A strange conversation

Jonathan Chimakonam’s advocacy of conversational thinking has taken African philosophy by storm. It is not an exaggeration to say that no one working in African philosophy, today, can say they are unaware of the so-called Conversational Society of Philosophy (CSP). Equally, I doubt if anyone working in the field could ever say they are not aware of the name Johnathan Chimakonam. His courageous effort to advance a particular form of thinking in the African philosophical tradition is a welcome innovation. While I admire his efforts, I remain unconvinced by some of his claims. Two important claims will be the target of my discussion. The first is his insistence on using very strange language in the pursuit of a conversation. The second is his insistence that his methodology is different from other forms of philosophizing

The concept of person in African political philosophy : an analytical and evaluative study.

Thesis (Ph.D.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermariztburg, 2008.The communitarian conception of person is the dominant view of personhood in African philosophy. This view centrally holds that personhood is something that is attained in direct proportion to one's moral worth and one's relations with her surrounding community. This view understands personhood as something that is acquired as one's moral responsibility grows. Essentially personhood is constituted by the community and expressed in relations that one has with her community. Thus the individual and the community are both tied in the same fate. The individual is seen as constituted by the community and as one with the community. Whatever happens to her happens to the whole community. Some leaders of newly independent Africa used this communitarian VIew of personhood to argue for a socialist order. Such an order would have been faithful to the traditional communitarian conception of person and the soc,i al as well as the economic order that proceeds from that conception. In order to develop an authentically African socialist programme these leaders strived to show that the communitarian conception of personhood naturally leads to African socialism. They took African socialism to be a panacea to economic and social ills that had been brought on by colonialism. This thesis seeks to interrogate both the communitarian conception of personhood and the resultant political ideology of African socialism. It is argued that the major driving factor behind the development of the communitarian view and African socialism is an inordinate desire to find and present the African difference. The problem started with Placide Tempels' futile search for an African ontology and has been perpetuated by all communitarians and African socialists. Thus this project is conceived as a philosophical critique of African communitarianism and the resultant socialism

Defending Rawls on the self: a response to the communitarian critique.

Thesis (M.A.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 2005.This thesis aims at defending John Rawls from the communitarian critique by Michael Sandel and Alasdair Maclntyre. The main focus of the thesis is to investigate how cogent their criticism of Rawls's conception of the person is. In chapter one I summarise Rawls's theory of justice. I look at the two principles of justice and what they entail. These principles determine the rights of the citizens as well as how material goods in society should be distributed. He formulates what he calls 'justice as fairness'. Deeply embedded in establishing the notion of justice as fairness are two inseparable ideas. These are the idea of the original position and the idea of the veil of ignorance. The original position presents a thought experiment in which individuals are brought together to come up with an ideal society that they would want to live in. The ideas they have to discuss ultimately include individual rights and freedoms as well as how material goods are to be shared in that society. The individuals, however, are deprived of certain crucial information about how they would appear in the resulting society. This is what Rawls calls the veil of ignorance. The individuals do not know who or what they are going to be in their society. In other words, they do not know if they are going to be male or female, rich or poor, rulers or the oppressed or what their personality traits/character type or talents and disabilities will be. In chapter two I will look at the communitarian objection to Rawls's project. As a crucial part of his characterisation of the veil of ignorance and the original position he claims that these individuals do not know of their own conception of the good. This means that they are not aware of what they will choose as worthwhile and what they will consider to be a wasted life. Thus, these individuals, in considering principles that must govern them, that is principles of justice, will not discriminate between those who pursue a life of enlightenment and those who pursue a life of drugs and heavy parties. This has caused problems with communitarians who insist that one cannot be indifferent to what she considers to be worthwhile. They argue that an individual will defend what she considers to be worthwhile in the face of what she considers to be base, she will discriminate what is worthwhile from what is not worthwhile. Any interpretation that does not conform to this understanding is a distorted understanding of the nature of individuals. The work of communitarians is very broad. My main concentration is going to be on the work of Michael J. Sandel and Alasdair Mclntyre in so far as they argue that Rawls's project rests on a fundamentally mistaken view of the self. I have chosen Sandel and Mclntyre because their work is similar though expressed differently. They both argue that Rawls views the individual as preceding the existence of her society. They both claim that Rawls is committed to a certain metaphysical view of the self that leaves out the essence of community and values in the make up of individuals. In chapter three I argue that the objections by both Maclntyre and Sandel fail to apply to Rawls's project. I argue that their objections have strayed from metaphysics of the person. Sandel and Maclntyre claim that Rawls is committed to a certain metaphysical view of the self. Sandel calls it an "antecedently individuated self and Maclntyre calls it an "unencumbered emotivist self. Using the example of Derek Parfit and Bernard Williams I conclude that Sandel and Maclntyre are not discussing metaphysics of the person but have brought other issues that are at odds with our traditional understanding of the metaphysics of the self. In chapter four I conclude by considering the differences between my response to the communitarian critique and Rawls's response. Rawls explicitly denies that his theory is committed to any view of the person. He argues that justice as fairness is intended as a political conception of justice. He argues that justice as fairness is a moral conception that is meant for a specific subject. The subject he has in mind refers to the economic social and political institutions that make up society. Rawls chooses to explain what his theory entails and its limitations regarding metaphysics. I show how my response differs from Rawls's and argue that my response has got certain attractions over Rawls's own response. I end by looking at possible ways of furthering the debate

