136 research outputs found
The Role of Physicians in the Production of Hospital Output
The purpose of this paper is to present estimates of production functions for hospitals in which a measure of the level of physician input is utilized. Since no data on the total number of hours worked by non-salaried physicians is available for a large sample of U.S. hospitals, alternative measures of physician input had to be constructed. As these measures are somewhat imperfect, the results I obtain should be considered tentative and preliminary.
Strategy-proofness and Markets
If a market is considered to be a social choice function, then the domain of admissible preferences is restricted and standard social choice theorems do not apply. A substantial body of analysis, however, strongly supports the notion that attractive strategy-proof social choice functions do not exist in market settings. Yetprice theory, which implicityly assumes the strategy-proofness of markets, performs quie well in describing many real markets. This paper resolves this paradox in two steps. First, given that a market is not strategy-proof, it should be modeled as a Bayesian game of incomplete information. Second, a double auction market, which is perhaps the simplest operationalization of supply and demand as a Bayesian game, is approximately strategy-proof even when the number of traders on each side of the market is quite moderate.
Internal versus external growth in industries with scale economies: A computational model of optimal merger policy
We study optimal merger policy in a dynamic model in which the presence of scale
economies implies that firms can reduce costs through either internal investment in build-
ing capital or through mergers. The model, which we solve computationally, allows firms
to invest or propose mergers according to the relative profitability of these strategies. An
antitrust authority is able to block mergers at some cost. We examine the optimal policy
when the antitrust authority can commit to a policy rule and when it cannot commit, and
consider both consumer value and aggregate value as possible objectives of the antitrust
authority. We find that optimal policy can differ substantially from what would be best
considering only welfare in the period the merger is proposed. We also find that the abil-
ity to commit can lead to a significant welfare improvement. In general, antitrust policy
can greatly affect firms` optimal investment behavior, and firms` investment behavior can
in turn greatly affect the antitrust authority`s optimal policy
Lumpy Capacity Investment and Disinvestment Dynamics
Capacity addition and withdrawal decisions are among the most important strategic decisions made by firms in oligopolistic industries. In this paper, we develop and analyze a fully dynamic model of an oligopolistic industry with lumpy capacity and lumpy investment/disinvestment. We use our model to suggest answers to two questions: First, what economic factors facilitate preemption races? Second, what economic factors facilitate capacity coordination? With a series of examples we show that low product differentiation, low investment sunkness, and high depreciation tend to promote preemption races. The same examples also show that low product differentiation and low investment sunkness tend to promote capacity coordination. Although depreciation removes capacity, it might impede capacity coordination. Finally, our examples show that multiple equilibria arise over at least some range of parameter values. The distinct structures of these equilibria suggest that firms’ expectations play a key role in determining whether or not industry dynamics are characterized by preemption races and capacity coordination. Taken together, our results suggest that preemption races and excess capacity in the short run often go hand-in-hand with capacity coordination in the long run
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