Licensing Schemes in Endogenous Entry

This paper examines the optimal licensing scheme when the number of licensees is determined endogenously. We demonstrate that a license holder obtains monopoly profit even if the license holder uses only a fixed fee as long as the marginal cost is constant. Furthermore, we show that under free entry of licensees, a license holder can obtain monopoly profit with any combination of a positive fixed fee and a unit royalty that satisfies a certain condition. Even if the fixed fee is regulated to be a certain level, a license holder can achieve monopoly profit by means of a unit royalty. This result is in contrast with that of a case where the number of licensees is exogenously determined.license, endogenous entry

Reclaiming Banyumas Identity an Interpretive Studyabout Identity and Character of Local Society Based on Literary Studies of History, Attitudes, Behavior, ARTS and Culture

The objectives of these study is to explore more about Banyumas cultural identity through. Caused by politics and power in the past, some of writings indicated that there were alienation, seclusion towards Banyumas culture due to political objectives created by Keraton elite and Colonial ruler in the past. As many Javanese culture, This view exclude other forms of arts and culture which flourished besides the mainstream culture or in this case high culture as Keraton had. And then labeled those art as folk art, sometimes not representation of Javanese culture or even as included as non art at all. For instance, Prior to Indonesian Independence in 1945, art, culture and symbols represented by keraton in Yogyakarta and Surakarta considered appraised a higher status compared to Banyumas culture and identity. Contradicted with inferior behavior in general, Banyumas attitudes towards Keraton, are resistant, doubt, lowered, and even mocked them. It showed in daily life interactions especially when they dealt with Bandek language, the sublimity in Keraton rituals, art culture and philosophy and also nobility symbols. Banyumas people are commonly proud of their culture and identity but at the same time they feel inferior towards Keraton or Javanese mainstream culture. This study concentrated in inferiority complex phase based on Adler's thesis. Response coming from Banyumas people is often paradoxical with the inferiority as a general. One of its implications was the emergence of new character as compensation. These compensation commonly reflected in two ways, first would be elevate own's status and secondly lowering the others.The common attitudes shown on this compensations for example passionally willingness to be superior, insulting,hostile and indifference. Tujuan utama dari penelitian ini adalah untuk melakukan telaah lebih dalam mengenai kebudayaan Banyumas. Karena adanya politik dan kekuasaan yang bermain di masa lalu, beberapa tulisan mengindikasikan adanya alienasi, pengasingan terhadap kebudayaan Banyumas yang disebabkan karena tujuan politis yang diciptakan pihak – pihak keraton dan penguasa kolonial. Seperti kebudayaan Jawa yang lain, bentuk kesenian dan kebudayaan yang berkembang selain kebudayaan Keraton Jawa tidak dianggap sebagai perwakilan bentuk kebudayaan Jawa. Setelah itu, ada pemberian cap sebagai kebudayaan rakyat, kebudayaan yang rendah atau bahkan bukan kebudayaan sama sekali. Sebagai contoh, sebelum Kemerdekaan di tahun 1945, seni, budaya dan simbol - symbol yang dikeluarkan keraton Jogjakarta dan Surakarta dianggap memiliki status yang lebih tinggi dibanding identitas dan Kebudayaan yang ada di Banyumas. Berlawanan dengan sikap inferior secara umum, sikap orang Banyumas terhadap Keraton bersifat melawan atau menentang, ragu, merendahkan dan bahkan mengejek. Hal ini terlihat dalam interaksi setiap harinya terutama terkait dengan Bahasa Bandek yang khas digunakan pihak Keraton, Keagungan ritual di dalam keraton, seni budaya, filosofi serta simbol simbol keningratan. Orang Banyumas secara umum merasa bangga atas identitas kebudayaan yang dimilikinya namun di saat yang sama merasa inferior jika dibandingkan dengan kebudayaan Keraton yang dianggap sebagai kebudayaan Jawa yang dikenal secara umum. karena alienasi tersebut, kebudayaan Banyumas menurut Anderson Sutton, mengalami perendahan secara politis dan artistik terhadap Kebudayaan Keraton “”subordinate politically and inferior artistically to the greatcourts”(Sutton, 1986 : 116). Penelitian ini terfokus terhadap inferiority complex yang diambil dari pemikiran Alfred Adler. Karena respons dari masyarakat Banyumas yang seringkali berlawanan dengan sikap inferior secara umum. Salah satu implikasi dari sikap ini adalah compensation atau kemunculan sikap lain (Broh, 1979 : 178). Sikap ataun kompensasi ini umumnya muncul dalam dua sikap, yang pertama adalah dengan menaikkan status yang dimilikinya dan yang kedua merendahkan status yang dimiliki pihak lainnya. Sikap yang umum tercermin dari kompensasi tersebut adalah keinginan yang menggebu untuk unggul, memusuhi, merendahkan, melawan tidak peduli

