loans, collected also from migrants. By giving the providers of internationally applicable education a stake also in efficiency gains earned elsewhere, graduate taxes would encourage member states to invest more in internationally applicable education.graduate taxes, European Union, migration, brain drain and brain gain
Educating Europe
The mobility of labor reduces national incentives to invest in internationally applicable education. Such effects may be especially severe for the prospective new member states of the European Union. The European Union could overcome this by allowing countries to institute graduate taxes or income-contingent loans, collected also from migrants. This paper presents calculations on how such a system could look like for Finland, as well as discusses its implementation. Such contracts could be voluntary, education financed publicly only for those accepting also to share the returns. With EU enlargement, such reforms could generate a triple dividend.graduate taxes, European Union, individual accounts, income- contingent loans, migration
On Human Capital Formation with Exit Options: Comment and New Results
Katz and Rapoport (2005) conclude that with linear production technology and the possibility of unilateral migration, region-specific shocks may increase the average level of education. Previously, Poutvaara (2000) derived a corresponding result with Cobb-Douglas technology and migration which may go in both directions. This paper shows that the exit option may reduce human capital formation with a quadratic production technology.human capital formation, migration, economic volatility
Public Education in an Integrated Europe: Studying to Migrate and Teaching to Stay?
An increasing international applicability of a given type of education encourages students to invest more effort when studying. Governments, on the other hand, face an incentive to divert the provision of public education away from internationally applicable education toward country-specific skills. This would mean educating too few engineers, economists and doctors, and too many lawyers. If the total tax rate is kept constant, then replacing part of existing wage taxes with graduate taxes, collected also from migrants, would improve efficiency. It could even allow for a Pareto-improvement.graduate taxes, public education, European Union, migration, brain drain and brain gain
Social Security Incentives, Human Capital Investment and Mobility of Labor
Migration between countries with earnings-related and flat-rate pay-as-you-go social security systems may change human capital investments in both countries. The possibility of emigration boosts investments in human capital in the country with flat-rate benefits. Correspondingly, those expecting to migrate from the country with earnings-related benefits to a country with flat-rate benefits may reduce their investment in education. With suitably planned transfers between the two countries, allowing for migration may generate a Pareto-improvement for all current and future generations. Without transfers, either country may be unable to pay for promised benefits when labor becomes mobile.social security, education, migration, earnings-related and flat-rate pensions
On the Political Economy of Social Security and Public Education
I analyze simultaneous voting on the wage tax rate and investment in public education using a model with three overlapping generations and ability differences inside each cohort. Wage tax revenue finances public education and social security benefits. I derive the results both for a once-and-for-all voting system with commitment and for repeated voting. My model allows demographic change and productivity growth. Even when cohorts are of the same size, the median voter may be a young uneducated citizen.Social security; Public education; Voting; Implicit intergenerational contract; Structure-induced equilibrium
Federation's alternative tax constitutions and risky education
We analyze a two-period modell where risk-averse students divide their time between risky education, leisure, and work. The educated can migrate. Wagetax financed transfer to students acts as an insurance, and increases both investment in education and demand for leisure. We drive sufficient conditions for tax competition to lead to too low wage tax rates. We suggest, that the educated should pay their wage taxes to the region which has financed their education. We show that this would increase taxation and investment in education, and would benefit also the owners of the complementary factor. --Fiscal federalism,tax competition,optimal taxation,education subsidies,tax constitution
- …