3 research outputs found

    Valuing Farm Financial Information

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    Despite the merits of good farm record keeping, little is known about the value farmers place on their farm financial records. This study uses a willingness-to-accept experimental second price auction to elicit such values from farmers. Results indicate farm records are extremely valuable and that some diversity in values is explained by the characteristics of the records and farmers. We find that experimental auctions can be used to elicit values for extremely high-valued goods, and we demonstrate how they can be used to value a complex good comprised of many sub-components.Farm Management,

    The Current State and Value of Farm Record Keeping

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    Despite the purported merits of good farm record keeping, and heavy investments made by some state Extension programs, little is known about the current state of farm financial records and the value farmers place on those records. Through the use of a survey, this study provides an overview of the current state of Midwestern farm financial records. This study also used a second price auction to determine the values farmers place on their financial records by eliciting the minimum amount farmers were willing to accept to give up their records. Survey results indicate that most farmers have a basic understanding of farm recordkeeping but do not practice more advanced accounting and financial techniques. The auction results indicate financial records are extremely valuable but exhibit wide diversity in valuations among farmers

    Valuing Farm Financial Information

    No full text
    Despite the merits of good farm record keeping, little is known about the value farmers place on their farm financial records. This study uses a willingness-to-accept experimental second price auction to elicit such values from farmers. Results indicate farm records are extremely valuable and that some diversity in values is explained by the characteristics of the records and farmers. We find that experimental auctions can be used to elicit values for extremely high-valued goods, and we demonstrate how they can be used to value a complex good comprised of many sub-components
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