Ordinally Bayesian Incentive Compatible Stable Matching

Nous étudions des questions d'incitation dans le cadre des problèmes de marriage, en remplassant la notion de non-manipulabilité par celle de Compatibilité Incitative Bayésienne Ordinale (OBIC). Cette condition exige que dire la vérité maximise l'utilité espérée calculée par rapport à la loi a priori de chaque agent et sous l'hypothèse que les autres agents disent la vérité. Nous montrons que, sans restriction sur les préférences, il n'existe aucune procédure stable et OBIC. On suppose ensuite que les préférences sont telles que rester célibataire est la pire option pour chaque agent. Dans ce cas, si les probabilités a priori sont uniformes, les mariages générés par les algorithmes d'acceptation différée sont OBIC. Cependant, pour des lois a priori génériques, il n'existe pas de procédures stables et OBIC, même pour des préférences restreintes.Marriage stable;Incitation;Manipulabilité

Ordinally Bayesian Incentive Compatible Stable Matchings

We study incentive issues related to two-sided one-to-one stable matching problem after weakening the notion of strategy-proofness to Ordinal Bayesian Incentive Compatibility (OBIC). Under OBIC, truthtelling is required to maximize the expected utility of every agent, expected utility being computed with respect to the agent’s prior beliefs and under the assumption that everybody else is also telling the truth. We show that when preferences are unrestricted there exists no matching procedure that is both stable and OBIC. Next preferences are restricted to the case where remaining single is the worst alternative for every agent. We show that in this case, if agents have uniform priors then the stable matchings generated by “deferred acceptance algorithms” are OBIC. However, for generic priors there are no matching procedures that are both stable and OBIC even with restricted preferences.stable matching, incentives, strategy-proofness

A psychologically-based model of voter turnout

We analyze a psychologically-based model of voter turnout. Potential voters experience regret if they fail to vote, which is the motivation for participation in voting. Regret from abstention is inversely related to the margin of victory. Voters on the winner's side experience less regret than those on the loser's side. We show that the unique equilibrium involves positive voter turnout. We show that the losing side has higher turnout. In addition, voter turnout is positively related to importance of the election and the competitiveness of the election. We also consider scenarios in which voters are uncertain about the composition of the electorate's political preferences and show similar phenomena emerge.voter turnout, regret, economics and psychology

A psychologically-based model of voter turnout

We analyze a psychologically-based model of voter turnout. Potential voters experience regret if they fail to vote, which is the motivation for participation in voting. Regret from abstention is inversely related to the margin of victory. Voters on the winner's side experience less regret than those on the loser's side. We show that the unique equilibrium involves positive voter turnout. We show that the losing side has higher turnout. In addition, voter turnout is positively related to importance of the election and the competitiveness of the election. We also consider scenarios in which voters are uncertain about the composition of the electorate's political preferences and show similar phenomena emerge.voter turnout, regret, economics and psychology

Ordinally Bayesian Incentive Compatible Stable Matching

We study incentive issues related to the two-sided one-to-one stable matching problem after weakening the notion of strategy-proofness to Ordinal Bayesian Incentive Compatibility (OBIC). Under OBIC, truthtelling is required to maximize expected utility of every agent, expected utility being computed with respect to the agent's prior and under the assumption that everybody else is also telling the truth. We show that when preferences are unrestricted there exists no matching procedure that is both stable and OBIC. Next preferences are restricted to the case where remaining single is the worst alternative for every agent. We show that in this case, if agents have uniform priors the stable matching generated by the "deferred acceptance algorithms" are OBIC. However, for generic priors there are no procedures that are both stable and OBIC even with restricted preferences.Nous étudions des questions d'incitation dans le cadre des problèmes de marriage, en remplassant la notion de non-manipulabilité par celle de Compatibilité Incitative Bayésienne Ordinale (OBIC). Cette condition exige que dire la vérité maximise l'utilité espérée calculée par rapport à la loi a priori de chaque agent et sous l'hypothèse que les autres agents disent la vérité. Nous montrons que, sans restriction sur les préférences, il n'existe aucune procédure stable et OBIC. On suppose ensuite que les préférences sont telles que rester célibataire est la pire option pour chaque agent. Dans ce cas, si les probabilités a priori sont uniformes, les mariages générés par les algorithmes d'acceptation différée sont OBIC. Cependant, pour des lois a priori génériques, il n'existe pas de procédures stables et OBIC, même pour des préférences restreintes

Ordinally Bayesian incentive-compatible voting schemes

We study strategic voting after weakening the notion of strategy-proofness to Ordinal Bayesian Incentive Compatibility (OBIC). Under OBIC, truthelling is required to maximize the expected utility being computed with respect to the voter's prior beliefs and under the assumption that everybody else is also telling the truth. We show that for a special type of priors i.e., the uniform priors there exists a large class of social choice functions that are OBIC. However, for priors which are generic in the set of independent beliefs a social choice function is OBIC only if it is dictatorial. This result underlines the robustness of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem.

How Optimism Leads to Price Discovery and Efficiency in a Dynamic Matching Market

Abstract We study a market search equilibrium with aggregate uncertainty, private information and heterogeneus beiefs. Traders initially start out optimistic and then update their beliefs based on their matching experience in the market, using the Bayes rule. It is shown that all separating equilibria converge to perfect competition in the limit as the time between matches tends to 0. We also establish existence of a separating equilibrium.Markets with search frictions, aggregate uncertainty, heterogeneous beliefs, optimism, bargaining, foundations of Walrasian equilibrium

How Optimism Leads to Price Discovery and Efficiency in a Dynamic Matching Market

We study a market search equilibrium with aggregate uncertainty, private information and heterogeneus beiefs. Traders initially start out optimistic and then update their beliefs based on their matching experience in the market, using the Bayes rule. It is shown that all separating equilibria converge to perfect competition in the limit as the time between matches tends to 0. We also establish existence of a separating equilibrium.Markets with search frictions, aggregate uncertainty, heterogeneous beliefs, optimism, bargaining, foundations of Walrasian equilibrium

A psychologically-based model of voter turnout

We analyze a psychologically-based model of voter turnout. Potential voters experience regret if they fail to vote, which is the motivation for participation in voting. Regret from abstention is inversely related to the margin of victory. Voters on the winner's side experience less regret than those on the loser's side. We show that the unique equilibrium involves positive voter turnout. We show that the losing side has higher turnout. In addition, voter turnout is positively related to importance of the election and the competitiveness of the election. We also consider scenarios in which voters are uncertain about the composition of the electorate's political preferences and show similar phenomena emerge

A psychologically-based model of voter turnout

We analyze a psychologically-based model of voter turnout. Potential voters experience regret if they fail to vote, which is the motivation for participation in voting. Regret from abstention is inversely related to the margin of victory. Voters on the winner's side experience less regret than those on the loser's side. We show that the unique equilibrium involves positive voter turnout. We show that the losing side has higher turnout. In addition, voter turnout is positively related to importance of the election and the competitiveness of the election. We also consider scenarios in which voters are uncertain about the composition of the electorate's political preferences and show similar phenomena emerge