17 research outputs found
Institutionalising Kant's political philosophy: Foregrounding cosmopolitan right
There exists a longstanding debate over the global institutional implications of Immanuel Kant's political philosophy: does such a philosophy entail a federal world government, or instead only a confederal âleague of nationsâ? However, while the systematic nature of Kant's tripartite âdoctrine of right' is well recognised, this debate has been conducted with all but exclusive focus on âinternational right' in particular. This article, by contrast, brings âcosmopolitan right' firmly into view. It proceeds by way of engagement with the two Kantian arguments made in defence of a âleague of nationsâ in discussion of international right, each of which appeals to aspects of statesâ supposed âpersonhoodâ: the first appeals to statesâ distinctive moral personality; the second to statesâ physical manifestation. The article considers what happens when we assess these arguments not just in light of the demands of international right, but also in light of cosmopolitan right, and thus in light of public right more comprehensively. The answer is that such arguments cannot succeed as full defences of a league of nations. Indeed, when we assess such arguments with cosmopolitan right in view, they point instead â either tentatively or definitively â in the direction of world government
My body and other objects : the internal limits of selfâownership
Common practices such as donating blood or selling hair assume rights of disposal over oneself that are similar to, if not indistinguishable from, property rights. However, a simple view of selfâownership fails to capture relevant moral differences between parts of a person and other objects. In light of this, we require some account of the continuity in the form of ownership rights a person has over herself and other objects, which also acknowledges the normative differences between constitutive parts of a person, on the one hand, and external objects, on the other. This paper provides such an account by arguing that there are reasons internal to a general justification of property rights to limit the extent of powers included in ownership of different kinds of object, depending on how the person is situated in relation to them. Rejecting a typical Hohfeldian view of property as a univocal, gradable concept allows us to make space for a new approach to property and selfâownership: one which can make sense of various uses of the body as property without entailing that our relation to those parts is exhaustively characterised by an ordinary property right
Coercion
Coercion is thought to be morally and politically important for a number of reasons. The first is that to be coerced into doing something can form the basis for a claim that one is not responsible for that action. The second is that coercing others means forcing or making them do something against their wills, and thus interferes with their freedom or liberty or autonomy. Finally, the ability to coerce others is an important form of social power. To better understand coercion it is useful to note four significant distinctions: (1) between being directly coerced by another person as opposed to being subjected to âcoerciveâ pressures; (2) between being coerced by physical force and being coerced by being confronted with a âforced choiceâ; (3) between âcoercionâ as a means of making another act, and being subjected to âduressâ; and (4) between offers and threats, and when and why the latter are morally problematic on the grounds of coercion
Domination and enforcement: The contingent and non-ideal relation between state and freedom
Measuring nurse attitudes towards deliberate self-harm: the Self-Harm Antipathy Scale (SHAS)
Law and Coercion: Some Clarification
The relationship between law and coercion has been, and still is, a central topic in legal philosophy. Despite this, discussion about it is immersed in confusion. Some philosophers have noticed this, but hardly any work has been done to attempt to solve or even identify the confusions. This paper aims to fill this gap. Here I propose distinctions and qualifications that help us clarify the relationship between law and coercion and avoid confusion. Building on the clarificatory work, I then argue that despite there being several distinct philosophical discussions about the relationship between law and coercion, one of them should be prioritised