The Role of Incentive Design in Parliamentarian Anti-Corruption Programmes

The “first wave” of donor sponsored anti-corruption programmes usefully focused on elaborating recommendations for parliamentarians or tried to train them (develop human capital) in anti-corruption. Now it time for these programmes to take into account parliamentarian incentives to adopt these recommendations and/or use this “knowledge.” This paper will discuss these incentives and the ways these programmes should and can help build political capital by managing voter demands, political competition, patronage, and enforcement. The paper also reviews some basic theories from formal political economy which may be of interest to practitioners interested in bridging the theory-practice gap.anti-corruption, incentive design, incentive compatibility

What Does the UN Convention on Corruption Teach Us About International Regulatory Harmonisation?

Should international institutions promote international regulatory harmonisation? This paper will present arguments, looking at the UN Convention Against Corruption, noting that international institution regulation may play less of a harmonising role that it ostensibly appears to. Section I discusses the underlying motivations for harmonisation, presenting three views of regulation based on the likely effects of 'globalisation' and noting most views support global harmonisation. Section II will discuss specifically the UN Corruption Convention and compare the Convention (which aims at global harmonising of certain practices against corruption) against its ideals and an optimal regulation. Section III will discuss the influence of regulatory 'clubs' (such as the OECD or OAS Corruption Conventions) and show how regional harmonisation may be superior to global harmonisation in terms of reaching an ideal and optimum. Section III will address how global harmonisation may be deleterious to national interests and will discuss how such global harmonisation may be 'domesticated' in the nations' laws and moeurs. Because business practices depend on a wide range of influences in the national business system, attempts at harmonisation are at best 'ambivalent'.

Drafting Implementing Regulations for International Anti-Corruption Conventions

How can executive agencies in developing countries implement international conventions against corruption? This paper looks at the legal issues presented by the Council of Europe, United Nations and OECD conventions against corruption; as well as the choices which executive agencies (such as the tax police, customs and border guard) in developing countries have in helping to implement these conventions. This paper reviews the potential obligations which these Conventions impose on executive agencies and the legal principles which should be enshired in executive regulation which translates these conventions into practice. This paper provides a simple legal/administrative test for corruption as well as tests for complicity, respondeat superiour, and tests which help establish jurisdiction between departments and between countries (in international corruption cases). The paper also discusses mechanisms for financing anti-corruption work, the conduct of tests or probes of civil servant bribe-taking behaviour, and the optimal fine to apply to businesses engaging in corruption as determined under a civil law standard

How has the continuation of ‘soft’ budget constraints affected the performance of state‐owned enterprises and is the alternative of privatisation feasible?

This paper will argue that the continued existence of state‐owned enterprises (SOE) soft budget constraints, while adversely affecting SOE performance, reflects wider problems in the regulation of Chinese industry. As such, simple recourse to privatisation will not address the deep structural factors, such as over‐politicisation and under‐regulation of the private sector, which affect SOE performance. Section I of the paper will discuss the “direct” effects of soft budget constraints on SOE performance in China. Section II will address the “indirect effects” of soft budget constraints through their effects on the competitive environment vis‐a‐vis private sector firms. Section III will address the issue of privatisation and discuss the broader factors which affect both the extension of soft budget constraints and low SOE performance. Kaip „minkštojo“ biudžeto trukdžiai daro įtaką valstybinių įmonių veiklos rezultatams? Ar veiksnios privatizacijos alternatyvos? Santrauka Straipsnyje autorius vertina vieną iš didžiausių ekonomikos transformacijas patiriančių šalių pasaulyje – Kiniją. Pagrindinė straipsnio užduotis – įvertinti, ar iki šiol propaguojama Kinijos valstybinių įmonių „minkštųjų“ biudžetų politika nedaro neigiamo poveikio jų veiklos rezultatams, kartu atskleidžiant platesnį Kinijos pramonės reguliavimo diapazoną. Privatizacijos bumas negali išvesti Kinijos ekonomikos iš gilių struktūrinių gniaužtų, tokių kaip perdėtas ūkio politizavimas, privataus sektoriaus nereguliavimas, kurie daro aiškią įtaką valstybinių įmonių veiklos rezultatams. Todėl 1-oje straipsnio dalyje bus diskutuojama apie „tiesioginius“ „minkštųjų“ biudžetų padarinius Kinijos valstybinių įmonių valdymui. 2-oje straipsnio dalyje bus dėstoma apie „tiesioginius“ „minkštųjų“ biudžetų padarinius per konkurencingumo aplinkos prizmę, supriešinant valstybines įmones su privačiomis. 3-ioje straipsnio dalyje keliamas privatizacijos klausimas, diskutuojama dėl kitų veiksnių, kurie lemia tiek „minkštųjų“ biudžetų apribojimus, tiek žemus valstybinių įmonių veiklos rezultatus. First Published Online: 21 Oct 2010 Reikšminiai žodžiai: „minkštasis“ biudžetas, valstybinės įmonės, miesto ir kaimo vietovių įmonės, privatizacija, Kinija

How Should Public Procurement Law Deal With FinTech?

