The International Dimension of the Antitrust Practice in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic

This paper analyses how the competition authorities in the Czech republic, Poland and Hungary (CPH) have dealt with the interface between trade and competition in their actual practice. The following findings emerge (i) there has not been any significant conflict in the allocation of jurisdiction between CPH on the one hand and the EU on the other hand. This may however be due to a lack of integration between these countries. (ii) the definition of the relevant geographic market suffers from significant shortcomings in each country under review with a general bias in favour of narrow market definition. Problems are most severe in the Czech republic. (iii) Anti-trust agencies in all three countries have attempted to advocate competition in the formulation of trade policy. Developments regarding the independence of the agencies is however mixed. There are some worrying signs that the Polish agency has become less independent whereas the Hungarian agency has probably become even more independent (iv) anti-trust agencies in all three countries could indeed be pursuing objectives of industrial policy in the exercise of merger control towards foreign firms. The situation is most severe in Poland where the suspicion arises that profitable market positions have been auctioned off to foreign buyers in exchange for commitments which are unrelated to the competitive situation.antitrust; transition

The Modernisation of EU Competition Policy : Making the Network Operate

This paper does not seek to evaluate whether decentralisation of the implementation of Art.81 ECT is desirable but simply analyses how the network of enforcers envisaged in the White Paper would operate. We identify two issues. We observe that in the proposed framework, simultaneous enforcement by several authorities is likely to occur and that each member states will have little incentive to take into account in its decision the interests of other member states. We show that such system of enforcement can have a "disintegrating effect", to the extent that it does not allow for a balancing between positive and negative net benefits across member states. We suggest that in order to avoid these effects, some co-ordination between the members of the network should be organised. In particular, we advocate the re-emergence in the intra-EC context of a 'positive comity' obligation and we suggest that a formal procedure for co-ordination between different institutions should be laid down (as in the US). We further observe that the accountability of antitrust authorities could deteriorate in the White Paper era. In order to address this concern, we suggest that institutional constraints like accountability and independence standards should be imposed on member states. Finally, drawing on the US experience with multiple enforcement, we argue that the role of the Commission should be as much to manage regulatory innovation (arising from the enforcement activity of member states) as to resolve conflict.antitrust; institution design

Implications of Weak-Interaction Space Deformation for Neutrino Mass Measurements

The negative values for the squares of both electron and muon neutrino masses obtained in recent experiments are explained as a possible consequence of a change in metric within the weak-interaction volume in the energy-momentum representation. Using a model inspired by a combination of the general theory of relativity and the theory of deformation for continuous media, it is shown that the negative value of the square of the neutrino mass can be obtained without violating allowed physical limits. The consequence is that the negative value is not necessary unphysical.Comment: 12 pages, 5 figures, LaTe

Thermodynamics of AdS planar black holes and holography

A large AdS Schwarzschild black hole can be approximated by an AdS planar black hole. However, the temperature of a planar black hole is not well defined due to the translational invariance of the horizon. We propose to fix this arbitrariness by imposing the entropy area law. Furthermore, using the AdS/CFT holography, we propose a relationship between the temperatures of an AdS planar and large AdS Schwarzschild black holes.Comment: 13 pages, clarifying comments added, typos corrected, published in JHE

Mexico - Measures Affecting Telecommunications Services (WT/DS204/R) A Comment on "El mess in TELMEX”

This chapter reviews the panel report on Mexico - Measures Affecting Telecommunication Services. The Panel considered claims by the United States that Mexico acted inconsistently with its obligations in respect to the liberalization of its market for telecommunication services. It is the first Panel to consider solely the rules agreed upon in the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). It is also the first Panel to deal with the telecommunication services industry and its complex layers of legislation, in particular the rules agreed to in the Telecommunications Reference Paper (TRP) on pro-competitive regulatory principles. Viewed from this perspective, this report is, because of its potential as a precedent, of particular significanc

From the White Paper to the Proposal for a Council Regulation: How to Treat the New Kids on the Block?

