7 research outputs found
Equating categorially names and quantifiers within first-order logic
Grammarians traditionally consider quantifier expressions such as something, everything, somebody, everybody, some dog, every dog together with names (singular name expression) as belonging to the noun phrases category. The reason is simple: both quantifier expressions and names can be used as subjects in sentences. Logicians on the other hand, usually treat quantifier expression (in short: quantifiers) as operators, i.e. as expressions of a different category from the name category. The source of this distinction seems clear: names are categorametic, whereas operators are syncategorsmetic expressions. However, when we are trying to explain the opposition categorametic-syncategorametic we usually give names and quantifiers as paradigmatic examples respectively
Ways of reference to Meinongian objects. Ontological commitments of Meinongian theories
A. Meinong’s views are usually associated with an highly inflated ontology including various kinds of nonexistent objects, incomplete and impossible ones among others. Around the turn of the century B. Russell strongly criticised this ontology accusing it of inconsistency. And perhaps because of this criticism Meinong’s views have been forgotten for a long time. Only recently some philosophers have created theories of objects which are formalisations of Meinong’s ontology or which are directly inspired by the ontology 1 . However there still remains a need to discuss the problem of ways of reference to Meinongian objects regarding their specific structure of predication, and the interrelated problem of ontological commitment of those theories.Meinong’s ontological theory seems to be not so bizzare if we interpret it as a theory of possible intentional objects, i.e. possible objects of consciousness. And this interpretation perfectly agrees with phenomenological tradition from Brentano to Husserl and with the contemporary philosophy of mind. Needless to say reference is a special form of intentional relation so semantical investigations into these objects are of great relevance for general theory of intentionality
Ramsey's Thesis. The Indiscernibility of Objects and Properties in Logic
Ramsey questions the distinction between subject and predicate in sentences. Since the distinction mirrors the ontological distinction object/property (particular/universal) he questions the latter distinction as well. There is a symmetry between the category of objects and the category of properties: an object can possess a number of properties and a property can be exemplified by a number of objects. Consequently, it may be claimed that the two categories are formally indiscernible. The paper develops Ramsey's thesis on the ground of logic. Different senses of indiscernibility are discussed and various systems of logic are examined with respect to these senses. Most systems do not distinguish objects from properties in at least one sense
Some More Ado about Nothing: A Logical Analysis of Nothingness
Nothingness is a perennial subject of philosophical inquiry. From the logical point of view, the problem is that “nothing” is an ambiguous word: it can be used either as a negated existential quantifier or as a singular term. If it is used as a singular term, then it refers to nothing at all. In this paper, a number of recent formal treatments of nothingness are critically discussed. The author proposes some new logical approaches to nothingness, involving notions of generalized quantifiers, Meinongian objects, and aspectual objects
About Logic of Truthmakers
The paper discusses main issues concerning truthmakers: (1) what is the ontological status of truthmakers (are they ordinary objects, situations, tropes etc?), (2) what are deduvtive properties of truthmakers. A simple logic of truthmakers is developed. The logic consists of an axiomatic system and a possible world semantics