FinTech -- along with the blockchain, other distributed ledger, smart contract, and tokenization usually assumed to accompany it -- could change the way governments procure goods and services. Procurement authorities and procurement law can play a vital role in the development of FinTech. They can help build the FinTech platforms and ecosystems that help them engage in public procurement. They should not try to procure such FinTech outright. At the national level, regulators should not just leave FinTech rulemaking up to financial regulators. Contracting authorities should not just develop or use their own selected FinTech applications willy-nilly. They should contribute to overall changes in procurement law - which extend far beyond simple supervisory or regulatory technologies (RegTech/SupTech). Governments should get serious about the Agreement on Government Procurement and similar treaties - by creating a new authority to help develop the law needed to put FinTech-enabled procurement platforms in place. China’s own world-leading FinTech and cross-border public procurements do not always contribute to a global level playing field. Any FinTech applications facilitating public procurement should thus encourage compliance with the procurement law legal principles the international community has developed over decades

When EU Law meets Arab Law: Assessment of Anti-Corruption Law in Morocco and Some Proposed Amendments

This article reviews the present state of the adoption of anti-corruption legal provisions usually adopted in EU (or candidate) countries in Morocco. Morocco lags behind many countries in its adoption of anti-corruption legislation and the recently established Central Agency of the Prevention of Corruption is unlikely to succeed in speeding up the adoption of these measures. English language translations of a number of Moroccan anti-corruption legal instruments are presented and amendments to these legal instruments are recommended (based on international best practice) in order to increase the likely effectiveness of Moroccan law enforcement institutions in fighting corruption.

The Design and Implementation of Ethics-Related Administrative Law in Eastern Europe

How can senior policymakers use data in the design of ethics (anti-corruption) related legislation and regulations? In this paper, we describe how to draft subsidiary legislation (mainly executive agency regulations) based on explicit or implied competencies given by national legislation. We then discuss how to conduct the organisational, legal, economic and audit analysis needed to allocate ethics-related rights and obligations across-government and within the Agency. We illustrate with an example from Romania and use the tools we have presented to make recommendations for Hungary. We describe the roles that the human resource managers and internal auditors play in implementing the provisions of Agency-level ethics-related regulations. We conclude by encouraging policy makers to make greater use of ethics-related regulations

The Middle Eastern Wealth Management Industry: Boon or Bust?

The wealth management industry in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) represents a roughly $800 billion opportunity. Yet, tapping this opportunity will require new strategies by the wirehouses looking to penetrate into this market. In this paper, we argue that Middle-Eastern policymakers and bankers will need to develop an indigenous wealth management industry which keeps the super-wealthy’s investments at home. Developing a local national wealth management industry requires letting in foreign competition, changing banking and securities laws, and growing local companies whose share are worth buying. We show why Turkey has succeeded in growing a nationally and internationally competitive wealth management industry – whereas Saudi Arabia’s remains less than ideal. We also describe how policymakers can help brings the billions abroad home by making business easier, reforming banking and securities law, and forcing local banks to become more efficient. We also describe how foreign wealth management firms can increase their assets under management in the region. These multi-trillion dollar mammoths should use their negotiating power to open MENA markets and grow local multi-millionaires

Compliance Audit of Anti-Corruption Regulations: A Case Study from Carpatistan Customs

The principles and findings from internal government audits (aimed at generating recommendations to improve compliance with anti-corruption regulations) can greatly contribute to the wider anti-corruption literature. Internal audit techniques can overcome the weaknesses of the four predominant approaches to evaluating anti-corruption regulatory performance – the systems design approach, the ad-hoc controls studies approach, the descriptive legal analysis approach and the prescriptive manuals and handbooks approach. This paper discusses a compliance audit of anti-corruption regulations in an anti-corruption audit conducted in 2009. The audit findings and recommendations illustrate the ways that models and previous research in the social sciences can be used in the internal audit methodology in order to generate recommendations which provide risk-adjusted, positive net benefits for the government agency