"Exclusive Dealing Contract and Inefficient Entry Threat"

This paper examines the effects of exclusive dealing contracts in a simple model with manufacturers-distributors relations. We consider entrants in both manufacturing and distribution sectors. It is well-known that a potential entry threat is welfare increasing under homogenous price competition, even though the potential entrant is less productive. This paper reexamines this intuition by employing the above model. We show that the entry threat of a less-productive manufacturer is welfare decreasing when there is an exclusive dealing contract between the incumbent manufacturer and distributor. This result is in contrast to the view of the contestable markets literature.

Exclusive Dealing and Large Distributors

A seminal work by Fumagalli and Motta (2006) explored that an incumbent manufacturer cannot deter an entry by exclusive dealing contract with distributors. This paper extends the flamework of Fumagalli and Motta and examines a situation in which an incumbent distributor tries to deter an entry of efficient distributor by exclusive dealing contracts with manufacturers. The result of this paper is quite opposite to that of Fumagalli and Motta. The exclusion can be successful. It is an unique equilibrium. In this sence, the effects of exclusive dealing depends on the mareket stiructure. Moreover, we extend our model with an entrant even in upstream. It may decrease the possibility of exclusion but may promote the inefficient vertical relation between the entrants.

Exclusive Dealing Contracts by Distributors

The existing literature about exclusive dealing contracts has focused on cases where an incumbent manufacturer offers exclusive contracts to deter an entry. In contrast, we consider the case where an incumbent distributor offers exclusive dealing contracts to deter an entry. Exclusive dealing contracts by a distributor are less effective. We will show that the outcome of such contracts is quite different from the outcomes in the traditional literature. If the number of manufacturers is sufficiently high, it is impossible to exclude an efficient entry. Furthermore, if we allow two- part tariff contracts, the entrant distributor can enter the market for any number of manufacturers.

Exclusive dealing contract and inefficient entry threat.

This paper examines the effects of exclusive dealing contracts offered by an incumbent distributor to an incumbent manufacturer with entrants in both manufacturing and distribution sectors. It is well-known that a potential entry threat is welfare increasing under homogenous price competition, even though the potential entrant is less productive. This paper reexamines this intuition. We show that the entry threat of a less-productive manufacturer is welfare decreasing when there is an exclusive dealing contract between the incumbent manufacturer and distributor.Exclusive Dealing, Entry Threat, Vertical Restraint, Antitrust

"Exclusive Dealing and the Market Power of Buyers"

This paper examines the effects of exclusive dealing contracts offered by an incumbent distributor. The effectiveness of exclusive dealing contracts offered by distributors is quite different from those offered by incumbent manufacturers. The traditional literature has focused solely on exclusive dealing contracts made by incumbent manufacturers and has derived multiple equilibria within homogeneous price competition models. In contrast, this paper asserts that exclusive dealing contracts made by a distributor generate a unique equilibrium and that an efficient entrant must be excluded under the equilibrium as long as distributors have sufficient bargaining power.