The Effect of Combination Companies on Electricity Rate Structures in the United States

In general, public policy in the United States has been directed to maintaining competition. The belief has been that competitive free enterprise economy is the best means toward a higher standard of living and the preservation of personal freedom. In many industries, however, competition is imperfect. The electric power and natural gas industries are such activities

Development of Agricultural Cooperatives in Thailand

The seed of cooperatives was first brought to Thailand by Sir Bernard Hunter, the British banker, in 1914. Because of his suggestion , the first cooperative society was established in Phitsanulok Province in the northern part of Thailand, on February 26, 1916, along the lines of the Raiffeisen model, or what is known as the village credit cooperative. The government at that time was still an absolute monarchy under the reign of King Rama VI. It desired, however, to relieve farmers from severe indebtedness and to enable them to expand their rice production, which was at that time becoming more and more important in earning foreign exchange. During the initial stages of cooperative development, the government directly provided cooperatives with funds to be loaned to members

Trend Inflation and the Nature of Structural Breaks in the New Keynesian Phillips Curve

In this paper, we investigate the nature of structural breaks in inflation by estimating a version of the New Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC) in the presence of a unit root in inflation. We show that, with a unit root in inflation, the NKPC implies an unobserved components model that consists of three components: a stochastic trend component, a component that depends upon current and future forecasts of real economic activity, and a stationary component which is potentially serially correlated (or a component of inflation that is not explained by the conventional forward-looking NKPC). Our empirical results suggest that, with an increase in trend inflation during the Great Inflation period, the response of inflation to real economic activity decreases and the persistence of the inflation gap increases due to an increase in the persistence of the unobserved stationary component. These results are in line with the predictions of Cogley and Sbordone (2008), who show that the coefficients of the NKPC are functions of time-varying trend inflation

Trend Inflation and the Nature of Structural Breaks in the New Keynesian Phillips Curve

In this paper, we investigate the nature of structural breaks in inflation by estimating a version of the New Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC) in the presence of a unit root in inflation. We show that, with a unit root in inflation, the NKPC implies an unobserved components model that consists of three components: a stochastic trend component, a component that depends upon current and future forecasts of real economic activity, and a stationary component which is potentially serially correlated (or a component of inflation that is not explained by the conventional forward-looking NKPC). Our empirical results suggest that, with an increase in trend inflation during the Great Inflation period, the response of inflation to real economic activity decreases and the persistence of the inflation gap increases due to an increase in the persistence of the unobserved stationary component. These results are in line with the predictions of Cogley and Sbordone (2008), who show that the coefficients of the NKPC are functions of time-varying trend inflation

Choice of rice production technique in Thailand, 1890-1940

Typescript.Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Hawaii at Manoa, 1989.Includes bibliographical references (leaves [182]-189).Microfiche.xv, 189 leaves, bound ill. 29 cmThis study analyzes the choice of rice production technique in Thailand during 1890-1940. It focuses on two techniques: transplanting and broadcasting. Although transplanting has been the traditional rice growing method in Thailand at least since the seventeenth century, most cultivators in the newly developed areas of the commercialized Central Plain during the period adopted broadcasting. The two conventional explanations for choice of rice production technique--Iocal water conditions and factor prices--cannot consistently explain this choice. The water conditions necessary for transplanting rice did exist in the area, and factor prices during the period moved in favor of transplanting. Because the two techniques differ both in terms of variable input per unit of land and fixed capital input, a choice of technique model is formulated using the theory of production and the theory of investment to explain the choice of broadcasting. The model is a neoclassical production relation modified to incorporate fixed capital input and the firm's planning horizon. In this regard, the model allows a simultaneous analysis of the firm's short-run production decision and long-run capital investment. Empirical evidence regarding rice farming during the period is consistent with theoretical constructs. The main findings reveal that the choice of broadcasting during the period is a rational decision. The outcome was caused by uncertainty in land ownership and prices, which were consequences of increased external demand for rice and economic changes in Thailand at the time. Under uncertainty in land ownership, a short planning horizon and consequently a technique such as broadcasting which requires less fixed capital input minimizes expected losses. Under price uncertainty, broadcasting provides greater production flexibility and, consequently, higher profits for large landholding firms. This study contributes to conventional knowledge regarding factors affecting choice of rice production technique and, thus, improves the understanding of a firm's choice of technique. Although the model is simple and empirically oriented, it is adequate to analyze a firm's decision making process. The findings also illuminate relationships between external trade, internal institutions, and agricultural development. While the empirical results presented are specific to Thailand, the process employed here can be applied elsewhere

Transaction costs and choice of petroleum contract

Typescript.Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Hawaii at Manoa, 1989.Includes bibliographical references (leaves [127]-130).Microfiche.ix, 130 leaves, bound ill. 29 cmPetroleum contracts are very complicated in their share structure. This makes it difficult to generalize explanations on choice of petroleum contract. Current contracts are classified into four major types: concession, production-sharing, joint-venture, and service contracts. Two existing explanations on choice of contract--fisical regime and risk sharing--explain in terms of physical risk. They are inadequate for the purpose because the industry is also inherent with behavioral risk as shown by the existence of various mitigating terms in every type of contract. Behavioral risk here refers to the opportunity of the contracting parties to deviate from the original promise. This study proposes that a contract is selected not only to moderate physical risk but also to minimize ex-post opportunism. The theories of agency and self-enforcing contract are used in constructing a contractual choice model. It shows that types of contracts are distinguished by incentive payment terms, which are designed to minimize opportunism. When the country has little information on petroleum reserve, a high incentive payment contract will be selected, and vice versa. Also, if the circumstance changes ex post, new terms or a new type of contract are adopted to maximize the contracting parties' mutual benefits. The available evidence supports this hypothesis. The high incentive contract--concession contract--is always granted in newly oil exploration countries. Other three lower incentive contracts are drawn in countries which have high commercial quantity of petroleum reserve. A one-way analysis of variance test shows that means of oil-field size among the three groups of countries that adopted different types of contracts at a particular time differ significantly at the level of 90%. The Less Significant Difference (LSD) test confirms that means for the group of countries employing the production-sharing or the joint-venture differs significantly from the group of countries that employs the service contract. When oil prices change, new terms or a new type of contract are adopted without interventions from the third party. In conclusion, empirical evidence is consistence with the model for choice of petroleum contract developed in this study. The model can be more vigorously tested if additional data and information are available