I limiti del naturalismo in etica

Philippa Foot’s Natural Goodness is a restatement of a naturalistic theory of ethics. It is an interesting book for many reasons, since the author changes her position from a broadly Humean position to a more thoroughly Aristotelian one. Foot criticizes the non-cognitivist stance and various forms of expressivism and utilitarianism. She now declares that there are categorical imperatives, a thesis she used to deny. These imperatives are based on the idea of «patterns of natural normativity» which depend on the forms of life we are talking about. Human life needs practical rationality in order to flourish, and this means to have a rational will, without «volitional defect». Yet, this strategy confines practical rationality to an instrumental value and, more importantly, it can’t stand the objection that, after all, being human or flourishing as human may not be a normative ideal, e.g. from a Nietzschean point of view. Only if the will has an intrinsic side constraint as pure will, the Nietzschean objection can be faced: even a Will of Power cannot will against itself. But it can still will against nature. Naturalism, at least in this version, cannot face such a challenge

Etica ed eugenetica

Recent developments in molecular biology and genetic engineering open the possibility of rethinking the meaning of an eugenic project in contemporary society. Whereas the old eugenic movement aimed at an “improvement of the race” and explicitly adopted coercitive means, eugenetics in a liberal society would be the result of the free and equal access of the public to the genetic technologies available. Buchanan, Brock, Daniels and Wikler suggest in a recent book that access to genetic therapy and enhancement can be permitted without generatine any discrimination, provided that it is regulated by rules of fairness that guarantee the equality of opportunities. Things are not so simple, anyway, because a normative model of a “perfectly healthy” individual will impose itself in the social perception, and equality of access does not protect against the discrimination of those who depart from such “perfectionist” model. A different approach is also suggested by Habermas in a recent book, where he maintains that the self-normative image of man as free and equal needs to be protected leaving the genome untouched

La normatività delle ragioni morali nell’intuizionismo: una critica

According to the intuitionist picture of moral normativity, prima facie duties are features of the overall nature of an act, which together make them overall right or wrong. W.D. Ross says that prima facie duties are «not a duty», but something which has a special relation to duty. These fea-tures are «apprehended» by way of an intellectual act (intuition), which implies that they are the object of a theoretical cognitive act. This image creates serious problems for both the theory of moral normativity and the theory of motivation. The problem is how to explain the practical nature of duties and their connection with the will: the intuitionist picture sketches a rather passive role for the will, both in determining the obligatoriness of an action and the possible motivation for it. This rather intellectualistic picture fails to explain the authority and motivational power of moral reasons. Furthermore, the outcome of this position is to lead back to a form of naturalism (an out-come which is certainly contrary to the intuitionist tradition itself) and to a problematic externalist explanation of moral motivation. In the end it is suggested that a more thoroughly Kantian theory of normativity shows a more promising picture for this problem

Neuroscience and Metaethics: A Kantian Hypothesis

The interpretation of experimental data in neuroscientific research concerning moral decisions is controversial. One of the leading experimenters in the field, Joshua Greene, holds that the data show that deontological theories of morality are the expression of a confabulation which tries to give a rational justification for emotional responses. His arguments are criticized on the basis of a different interpretation of deontology. On the other hand, Marc Hauser, John Mikhail and others have proposed a research project in moral psychology called Universal Moral Grammar. This perspective is more promising as far as the normative dimension of moral judgment is concerned. Yet, it is suggested that rather than looking for the universal moral principles we should look for the (univerdsal) formal principles of morality, in a more thoroughly Kantian perspective

Charles Taylor: l'identità moderna fra genealogia e normatività

This article tries to point out a source of potential conflict in Charles Taylor’s theoretical perspective. There is an unsolved tension between the historical reconstruction of the genealogy of the modern identity and the theoretical claim that our moral reactions are the basis of an objective assessment of practices. My intention is to analyse this tension at three different levels of discourse: first, Taylor’s position as a liberal non-atomist thinker hinges upon his idea that our moral identity depends on our free determination of our relation to good, which can be pursued only within the experience of a community. Second, this Hegelian trait of his perspective is also present in his meta-ethical theory, in which our moral reactions are said to be both instinctive and culturally mediate. In this case, it is not clear how an individual or a group can transcend this limited perspective, if any appeal to reason is inextricably tied to historical delimitations. Third, the principle that any culture in itself is to be considered equally valuable appears to be disputable in front of the objection that some cultures (e.g. nazism) do violate what seem to be fundamental rights and therefore do not deserve equal consideration and are not to be preserved