An Outline of the Basis of a New Afro-Communitarian Political Theory of Democracy

My aim in this paper is to offer an explanation of the orientation I have adopted in my work on African political theory. This explanation is necessitated by some puzzlement that has arisen as a result of the commitment I have sought to pursue. The most prominent complaint has been that I must own up and claim my liberal colours (OYOWE 2015, 514). I have been asked to refrain from making communitarian thought the basis of my political thinking as my commitment to communitarianism is not as thoroughgoing as it should (OYOWE 2015, 514). It is important that I explain this accusation away

The politics of limited communitarianism

The debate on the communitarian notion of personhood as initiated by Gyekye, in response to Menkiti, is both exhaustive and exhausted. Its exhaustiveness and exhaustion lies in the fact that, in all probability whatever can be said around it has been said, with truly nothing new likely ever being added. What is possibly left, is the potential for further additions to be more strident in their picking of sides or repeating that Gyekye and Menkiti are not sufficiently different or insisting on the authenticity of either approach to African thought. What is needed is to transcend the constraints of this debate by opening up new vistas of interpreting communitarian thought in personhood. Whatever merit there is in showing whether radical or moderate communitarianism is real, or in showing which of these two is better than the other, this discussion can be furthered by looking at implications of communitarianism to other facets of philosophy. The most plausible avenue that could be implicated in communitarian considerations is the sphere of politics. Theorising about the communitarian notion of persons, I suggest, is partly to theorise about the political. If the commitments on which the doctrine of communitarianism is founded, are used to capture the sort of relations that exist between individuals, and between individuals and the community, then this relationship has an effect on how we conceive of the political theory we think appropriate. It is suggested here that contemplating on the communitarian polity will show the shortcomings of communitarianism as conceived by Gyekye and Menkiti.Keywords: Menkiti, Gyekye, Communitarianism, Limited Communitarianism, Personhood, Classical Communitarianis

Philosophers’ debt to their students : the South African case

Philosophy teachers owe their students a little more than mere formal instruction of topics popular in philosophy. What they owe their students is largely influenced by philosophy’s claims to be a discipline that is principally dedicated to the study and fostering of wisdom. Therefore, there is an obligation to be wise on the part of philosophy teachers so that they can deliver that wisdom. A big part of this would involve a sort of transformation in knowledge and character that the teachers themselves must go through as a result of engaging in philosophy. Such transformation will not only show in ways that philosophers live their private lives, as wise people, but will certainly show in the topics they teach their students and how they help their students to wisely respond to their environment through an enlightened, relevant and empowering curriculum. If philosophers fail at this task, they will only dispatch fragmented pieces of information about philosophical topics and method that are of no use to their students. If philosophers are unable to see the shortcomings of this approach, then they can just as well count themselves unfit to be called (wise) teachers but technical philosophers. The fees must fall and Rhodes must fall movement coupled with demands for decolonisation, caught philosophers underprepared for such demands from students. Hence, in this article, I seek to examine the legitimate demands for transformation of the curriculum and how philosophical instruction in the country contributed to this protest, which eventually was caricatured in some sections as unreasonable. I argue that beyond what appears as unreasonable demands by students, there is an obligation by philosophy teachers to be responsible and responsive to the students’ context in what they teach

