Optimal Paternalistic Savings Policies

Abstract We study optimal savings policies when there is a dual concern about undersaving for retirement and income inequality. Agents differ in present bias and earnings ability, both unobservable to a planner with paternalistic and redistributive motives. We characterize the solution to this two-dimensional screening problem and provide a decentralization using realistic policy instruments: mandatory savings at low incomes but a choice between subsidized savings vehicles at high incomes—resembling Social Security, 401(k), and IRA accounts in the US. Offering more savings choice at higher incomes facilitates redistribution. To solve large-scale versions of this problem numerically, we propose a general, computationally stable, and efficient active-set algorithm. Relative to the current US retirement system, we find significant welfare gains from increasing mandatory savings and limiting savings choice at low incomes

Optimal Paternalistic Savings Policies

Abstract We study optimal savings policies when there is a dual concern about undersaving for retirement and income inequality. Agents differ in present bias and earnings ability, both unobservable to a planner with paternalistic and redistributive motives. We characterize the solution to this two-dimensional screening problem and provide a decentralization using realistic policy instruments: mandatory savings at low incomes but a choice between subsidized savings vehicles at high incomes—resembling Social Security, 401(k), and IRA accounts in the US. Offering more savings choice at higher incomes facilitates redistribution. To solve large-scale versions of this problem numerically, we propose a general, computationally stable, and efficient active-set algorithm. Relative to the current US retirement system, we find significant welfare gains from increasing mandatory savings and limiting savings choice at low incomes

Essays in Public Economics

This dissertation is comprised of three separate chapters that study the optimal design of different government policies. In the first chapter, which is joint work with Christian Moser, I study the optimal design of retirement savings policies and how under-saving for retirement can be dealt with by the government when there is also considerable income inequality in the economy. I find that a redistributive government would find it optimal to provide more flexibility on savings of higher earners, thorugh the usage of special retirement savings accounts (401(k)s), and this government would find it optimal to offer social security benefits to make sure low earners have sufficient resources during retirement. In the second chapter, I study the optimal design of labor income taxes when there is advance information about the unobservable heterogeneity in labor earnings ability into the future. I find that the standard optimal taxation results are greatly affected, and in particular top income tax rates can differ significantly if the Pareto tail of the distribution of labor earnings ability differs across workers with different expectations. I find in the data from the Survey of Consumer Finances that there are significant differences on the Pareto tail of the distribution of earnings ability across different educational levels. Therefore, optimal income taxes across those groups differ significantly. Finally, in the third chapter, which is joint work with Michael Sockin, I study the optimal design of subsidies to higher education. I find that the optimal subsidy level satisfies a simple formula that depends on three key components: the redistributive motive; the extensive margin elasticity of education attainment with respect to the cost of education; and the elasticity of aggregate labor supply with respect to the cost of education

On insurance markets with endogenous information acquisition: A robust mechanism design approach

Neste trabalho propomos a aplicação das noções de equilíbrio da recente literatura de desenho de mecanismo robusto com aquisição de informação endógena a um problema de divisão de risco entre dois agentes. Através deste exemplo somos capazes de motivar o uso desta noção de equilíbrio, assim como discutir os efeitos da introdu ção de uma restrição de participação que seja dependente da informação. A simplicidade do modelo nos permite caracterizar a possibilidade de implementar a alocação Pareto efiente em termos do custo de aquisição da informação. Além disso, mostramos que a precisão da informação pode ter um efeito negativo sobre a implementação da alocação efi ciente. Ao final, sao dados dois exemplos específicos de situações nas quais este modelo se aplica