Docking mechanism for spacecraft

A system is presented for docking a space vehicle to a space station where a connecting tunnel for in-flight transfer of personnel is required. Cooperable coupling mechanisms include docking rings on the space vehicle and space station. The space station is provided with a tunnel structure, a retraction mechanism, and a docking ring. The vehicle coupling mechanism is designed to capture the station coupling mechanism, arrest relative spacecraft motions while limiting loads to acceptable levels, and then realign the spacecraft for final docking and tunnel interconnection. The docking ring of the space vehicle coupling mechanism is supported by linear attentuator actuator devices, each of which is controlled by a control system which receives loading information signals and attenuator stroke information signals from each device and supplies output signals for controlling its linear actuation to attenuate impact loading or to realign the spacecraft for final docking and tunnel interconnection. The retraction mechanism is used to draw the spacecraft together after initial contact and coupling. Tunnel trunnions, cooperative with the latches on the space vehicle constitute the primary structural tie between the spacecraft in final docked configuration

Cloud-Aerosol LIDAR and Infrared Pathfinder Satellite Observation (CALIPSO) Spacecraft: Independent Technical Assessment

CALIPSO is a joint science mission between the CNES, LaRC and GSFC. It was selected as an Earth System Science Pathfinder satellite mission in December 1998 to address the role of clouds and aerosols in the Earth's radiation budget. The spacecraft includes a NASA light detecting and ranging (LIDAR) instrument, a NASA wide-field camera and a CNES imaging infrared radiometer. The scope of this effort was a review of the Proteus propulsion bus design and an assessment of the potential for personnel exposure to hydrazine propellant

Space Shuttle Program: Automatic rendezvous, proximity operations, and capture (category 3)

The NASA Johnson Space Center is actively pursuing the development and demonstration of capabilities for automatic rendezvous, proximity operations, and capture (AR&C) using the Space Shuttle as the active vehicle. This activity combines the technologies, expertise, tools, and facilities of the JSC Tracking and Communications Division (EE), Navigation, Control and Aeronautics Division (EG), Automation and Robotics Division (ER), and Structures and Mechanics Division (ES) of the Engineering Directorate and the Flight Design and Dynamics Division (DM) of the Mission Operations Directorate. Potential benefits of AR&C include more efficient and repeatable rendezvous, proximity operations, and capture operations; reduced impacts on the target vehicles (e.g., Orbiter RCS plume loads); reduced flight crew work loads; reduced ground support requirements; and reduced operational constraints. This paper documents the current JSC capabilities/tools/facilities for AR&C and describes a proposed plan for a progression of ground demonstrations and flight tests and demonstrations of AR&C capabilities. This plan involves the maturing of existing technologies in tracking and communications; guidance, navigation and control; mechanisms; manipulators; and systems management and integrating them into several evolutionary demonstration stages

Orbiter escape pole

A Shuttle type of aircraft (10) with an escape hatch (12) has an arcuately shaped pole housing (16) attachable to an interior wall and ceiling with its open end adjacent to the escape hatch. The pole housing 16 contains a telescopically arranged and arcuately shaped primary pole member (22) and extension pole member (23) which are guided by roller assemblies (30,35). The extension pole member (23) is slidable and extendable relative to the primary pole member (22). For actuation, a spring actuated system includes a spring (52) in the pole housing. A locking member (90) engages both pole members (22,23) through notch portions (85,86) in the pole members. The locking member selectively releases the extension pole member (23) and the primary pole member (22). An internal one-way clutch or anti-return mechanism prevents retraction of the extension pole member from an extended position. Shock absorbers (54)(150,152) are for absoring the energy of the springs. A manual backup deployment system is provided which includes a canted ring (104) biased by a spring member (108). A lever member (100) with a slot and pin connection (102) permits the mechanical manipulation of the canted ring to move the primary pole member. The ring (104) also prevents retraction of the main pole. The crew escape mechanism includes a magazine (60) and a number of lanyards (62), each lanyard being mounted by a roller loop (68) over the primary pole member (22). The strap on the roller loop has stitching for controlled release, a protection sheath (74) to prevent tangling and a hook member (69) for attachment to a crew harness

Shuttle Ground Support Equipment (GSE) T-0 Umbilical to Space Shuttle Program (SSP) Flight Elements Consultation

The NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) was tasked with assessing the validity of an alternate opinion that surfaced during the investigation of recurrent failures at the Space Shuttle T-0 umbilical interface. The most visible problem occurred during the Space Transportation System (STS)-112 launch when pyrotechnics used to separate Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) Hold-Down Post (HDP) frangible nuts failed to fire. Subsequent investigations recommended several improvements to the Ground Support Equipment (GSE) and processing changes were implemented, including replacement of ground-half cables and connectors between flights, along with wiring modifications to make critical circuits quad-redundant across the interface. The alternate opinions maintained that insufficient data existed to exonerate the design, that additional data needed to be gathered under launch conditions, and that the interface should be further modified to ensure additional margin existed to preclude failure. The results of the assessment are contained in this report

Independent Review Support for Phoenix Mars Mission Robotic Arm Brush Motor Failure

The Phoenix Project requested the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) perform an independent peer review of the Robotic Arm (RA) Direct Current (DC) motor brush anomalies that originated during the Mars Exploration Rover (MER) Project and recurred during the Phoenix Project. The request was to evaluate the Phoenix Project investigation efforts and provide an independent risk assessment. This includes a recommendation for additional work and assessment of the flight worthiness of the RA DC motors. Based on the investigation and findings contained within this report, the IRT concurs with the risk assessment Failure Cause / Corrective Action (FC/CA) by the project, "Failure Effect Rating "3"; Major Degradation or Total Loss of Function, Failure Cause/Corrective Action Rating Currently "4"; Unknown Cause, Uncertainty in Corrective Action.