Consensus as Democracy in Africa

Some philosophers on the African continent and beyond are convinced that consensus, as a polity, represents the best chance for Africa to fully democratise. In Consensus as Democracy in Africa, Bernard Matolino challenges the basic assumptions built into consensus as a social and political theory. Central to his challenge to the claimed viability of consensus as a democratic system are three major questions: Is consensus genuinely superior to its majoritarian counterpart? Is consensus itself truly a democratic system? Is consensus sufficiently different from the one-party system? In taking up these issues and others closely associated with them, Matolino shows that consensus as a system of democracy encounters several challenges that make its viability highly doubtful. Matolino then attempts a combination of an understanding of an authentic mode of democracy with African reality to work out what a more desirable polity would be for the continent

The end of ubuntu

Since the advent of democracy in South Africa, there has been a concerted effort at reviving the notion of ubuntu. Variously conceived, it is seen as the authentic African ethical concept, a way of life, an authentic mode of being African, an individual ideal, the appropriate public spirit, a definition of life itself and the preferred manner of conducting public and private business. Thus, among other public displays of the spirit of ubuntu, the government of the day has deliberately chosen its service delivery mantra and its public slogan as Batho Pele (people first) to animate, or perhaps pay obeisance to, ubuntu. In this paper we seek to advance arguments that question such a public, widespread, and concerted ‘ubuntu-isation’ of the intellectual, business, public and private lives. Our project follows two main lines of reasoning. (1) We seek to show that the aggressive promotion of ubuntu in post-apartheid South Africa is an elitist project so conceived by the new black elite. It is conceived both as a restorative move that is aimed at securing the dignity of the black masses as well as an attempt at forging a so-called black identity. This line of reasoning will rely on similar historical cases on the continent that sought to aggressively promote an African mode of being, which coincided with both the end of colonialism and the rise of black elitism. We note that such attempts always ended in very public social and political failure. (2) We seek to question the desirability of ubuntu as a mark/guide of the spirit of the nation. Here our critique shall be concentrated on the disjunct that exists between the metaphysical conditions necessary for the attainment of ubuntu and the stark ontological and ethical crisis facing the new elite and ‘our people’.South African Journal of Philosophy 2013, 32(2): 197–20

Are we finished with the ethnophilosophy debate? A multi-perspective conversation

In line with the tradition of the Conversational School of Philosophy, this essay provides a rare and unique space of discourse for the authors to converse about the place of the ‘ethno’ in African philosophy. This conversation is a revisit, a renewal of the key positions that have coloured the ethnophilosophy debate by the conversers who themselves are notable contributors to arguments for and against the importance of ethnophilosophy in the unfolding of African philosophy particularly in the last decade or so. There are four key positions that have been argued for in the pages of this paper: (1) ethnophilosophy is not African philosophy and it is useless and inimical to the growth of African philosophy and should thus be jettisoned – Matolino; (2) ethnophilosophy is the foundation for African philosophy as it provides the raw materials for African philosophical discourse – Ogbonnaya and Agada; (3) ethnophilosophy has some value for African philosophy but it is definitely not the foundation for genuine African philosophy the way criticism and rigours are – Attoe; and (4) ethnophilosophy can be adequately conceived as African philosophy particularly in terms of its etymology as culture or race philosophy, dealing with a philosophical or critical reflections on, and exposition of, immanent principles in African thought – Mangena and Etieyibo. These conversers provide good arguments for the positions they hold, arguments that are of course, open for further interrogation. Two points can be concluded from the ethnophilosophy debate provided in this essay: (1) the disparities in views among conversers it seems, stem ultimately from the understanding of ethnophilosophy that each converser holds, which varies from the notion of a method used at some point in the history of African philosophy, to an etymological understanding as culture philosophy; and (2) the debate about  ethnophilosophy in the spirit of any philosophical tradition remains a perennial one that is yet to be concluded. This essay certainly concretises what is on ground and paves the way for further discussions.Keywords: Ethno, African philosophy, Foundationalist, Universalist, Particularist, The common moral position (CMP), Ethnophilosoph