This Paper analyses how the network of enforcers envisaged in the Proposal for a Council Regulation on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty (September 2000) would operate. We identify four issues. First, we observe that the Proposal (unlike the White Paper) includes safeguards to avoid a shift of competence in favor of national competition laws, which may be questionable in terms of subsidiarity. Second, we recognize that the accountability of antitrust authorities might vary across the members of the network, so that, for instance, some authorities may be more prone than others to accept industrial policy considerations. The preservation of the Commission’s monopoly (among administrative units) with respect to decisions granting a positive application of Article 81(3) (a matter which was not fully clear in the White Paper) can be seen in this light. We suggest that the imposition of institutional constraints on Member States like accountability and independence standards could have been a more effective way of addressing the issue. Third, we observe that in the proposed framework, sequential enforcement by several authorities is likely to occur and that each Member States will have little incentive to take into account in its decision the interests of other Member States. We show that such a system of enforcement can have a ‘disintegrating effect ’, to the extent that it does not allow for a balance between positive and negative net benefits across Member States. The Proposal contains a number of measures which may reduce the scope of multiple enforcement, without however addressing the underlying incentive issue. We suggest that additional co-ordination between the members of the network may prove necessary. In particular, we advocate the re-emergence in the intra-EC context of a ‘positive comity’ obligation and we suggest that a formal procedure for co-ordination between different institutions might turn out to be necessary. Finally, we observe that if the Proposal formalises the (vertical) relationship between the Commission and the national competition authorities (beyond what was considered in the White Paper), it fails to bind the Commission discretion. We argue, in light of the US experience with multiple enforcement that such commitment would be useful

Greening the WTO: EGA, Tariff Concessions and Policy Likeness

This paper considers the APEC and EGA agreements which grant tariff concession through HS classifications beyond the six digit level ( ex outs ) in favour of green goods and discuss how these initiatives fit into the WTO legal regime. Even if the practical significance of the APEC agreement should not be overestimated as it involves modest tariff concessions over a subset of goods which are not heavily traded, these agreements involve a paradigm shift to the extent that they use tariffs concessions negotiated on a plurilateral basis as a policy instrument to meet public policy concern, instead of making market access conditional on meeting national regulations. We find that there is a tension between the current definition of likeness for the enforcement of MFN provisions and the use of ex outs and a risk that improved market access for ex outs could be seen a de facto discrimination. One way out of this conundrum is to define likeness in terms of policy rationales

Things Have Changed (or Have They?): Tariff Protection and Environmental Concerns in the WTO

This paper considers the APEC and proposed EGA agreements which grant tariff concession in favor of green goods. We find that the practical significance of the APEC agreement should not be overestimated as it involves modest tariff concessions over a subset of goods which are not heavily traded. Still, these agreements involve a paradigm shift to the extent that they use tariffs concessions negotiated on a plurilateral basis as a policy instrument to meet public policy concern, instead of making market access conditional on meeting national regulations. We model the mechanism through which these tariff preferences provide incentives to change production in favor of green goods in exporting countries and highlight the challenges that the implementation of these agreements involve

From the White Paper to the Proposal for a Council Regulation

This Paper analyses how the network of enforcers envisaged in the Proposal for a Council Regulation on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty (September 2000) would operate. We identify four issues. First, we observe that the Proposal (unlike the White Paper) includes safeguards to avoid a shift of competence in favour of national competition laws, which may be questionable in terms of subsidiarity. Second, we recognise that the accountability of antitrust authorities might vary across the members of the network, so that, for instance, some authorities may be more prone than others to accept industrial policy considerations. The preservation of the Commission’s monopoly (among administrative units) with respect to decisions granting a positive application of Article 81(3) (a matter which was not fully clear in the White Paper) can be seen in this light. We suggest that the imposition of institutional constraints on Member States like accountability and independence standards could have been a more effective way of addressing the issue. Third, we observe that in the proposed framework, sequential enforcement by several authorities is likely to occur and that each Member States will have little incentive to take into account in its decision the interests of other Member States. We show that such a system of enforcement can have a ‘disintegrating effect ’, to the extent that it does not allow for a balance between positive and negative net benefits across Member States. The Proposal contains a number of measures which may reduce the scope of multiple enforcement, without however addressing the underlying incentive issue. We suggest that additional co-ordination between the members of the network may prove necessary. In particular, we advocate the re-emergence in the intra-EC context of a ‘positive comity’ obligation and we suggest that a formal procedure for co-ordination between different institutions might turn out to be necessary. Finally, we observe that if the Proposal formalises the (vertical) relationship between the Commission and the national competition authorities (beyond what was considered in the White Paper), it fails to bind the Commission discretion. We argue, in light of the US experience with multiple enforcement that such commitment would be useful