Internal to what? A critique of the distinction between internal and external reasons for action

The distinction between internalism and externalism can be interpreted in different ways, which must be kept clearly distinct. The distinction between internal and external reasons for action, proposed by Bernard Williams (1980), can be interpreted as expressing a form of internalism. If we assume that internalism seems preferable to externalism and Williams’s "internal reason theorist" as an internalist, we have an example of an anti-rationalistic form of internalism. I will suggest that Williams’s arguments do not justify his distinction and the consequences he draws, basically because of the unjustified exclusion of rational elements from the "subjective motivational set". Moreover, Williams’s position seems exposed to a subjectivistic outcome which he himself probably would wish to avoid. Therefore, I argue that the distinction between internal and external reasons should be abandoned. Some considerations in favour of a rationalistic interpretation of internalism and of the normativity of moral reasons are then suggested

Sfide etiche nell'assistenza agli anziani in contesto acuto e residenziale: una revisione di scopo

Introduction: The discontinuity between the high ideals of nursing education and real-world practice is a major cause of frustration, moral distress and burnout among the youngest, and pushes up to half nurses to change career within two years. These conditions are accentuated in the care of elderly patients with multiple chronic needs. Method: A multidisciplinary team of nurses and philosophers investigated the chronic determinants of ethical issues in aged care nursing, building on insightful experiences from different institu­tional settings, in order to provide evidence for contextualized and patient-oriented professio­nal support. A scoping review protocol was employed at this purpose. Results: Most of the environmental and organizational deteminants of chronical ethical issues are out­side the control of nurses, and most of the relational ones follow as a result in both settings. Many of the them have been confirmed and further aggravated by the COVID-19 pandemic. Discussion: Although there are not universal solutions to the issues described, still it is possible to distin­guish which determinants fall within the control of nurses, to help them prevent or manage their occurrence; and what are beyond, to help them avoid self-blame and transfer constructive information to those who can intervene. Conclusion: Education can help exercise critical thinking and communicate properly. However, once maximized team cooperation, orga­nizational efficiency, and individual soft skills, diminishing room for improvement will be available at increasing human and financial costs. Improving the condition of nurses is an urgent political responsibility and requires a broader socio-cultural change. Keywords: burnout, COVID-19, elderly, moral distress, workplace health promotion.Introduzione: La frattura fra educazione infermieristica e realtà lavorativa quotidiana rappresenta una frequente causa di frustrazione ed esaurimento psicofisico, che spinge fino a metà degli infermieri a ritirarsi entro due anni dal conseguimento del titolo. Tali condizioni sono accentuate nell’assistenza alla persona anziana affetta da bisogni cronici e complessi. Metodo: Un gruppo multidisciplinare di infermieri e filosofi ha studiato i determinanti ambientali, organizzativi e relazionali alla base dei problemi etici che emergono con maggior frequenza nell’assistenza alla persona anziana, sia nelle strutture per acuti, sia nelle strutture di ricovero a lungo termine, alla ricerca di evidenze utili a migliorare le condizioni dei professionisti. A tal proposito è stata una condotta una revisione di scopo. Risultati: La maggior parte dei problemi ambientali e organizzativi risultano essere al di fuori del controllo dei singoli infermieri, e la maggior parte dei problemi relazionali ne rappresentano la conseguenza. Molti di questi problemi sono stati confermati e aggravati dalla pandemia di COVID-19. Discussione: Sebbene non vi siano soluzioni trasversali a tutti i contesti, resta possibile distinguere quali problemi rientrino nel dominio di azione degli infermieri, per aiutarli a prevenirne o gestirne l’occorrenza; e quali invece vadano oltre, onde evitare sentimenti di autoaccusa, e trasferire informazioni utili a coloro che invece possono di volta in volta intervenire. Conclusioni: La formazione può allenare il pensiero critico e la comunicazione fra operatori, pazienti e familiari. Una volta raggiunti i massimi livelli possibili di cooperazione ed efficienza, tuttavia, margini di miglioramento sempre più ridotti saranno acquisiti a costi umani ed economici sempre maggiori. Il miglioramento delle condizioni degli infermieri dipende sempre sempre più da investimenti allocativi e culturali urgenti. Keywords: anziani, COVID-19, esaurimento psicofisico, politiche allocative, salute sul luogo di lavoro