The Distribution of Energy-Intensive Sectors in the US

We study the in uence of energy endowments on the location of energy-intensive industries. We use data on manufacturing sectors in 50 US states from 2002 until 2008, with detailed information on state endowments of coal, natural gas, oil and hydropower and sectoral fuel and electricity intensities. The effect of energy on industry location is statistically and economically significant. A one standard deviation increase in energy en- dowments per capita increases the activity of energy-intensive industries by about 20%.industry location;factor endowments;energy;Heckscher-Ohlin model

Brown Backstops versus the Green Paradox (Revision of CentER DP 2011-076)

Anticipated and unilateral climate policies are ineffective when fossil fuel owners respond by shifting supply intertemporally (the green paradox) or spatially (carbon leakage). These mechanisms rely crucially on the exhaustibility of fossil fuels. We analyze the effect of anticipated and unilateral climate policies on emissions in a simple model with two fossil fuels: one scarce and dirty (oil), the other abundant and dirtier (coal). We derive conditions for a ’green orthodox’: anticipated climate policy may reduce current emissions, and unilateral measures may unintentionally reduce emissions in other countries. Calibrations suggest that intertemporal carbon leakage (between -3% and 1%) is less of a concern than spatial leakage (19-39%).carbon tax;green paradox;exhaustible resource;backstop;climate change

Essays in environmental and resource economics

The dissertation also deals with conflicts between successive regulators that can arise when policy makers have self-control problems, or because successive regulators share a common concern for long-term environmental outcomes, but each regulator would like his successors to shoulder the costs of preventative policies. Lastly, it contains a chapter that highlights the importance of energy reserves for the location of energy-intensive manufacturing industries.

The Distribution of Energy-Intensive Sectors in the US

We study the in uence of energy endowments on the location of energy-intensive industries. We use data on manufacturing sectors in 50 US states from 2002 until 2008, with detailed information on state endowments of coal, natural gas, oil and hydropower and sectoral fuel and electricity intensities. The effect of energy on industry location is statistically and economically significant. A one standard deviation increase in energy en- dowments per capita increases the activity of energy-intensive industries by about 20%.

Assessing Unilateral Merger Effects in a Two-Sided Market: An Application to the Dutch Daily Newspaper Market

We compare different methods to assess unilateral merger effects in a two-sided market by applying them to a hypothetical merger in the Dutch newspaper industry. For this, we first specify and estimate a structural model of demand for differentiated products on both the readership and the advertising side of the market. This allows us to recover price elasticities and indirect network effects. Following Filistrucchi, Klein, and Michielsen (2010) marginal costs are then recovered from an oligopoly model of the supply side. We use these estimates of price elasticities, network effects and marginal costs to compare different methods that can be used to evaluate merger effects: We perform a concentration analysis based on the Herfindahl Hirschmann Index, a Small Significant Non-Transitory Increase in Price test, measure Upward Pricing Pressure, and conduct a full merger simulation.Two-sided markets;newspapers;advertising;network effects;merger simulation;SSNIP;UPP;HHI

Environmental Catastrophes Under Time-inconsistent Preferences

Abstract I analyze optimal natural resource use in an intergenerational model with the risk of a catastrophe. Each generation maximizes a weighted sum of discounted utility (positive) and the probability that a catastrophe will occur at any point in the future (negative). The model generates time-inconsistency as generations disagree on the relative weights on utility and catastrophe prevention. As a consequence, future generations emit too much from the current generation’s perspective and a dynamic game ensues. I consider a sequence of models. When the environmental problem is related to a scarce exhaustible resource, early generations have an incentive to reduce emissions in Markov equilibrium in order to enhance the ecosystem’s resilience to future emissions. When the pollutant is expected to become obsolete in the near future, early generations may however increase their emissions if this reduces future emissions. When polluting inputs are abundant and expected to remain essential, the catastrophe becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy and the degree of concern for catastro- phe prevention has limited or even no effect on equilibrium behaviour

Brown Backstops versus the Green Paradox (Replaced by CentER DP 2011-110)

Imperfect climate policies may be ineffective when fossil fuel owners respond by shifting their supply spatially (coined carbon leakage) or intertemporally (the green paradox). Though these effects are usually analyzed separately, the underlying mechanisms are similar. Exhaustibleffossil fuel owners must trade off present and future extraction or supplying one country and the other. Whereas this is a plausible representation for oil and natural gas, important emission-intensive substitutes such as coal and uncoventional oil are so abundant that their owners face no such trade-off. A decrease in coal demand in one time period or region will therefore not trigger an equal increase in supply in the other. Moreover, if imperfect climate policies causes oil and natural gas owners to supply more in the near future or in countries with lax regulation, demand for dirtier substitutes will go down. Both effects mitigate intertemporal and spatial carbon leakage. When the substitutability between oil and coal differs across time periods or countries, a 'strong green orthodox' may occur

Strategic Resource Extraction And Substitute Development

Abstract We analyze a dynamic game between a buyer and a seller of an exhaustible resource. The seller chooses resource supply; the buyer can pay a fixed cost to invent a perfect substitute for the resource at any time. In closed-loop equilibrium, the buyer adopts the substitute when the resource is exhausted. Investing makes the buyer worse off because it decreases resource supply, destroys his ability to derive surplus from the resource through delaying the investment cost incurrence, and causes a larger share of the resource stock to be sold at his reservation price. From the seller’s perspective, the buyer’s ability to develop a substitute is equivalent to an already available substitute with a higher marginal cost

Brown Backstops versus the Green Paradox (Revision of CentER DP 2011-076)

Anticipated and unilateral climate policies are ineffective when fossil fuel owners respond by shifting supply intertemporally (the green paradox) or spatially (carbon leakage). These mechanisms rely crucially on the exhaustibility of fossil fuels. We analyze the effect of anticipated and unilateral climate policies on emissions in a simple model with two fossil fuels: one scarce and dirty (oil), the other abundant and dirtier (coal). We derive conditions for a ’green orthodox’: anticipated climate policy may reduce current emissions, and unilateral measures may unintentionally reduce emissions in other countries. Calibrations suggest that intertemporal carbon leakage (between -3% and 1%) is less of a concern than spatial leakage (19-39%)